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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
March 5, 1976
List 1, Sheet 1
Cert. to CA 5
(Brown, Ainsworth, Morgan)
No. 75-636 CFX
INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
v.

UNITED STATES

~

Federal/Civil

Timely

)e""'(- I~

""'t. \ssu..es \M. No.

-\\es~~e.~·
\

art.. \-&- '0 e.
~J.~sc;e.d.,

75-672 CFX

T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc.
(same)

Vo

~t.~~~ UNITED

+...t\~ )S Cl..

1. SUMMARY: These petitions involve the same basic situation

'ot\teY ~\At(..
1 1 j_
-t't-' a.o ·\T .

STATES

involved in Franks v. Boman Transp. Co., No. 74-728, i.e.

..

allegations of discrimination against minorities in hiring

for over-the-road ("OTR", or "LD" for "line driver") trucking
jobs.

The instant petitions arise out of a "pattern or practice"

suit brought by the government under § 707 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6.

The major questions presented

by the two petitioners are: 1) whether ,the McDonnell Douglas
burden of proof scheme, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802, must be applied in a "pattern or practice"
suit (or, by implication, in class actions generally);

-

-

2) whether the unions are liable for a facially neutral

....._____

seniority system that perpetuates prior discrimination by

-

the employer; and 3) whether, under the system of contract
negotiation used in the trucking industry, the locals are
indispensable parties in a suit claiming liability for the
lock-in effect of the seniority provisions of the local and
area supplements to the national agreement.
2. FACTS: The decision below dealt with two consolidated
suits, the first brought against T.I.M.E.-DC, the International
(IBT~

and a local, alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination

at T.I.M.E.-DC's Nashville terminal, the second brought against
T.I.M.E.-DC and IBT charging a pattern or practice on a systemwide basis.

The T.I.M.E.-DC system operates 51 terminals in

26 states.

T.I.M.E.-DC has signed a total of 124 separate

collective bargaining agreements with 83 individual Teamster
locals at its various terminals.

--------

three basic parts, the National

Each contract consists of
1.ster Freight Agreement, an

Area Supplement, and Local Riders or Addenda.

The National

Master and the Area Supplements are negotiated nationally on
a multi-union, multi-employer basis (the locals give power of attorn ey).
The collective bargaining agreements provided for separate
area and local supplements for each of the four

bargainin~

units--OTR, city drivers ("CD"), garage workers, and clerical

~

,__.,..-

'--"

---.....----

--

workers.

Although nothing in the collective bargaining

agreements prohibits the transfer of an employee from one
unit to another, an employee who transfers maintains his
company seniority only for fringe benefits (such as vacation

.
as a new employee in the transferee unit •
...

rights) and is treated for purposes of bidding for jobs
~,......._.....

and layoffs

.......,_......,.....--...... .-

..... ...-.

.....;;;~~-

The suit, at least in the form it took in the CA,
involved only the rights of incumbent minority employees
(in non-OTR jobs) who had been hired during the period during
which T.I.M.E.-DC was alleged to have been engaged in
discriminatory assignment , and transfer practices (see Petn App.
at 29-30 n.33).
Prior to trial, IBT moved to dismiss on the grounds
~

of failure to join all the locals as indispensable parties.
The DC (Woodward) denied the motion (Petn App. 52-55).
After trial, but prior to the DC's decision, the government

--

a d T.I.M E.-DC entered into a consent decree in partial resolution
of
the suit.
.......______

The decree (approved by the DC) admitted no liability

but provided for a recruitment campaign, set minimum qualification
standards, provided for ratio hiring (subject to availability
of qualified applicants), and provided for certain amounts of
back pay.
The
, l.

a pattern

~C

([)

m
.
.
if so, which employees were "individual

was then left with the issue whether there
-

,,

~racti__se

...._

and,

---------

h~een

----------.,

or class discriminatees suffering the present effects of past

....____

discrimination."

The proof of pattern or practice consisted of

statistical tables showing the ratio of Blacks to Hhites in

each Standard Metropolitan

Statistica~

Area (SMSA) and in

each T.I.M.E.-DC terminal city, compared with the ratio of
Black to White employees at that terminal, and the breakdown
by race within each job classification (see Petn App. 21-22).
There was also testimony detailing specific instances of
discrimination by T.I.M.E.-DC

against minority persons seeki ng

to be hired or transfered into an OTR position (see Petn App. 24).

I!-

_..T.Q,e DC founf f iat there had been a "pattem or practice"

~ ~at

and

the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining

~~

agreements, while neutral on their face, operated to perpetuate

~~~

the effect of the prior discriminatory practices by impeding

f

the free transfer of minority employees to the (more desirable)

,,,~ i;_'

OTR jobs (Petn App. 61).

-

..... _

On the issue of remedies,
the government sought relief
,_
for an "affected class" of somewhat over 300 incumbent employees
who had been hired at T.I.M.E.-DC terminals that maintained
OTR domiciles prior to 1969--the approximate date at which T.I.M.E.-DC
~-:.

~-

...

actively bagan hiring minority group members as OTRs (the
"OTR domicile" requirement reduced the number of terminals affected
from 51 to 20).

As the case stood in the CA, former employees
~,.,

an~ e s~ d

applicants
were not
(Petn App. 29-31 n.33) •
.._...
.........,.._..covered
,.,..
The DC separated the "affected class" into three groups: those
._...

~

as to whom the evidence showed "severe injury because of the
pattern and practice of discrimination" (Group A), those
who "were very possibly the objects of discrimination" (Group
B), and those as to whom there was no evidence tha t they were
harmed individually (Group C).

The DC created a complex system

----

-·-

of hiring preferences for these three groups, and provided
that Group A was to have carryover seniority back to July

---

2, 1965 (the effective date of Title VII), Group B was
to have carryover seniority back to January 14, 1971 (the
filing of the systemwide pattern or practice suit), and
Group C was to have no carryover seniority at all. [Note:
the DC's plan was fairly complex--I suggest that the reader,
if interested, take a look at theCA's description of the
plan, Petn App. 11-16.]

Thirty employees were given Group A

status, four were given Group B status, and the rest of the
three hundred-plus were put in Group C.
T.I.M.E.-DC, IBT, and the government all appealed.

The

CA affirmed the DC's finding of "pattern or practice" as
~y,..qe,c.e.,'

supported by the statistical and testimoniail~n-d ·-not clearly
erroneous.

It held that the locals were not indispensable

parties because the locals play little if any meaningful role
in negotiating the contracts, and the IBT adequately represents
the seniority status of its members.

It also agreed with the

DC that both the employer and the union were liable for a

C~~ ;~enior~ sys~e~that =-;erp;;=uates

~/b[ t~emp{o;:r,
C J>r

~-~of

the

~rior

discrimi:ation

The CA parted company with the DC, however, on the is sue
remedies,

First, it announced adherence to the "rightful

~7.

place" doctrine as announced in the CAS decisions in Franks

~~

v. Bowman Transp. Co. and the RodrigL1ez Trilogy (Nos.

Following Rodri guez, it declared

--

'~fJ. <

75-651,~

75-715, and 75-718, "straight lined" with these petns for
the March 5 conference).

.:;!:!._1::; 4~

that "rightful place" should be determined on the basis of
______.....___;

'VUfr.q-~~

----- ·;.---

a!c../.f,..-~,.~ ~ ~

;-( "'P'A-~~

...........'I:.J"'"---

~"1

the person's "qualification date"--the date the person had
the experience necessary to qualify him for an OTR position.

~ ~----------~~----~~'---~-----~-~----------------~------

4

~~ .(

The CA then rejected the DC's division of the class into
three groups.

"

A

4

~,A ,.~

It held that individualized proof is not

required in awarding relief in a "pattern or practice" suit
(noting that there are similarities and possible differences

~

~

-"'k. ~<Ibetween a government "pattern or practice" suit and a private

- -" " -'(

class action, Petn App. 34 n.33 [citing to Rodriguez]).
The CA stated:

"Whatever evidentiary hearings are required

for individuals can well be postponed to the remedy.'' (Petn
App. 34).

It is not clea;r, however, whether theCA intended

_______- ...,_.......____....... - - - -

-

that the various
.......... members of the class be required to prove
,..,

individualized discriminationo
..~

The paragraph following the

above-quoted sentence reads:
The result is that we cannot accept the gradations
of [Groups A, B, and C]. For all we know, at this
stage some [in Group C] may have suffered discriminations
even more egregious than those whom the Government
singled out to be persuasive witnesses to establish
pattern and practice. All those [in Groups A, B, and C]
are entitled to be given an opportunity to bid on future
vacancies in the specified job classifications to which
they are allowed to transfer by the District Court's
order on the basis of their seniority and, if they qualify J
for those jobs, to be permitted to exercise their full
seniority in such jobs for all purposes, including
bidding and layoff. (Petn App. 34-35)

[/J )"~never
---

makes clear (at least to me)

~hether

a

member of Group C must show individualized discrimination

-

or what such a showing would consist of.

Bits and pieces

---------------~---------------~---of the
opinion indicate that such a showing must be made,
for example, the CA states

11

1-Je do not think it necessary for

the trial court to reexamine the findings as to the discrimination

.;

•

against those in [Groups A and B] and ,the prejudice suffered
by each," (Petn App. 38) which seems to imply that an examination
(~e.~ Pe.:r"'- ltpp, lfLf n.lff)
must be made as to group C. ATheCA's discussion of seniority
carryover, however, seems to belie that implication.
In regard to carryover seniority, the CA adopted the
.....
'
~
"qualification date" principle announced in Rodriguez and
~

stated that CA6's use, in Thornton v. East Texas Motor
Freight, 497 F.2d 416 (CA6 1974), of a date based on the
date of application for transfer or of filing an EEOC charge
ignores the accepted principle that where there has been
a showing of classwide discriminatory practices coupled
with a seniority system that tends to freeze or perpetuate
the effects of that discrimination, a member of the affected
class need not actuall show that he or she unsuccessfull
attem te to trans er to tTe exc u ed osltlon. Petn
App.
ded
is extremely ambiguous on the
showing of discrimination required (or not required) of
Group C members, its citation to the Rodriguez Trilogy
might be taken as adoption of the rule adopted in that case,
namely, once a pattern or practice of discrimination has
been shown, a minority employee is entitled to relief unless
the employer can show that the employee's position is not
due to discrimination (e.g. there were no vacancies into which
he could have been hired).

See generally the memo on the

Rodriguez Trilogy.
The CA here also held that "qualification date" seniority
carryover for incumbents
includes full seniority even though it may extend back
beyond the"effective date" of Title VII since seniority
provisions that call for the forfeiture of accumulated
seniority on transfer serve to presently perpetuate the
effects of pre- ~ t ~ rimination. (Petn App. 36)

TheCA then discussed and decided ·a series of more
specific priority problems, only one of which is relevant
and holding
to a question presented by the parties. The factsArelevant
to that issue (priority for vacancies after layoffs) will
be discussed in the section on contentions.
Finally, the CA noted that under the three-group plan
of the DC, those in Group C had been given priority over all
other employees who have no seniority in the category into
which the Group C member was transferring [even if the other
employee had greater company-wide seniority].

TheCA held:

With all the victims now in one class, the record should
be developed when necessary to examine the impact of
such a preference on current non-victim, incumbent
employees who have been employed by the company longer
than a particular victim. (Petn App. 44)
The case was "remanded for further evidentiary and judgmental
proceedings consistent with this opinion."
3. CONTENTIONS: T.I.M.E.-DC (No. 75-672) claims: 1) The

/A~1

~'j-,1/'

~

CA erred when it held that racial composition statistics
not only are significant, but "may often be dispositive in
a pattern and practice claim." (Petn App. 23).

~+responds

~
~

The SG

(correctly) that the CA did not rely only upon

statistics, but rather relied also on the "massive amount
of testimony presented by live witnesses." (Petn App. 24).
2) TheCA erred when it found T.I.M.E.-DC liable in
the face of theCA's own recognition that T.I.M.E.-DC was
making a "laudable good faith effort" to eliminate discrimination.
(Petn App. 27-28).

The SG responds that the "good faith effort"

was evidenced only begining in 1971 (long after the 1968 filing

of the suit), the evidence of "good fa,i th effort" was
unquestionably due in part to the effects of the consent
decree, and, in any event, the government sought (and
received) seniority relief only for minorities hired prior
to March 1971 "at a time when the existence of T.I.M.E.-DC's
exclusionary practices was clear." (Resp 14-15).
3) The CA erred in refusing to apply the McDonnell Douglas

requirements to the government's proof of "pattern or
l§J?})J;Q.Yi.ng___i;!:t~ DC 1 s
practice . " T.I.M.E.-DC also claims that the CA erred inA
refusal

to credit T.I.M.E.-DC's claims that there were

no OTR openings at the relevant times, but as far as I can
tell, that holding was merely approval of a credibility
finding.

TheCA's refusal to apply the McDonnell Douglas

requirements was based entirely on the similar holding in
the Rodriguez Trilogy (see memo on the Rodriguez Trilogy)o
The SG argues that the Court recognized in McDonnell Douglas
that although the requirements there set out would be useful
in determining whether discrimination exists in an individual
case, they are not exclusive, and in a pattern or practice suit
the courts need not engage in an exhaustive case-by-case analysis

~

'

of each minority employee.

• statement in McDonnell Douglas that statistics may be significant

~~

~~

The SG points to the Court's

showing a pattern or practice of discrimination, 411 U.S.

at 804-805.
4) The CA erred in adopting a "qualification date"
standard for seniority carryover, and theCA's decision is
in conflict with CA6's decision in Thornton v. East Texas

.

' '

Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416 (CA6

1974)~

T.I.M.E.-DC

claims also that the imposition of a blanket "qualification
date" seniority was an improper overriding of the DG's
carefully structured decision made in the exercise of the
DC's proper discretion.

In adopting a "qualification date"

standard, the CA again relied on the Rodriguez Trilogy,
and I again refer the reader to the memo on those cases.

j

The SG responds that CA6 in Thornton was merely refusing
to override the discretion of the DC, CA6 was wrong, and
in any event, Thornton has been overruled by a subsequent

<J~::I~-~~~ &~·cTCLj

CA6 opinion that cited to the dissent in Thornton in holdingl"'____ _..
that where pattern or practice is shown, plant-wide seniority
should be "available regardless of whether an employee actually
sought a transfer previously."

E.E.O.C. v. Detroit Edison Co.,

Nos. 75-220, 75-221, 75-239, and 75-393 (Dec. 5 conference,
held for Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.).
5) The CA erred in its modification of the seniority/return
rights of laid-off OTR drivers.
of

issues~when

This question involves the

a laid-off OTR driver has "super priority" in

bidding on a vacancy, and _what priorities exist in "bumping"
less senior drivers at other terminals.

The issues seem to

me to be relatively fact-specific questions of the shaping
of an appropriate remedy, and I will not burden an already
overly long memo with a discussion of the specifics.

I refer

those interested in the issues to Petn App. 40-43 and Petn
for T.I.M.E.-DC 15-16.
Trilogy

I refer those intrigued to the Rodriguez

and the Sabala Pair (more of the "straight-line"), where

similar issues are considered.

IBT (No. 75-636).

IBT appears to state as a "Question

Presented" whether a union can be held liable for an otherwi se
neutral seniority system that merely perpetuates an employer's
independent discrimination.

I find no discussion of that

issue, however, in the "Argument" section.

IBT's other

claims are: 1) The CA erred in applying a "qualification
date" seniority standard and in refusing to apply the
requirements of McDonnell Douglas [same issue as raised by
T.I.M.E.-DC]; 2) The seniority carryover remedy is contrary
to§ 703(h)

[~Franks

v. Bowman Transp. Co.]; 3) TheCA

erred in affording relief where there was evidence of good
faith and effective efforts to remedy discrimination--the
Act only reaches continuing abuses; 4) The CA erred in holding
~·

that the locals were not indispensable parties.

In regard

to this latter contention, IBT notes that in two cases in
the Rodriguez Trilogy, the CA held (in identical circumstances)
that the International was not liable (see footnote 2 in

Rodriguez footnotes as merely an intracircuit conflict, noting
in those cases the Southern Conference (the regional body) was
( WtTio... The.

f#e..J)

·

also held liab 1~ and CAS held that the signatures of the locals
were merely a formality.

The SG states that the Southern

Conference is clearly controlled by the International.

The

SG does not conunent on the Sabala pair, where the issues of
the liabilities of the International and the local are
discussed at greater length.
4. DISCUSSION:

The two significant issues that are

presented in these petitions are 1) whether a McDonnell
Douglas test must be applied in a "pattern or practice"
suit; and 2) whether "qualification date" seniority is an
appropriate form of relief for incumbent discriminatees.

Both

issues are also involved in the Rodriguez Trilogy.
Two perhaps noteworthy differences between this case
and the Rodriguez Trilogy _are 1) this case

does~

present

the issue whether a prima facie case may be based solely on
statistical evidence; and 2) this case does involve a square

v

holding that "carryover seniority" may be ordered based on
a date prior to the effective date of Title VII.

The lower

courts have all assumed that such relief is available, and
some of the cases so holding were cited with approval during
the 1972 amendments to Title VII, but this Court has never
ruled on the question (Cf. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., No.
74-728, 4th draft at n.l8).

Neither petitioner raises the

issue, however, so if the Court is interested, it would have
to request specifically that the issue be addressed.
This case is probably not a "hold for Franks", because
it concerns the rights of incumbents (in Franks, "class 4"
discriminatees), a question not addressed in Franks o

See

Franks, 4th draft at 3o
There is a response.
2-25-76
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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
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List 1, Sheet 1

fYrw.bti.
iow~DM- does

T.I.M.E.-DC (Nos. 75-636 and 75-672)
The Rodriguez Trilogy (Nos. 75-651, 75-715, 75-718, and 75-720)
The Sabala Pair (Nos. 75-781 and 75-788)

a#f.4r~ ,dt{c.
tle-~cl,., .. dl

In my memoranda on these "straight-lined" cases, I indicated

~o~~+~ · that they raised a significant question as to the applicability
'o~sca.n ~fA·

of the McDonnell Douglas standards to the class action form
of suit.

Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., No. 74-728, appears to

-

decide this point by holding (4th draft at 23-24 and n.32) that
once the class representatives have proven a discriminatory

pattern or practice, and a particular form of relief is found

------------------

appropriate, the burden shifts to the employer to show that

individual members of the class who apply for such relief
were not in fact victims of the

discri~ination,

and

the employer has a right to attempt to make such a showing.
The opinion by Judge Brown in the T.I.M.E.-DC case
might be read as contemplating some sort of individualized
evidentiary hearing prior to the granting of relief to
any individual, see pool memo at 6-7.

The DC may therefore

be able to read the Franks holding into Judge Brown's opinion
(~.

f..,

:?3 \~ "J'"~C~ e. ~('c)\.uf\.'S

and proceed accordingly in the remand ordered by Judge

"f':.,,;_,..,)

Brown.~

The opinions by Judge Wisdom in the Rodriguez Trilogy
do not appear to contemplate individualized proof (except on
the issue of "qualification ") prior to the granting of
individualized relief.

Judge Wisdom's remarks (although

dicta in that the cases were ordered remanded on the relief
issue) therefore appear in conflict with the Franks holding
that the employer should be entitled to show that the individual
seeking relief was not the victim of discrimination.
The opinion by Judge Wisdom in the Sabala pair

would

appear to be unaffected by the Franks holding, in that the
DC in Sabala fashioned a remedy (seniority as of first opening
subsequent to "qualification date") that would seem to preclude
any of the defenses contemplated by Franks.

The employer

in Sabala might, however, defend against the award of ·
t~e

"cross-tenninal transfer"- seniority dates on the grounds

that although the employee , had indicated a willingness to transfer
before the DC, he would not in fact have done so at the relevant
time in the past.

To the extent that Sabala precludes such

a defense, it would appear to conflict with Frankso
\

~

Although

the employer is not a petitioner in the Sabala pair, to the
extent that the unions may be held liable for back pay on
remand (a possibility suggested by th~ CA), they would have
a claim to a similar defense.

To the extent the International

is allowed to assert the rights of its non-discriminatee
members, it has such a defense in regard to the seniority
relief

as granted.

From my belated recognition of Franks, I conclude that
the cases should at least be held for Franks.

After Franks

is handed down, the cases (if deemed not otherwise certworthy)
might be granted, vacated, and remanded for reconsideration
in light of Franks.

In the alternative, the Court might deny

the petitions on the grounds that the statements as to relief
in T.I.M.E.-DC and the Rodriguez Trilogy are mere dicta, and
the individualized defense issue is not raised in the Sabala
petitions (although note that it might be implied from the
"cross-terminal transfer" issue).
Revised Overview
With the McDonnell Douglas issue winnowed out, the entire
II

\1.

set of petitions presents the following major issues (in
statistical

approximate order of importance):

evidence alone is sufficient to establish a prima facie case
(the lower courts are virtually unanimous in holding that
statistical evidence alone can be sufficient, but this Court
has never ruled on the
in "lock-in"
F

issue); ~

the liability of the unions

se~orit? ~ns ; @

the appropriateness of

.._....

"q~ t i-9n dat ( ' car :_.y over~ni~ r ~ty for incumbents; and

4) whether carryover seniority can be granted back to a date
prior to the effective date of Title VII.

The first three issues are present.ed in the Rodriguez

I

Trilogy, the fourth is presented in T.I.M.E.-DC. The Sabala
pair present #2 in a slightly better form than it is presented
in Rodriguez in that the local in Sabala requested merger of
the rosters (Sabala, however, has the§ 1981 complication).
There are no real splits among the lower courts on thes e
questions--they are all still being worked out on rather an
ad hoc basis.

If the Court decides to grant in the absence

of a split on the grounds of the general importance of the
questions, I would suggest that the grant be of the first
three petitions in the Rodriguez Trilogy (i.e. the local,
the Southern Conference, and East Texas Motor Frieght--the
petitions arising out of the Rodriguez case itself), and that
the grant be limited so as to eliminate the "class certification"

-

issue.
Such a grant would mean that the Court would not be able

to reach the question whether carryover seniority may be _granted
from a date prior to the effective date of Title VII.

The ·

lower courts are unanimous in assuming (generally without
discussion) that such relief .c an be granted, and some of those
cases were cited - with approval during the 1972 amendments.
I have significant doubts about the correctness of the lower
courts' holdings, but as we get further and further away from
the effective date of Title VII, the importance of those holdings
becomes less--because fewer persons are affected by such carryover
seniority.

If the Court wishes to reach the carryover date

question, then T.I.M.E.-DC would have to be granted, with
an explicit request that the issue be addressed.

Granting

T.I.M.E.-DC has one advantage in that the SG would be a
direct party.

Its disadvantages (as compared to Rodriguez)

a~ Government

"pattern or practice" suit may have a

different standard of proof than a private class action, and
T.I.M.E.-DC does not present the issue whether the DC can
rely solely on statistical evidence.
I see no need to grant the Sabala pair unless the Court
is interested in reaching the § 1981 issue.

Given the fact

that Title VII tends to supplant § 1981 in most cases, a
ruling on § 1981 would not appear to be crucial.
If the Court contemplates a possible grant, a "call for
the views of the SG" on the Rodriguez Trilogy and the Sabala
pair would seem appropriate, with the "call" perhaps delayed
until after Franks is handed down.
My apologies to those I have misled on the McDonnell
Douglas issue.
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MEMO:

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Gene Corney

RE:

No. 75-636
No. 75-672

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS V. U.S.
T.I.M.E. -D.C., INC. V. UNITED STATES
BOBTAIL BENCH MEMO

------------------------------------------------------------------------+
There are three major parties in this case, and for the sake of
convenience I will
will be

refer to them as follows:

T;I.M.E .. -D.C., Inc.

referred to as Time; the INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF

TEAMSTERS will be referred to as IBT or the Union; and the United
States will be referred to as the United States or the Government.

### INTRODUCTION
After reading through the briefs and speaking with some
of the other clerks, this case does not strike me as difficult as
it first seemed.

narrow

There are several

important issues in the case.

but nonetheless

I will begin with the issues

raised by petitioner Time, and then proceed to the issues raised
by IBT, except to the extent that the issues raised by IBT overlap
with the issues raised by Timeo

###

ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONER TIME
Time challenges the decision of CA5 on a number of grounds.
summarize them as followsa

I would

first, both the CA and

the DC erred in concluding that there was sufficient evidence to
establish a showing of a pattern or practice or of discrimination;
second, assuming arguendo the validity of the DC's findings with
respect to instances of individual discrimination, the DC acted
properly in fashioning a remedy of individualized relief for
the identifiable victims of discrimination, but CA5 erred in
overturning the remedy selected by the DC;

..
.

~

.; ~·

..

_

.

·. '

.;

.'
•,'

:

~

',

third, CA5 erred in the way it structu'red the relief question on
remand primarily because it did not require application of the
McDonnell Douglas standards of proof; and finally, Time challenges
the decision of CA5 ordering a modification of the seniority
system to

speed up the entry of minority drivers into the

over the road (OTR) job category.
In discussing these objections, I think it is important to
keep in mind t h at the opinion of CA5 is not a model of clarity.
In

several crucial respect s it is difficult to

exactly what Judge Brown meant.

determine

Normally , that would cause

considerable difficulty on review in this Court.

But in this case

it seems to make things somewhat easier in that the Court, if
it decided decides to affirm, can indicate what it understands
the holding of CA5 to be.

1f1f1f IS STATISTICAL EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE A "PATTERN OR PRACTICE"

OF DISCRIMINATION IN A PATTERN OR PRACTICE SUIT BROUGHT BY THE
UNITED STATES?
It seems to me that this is not a very difficult issue.

The

question is whether the defendants in a pattern or practice suit did
in their hiring or promotion practices.

in fact discriminate

that question, statistical evidence has some probative value.
admittedly

rcumsu

circumstantial evidence,

why as a legal matter that

oesn

ma

could not rely on statistical evidence in

that

As to

It is

but I can't see
would mean that a court

determini ~O

whether the

Government has· established a prima facie violation of the relevant
statutes.

Indeed, as the SG notes, the Court has been willing to

rely on statistical evidence in this fashion in other contexts, such as
the jury

discrimination cases.

Whether a court

~c

ou

could rely 'tsolely"'on statistical evidence is

_
not__________________________
real~ue::::~-::-ca~=i:y
t:~::::-:~
~,

indicates that

statistical evidence can be given great weight, and

perhaps Judge Brown's opinion also implies that the statistical evidence
can be dispositive.

But

for present purposes it is important to

note that both Judge Brown's opinion for CAS and the DC

dec is ion

relied on testimonial evidence in addition to the government's
statistical data.

Certainly the combination of the two should be

sufficient (assuming fact findings below which are not clearly erroneous)
to make out a prima facie case of a violation of the statutes.
Time makes a number of attacks on the evidence in the case.
In this regard, I

1

would note that I would be hesitant to reverse

the concurrent fact findings of two lower courts.

The legal question--

can statistical evidence play a role: -is important and justifies
review

and discussion

by this Court.

--------------------~-----

Court should get too deeply

to tb

in reviewing the evidence itself.

But I don't think the
cas

i

t

In any event, I

involved

don 1 t think it

matters, since Time's attacks on the evidence are not that strong.
First, Time

suggests that its good faith efforts to terminate

emoloyment discrimination requires reversal of the DC's
Time did discriminate.

Judge Brown

responde~

finding that

that the r

recent

efforts to bring an end to employment discrimination were
insufficient

to eradicate the effects of the prior discrimination

on employees who continued to be "locked in" · •

e

in the

sense that they did not receive their~rightful place: Moreover, the

statistics relied on by Time do not rebut the the claim

that there

was pre-1971 discrimination in the hiring of OTR drivers, an important
observation in light of the fact that relief was sought in this
case for

persons hired after March of 1971.

Time notes that minority representation in its work force
Y~

from 7.1% in 1967 to 16.5% in 1972.

But this gives no indication

of the jobs for which the minorities were hired.

It is possible that all

or most were hired in the city classifications, an area to as to which
there is no claim that hirings were discriminatory.

The claim is that

OTR hiring was discriminatory, and the cited statistics do not indicate
a growth in percentage employed in that classification.

I don't think

it is necessary to run through the other data presented by Time.

My

own view is that given the statistics and testimony presented on behalf
of the government, nothing cited by Time in its brief suggests that we
mould overturn the factual findings of the lower courts.
Time also

gg ·

suggests, see Brief at

error to rely on much of the government's

d. I

, that it was
testimonial evidence

since it related to acts that took place before the effective date of
Title VII.

I see no merit in the argument.

The issue

here

-

is not whether the federal courts had the. power to remedy acts of
discrimination that took place prior to the e ffecticve date of the
federal stature statute.

Title VII is not retroactive, and in the

JEmedy section a court should be careful not to grant a remedy for
pre-Act discrimination.
remedy the

But the fact that

the federal DC can't

pre-Act discriminatory conduct does not mean that
t)$~

i t cannot consider that
0

cor~d ... c-~

cov~T

~e

4c..l-

with respect to allegations of a

.

d\t.C.t//N\{nJ,~.

pattern or practice

-

l.cl

c.o.,d"'o-1

l relevant,

and as long as the federal

is careful not to attempt to remedy the pre-Act conduct, I can

no reason to preclude its admissibility with

issue of

· · the · ·

, with respect to the

existence of a post-Act pattern or

practice of discrimination.
On this issue I conclude that there was sufficient evidence
consisting of statistical data and testimony

to support the findings of

the lower court that Time engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminatior

As to the broader question--can statistical evidence alone ever
be

suffi~ent

to make out a prima facie case--I findJl it somewhat

difficult to talk about the issue in the abstract.

In some cases

the statistical evidence may be so overwhelming, so accurate, and so
closely tailored to the discrimination issues before the
that it suffices to shift the burden of proof to the defendant.

DC
But

I would not go so far as to say that it suffices for all cases, or
even that it suffices in general.

I imageine the typical Title VII

~t~c~~r

and should, include both statistical data and testimonial
evidence.

###

THE Dcvs ALLOCATION OF RELIEF
You will recall that the DC divided the plaintiff class into
groups (A,B, and C) according to the DCvs perception of the

three

"degree of injury" suffered by each class member, and the DC
awarded different relief with respect to each subclass.

The

DC's determinations in this regard were based on evidence that
had been offered to prove that the defendants had engaged in a
pattern or practice of discrimination.
Time appears to be happy with the remedy ordered by the DCo
Time, of course, would prefer to have this Court hold that the
evidence going to individual instances of discrimination was
~

insuffif cient to support the findings of the lower courts, but
assuming arguendo that there was

adequate

evidence,

Time argues that CA5 erred in overturning the DC 's selection of a
remedy.

As far as Time is

concerned, the DC did two thingso

First, it concluded that there was sufficient evidence to conclude
that a pattern or practice of discrimination

existedo

Second ,

based on the record evidence, it concluded that only certain class

members had suffered sufficient injury, to justify an award of
broad relief.

Time characterizes the CA5 decision as holding that

in a pattern or practice suit it is unnecessary to prove that the
individual was the subject of discrimination.
This strikes me as a fairly easy issue, and I think Time is
simply wrong.

CA5 reversed, essentially taking the position that

what had been ad judie ate

d~as the question of "liability"--

was there a pattern or practice of discrimination.

From CA5°s

point of view, the issue of degree of injury suffered by each
member of the class had not been tried, and could be considered
in evidentiary hearings as part of the remedy question on remand.
The SG is quite correct in noting that CA5 took the most appropriate
approach to this issue.

In the

first place, there is simply

nothing to suggest that the Government was attempting before the
trial court to

present proof as to every member of the class.

Secondly , if the Government had to do that it would , as the SG
suggests ,

....

-

destroy the class action nature of the pattern or

¥;-

practice suit

tv-....

and~form

it into a mere aggregation of individual

1

.r

###

BURDEN OF PROOF AND SCOPE OF REMEPY
Time's third attack on the decision below concerns the way

CA5 structured the relief question on remand,

At

th~int,

the

decision of CAS is particularly confusing , and I would suggest
that the Court read the opinion

below to say essentially the

following a
The Government has established that 'r ime engaged i ; pattern
or practice of discrimination with respect to its h1ring for
OTR jobs. But it does not follow that every member of the class
is automatically entitled to reliefo Title VII authorizes
relief only for persons who were actually the victime of
racial discriminationo The particular class of persons in
this case obviously includes persons interested in working
for Time, since they were all employees of Time (as drivers)
durin g the alleged
discrimination. Moreover, any
relief awarded will go
only to
~---- persons
presently interested in working for Time,
since the seniority benefits go only to those who presently
seek OTR jobs. CAS apparently was of the view that a court
could infer that a city driver who shows that he was qualified
for an OTR job during the alleged discriminatory period and
who presently seeks an OTR job would have taken an O'rR job
but for the discrimination.
True, proof of actual application
is to be preferred, but as Judge Brown noted below, the
existence of the
pattern or practice may have deterred
employees from applying . Of course, the inference that such
a driver would have taken an OTR job but for the discrimination
is a rebuttable one. The opinion of CAS can be read to
contemplate evidentiary hearings on remand as to
individualized discrimination, and Time would be free on
remand to show that any given individual .
lacked
the job qualifications, lacked interest, or
that there
were no vacancies durin g the relevant period which the person
could have applied for but for the discrimination.
If the individual makes out ..K prima facie
· showing of
discrimination, and Time fails to rebut the appropriate
inference, what shall the remedy be? Here, the CAS opinion
can be read to incorporate the Rodriguez trilogy approach.
Full
carry-over seniority may be excessive, since one
cannot take an OTR job until one is qualified. On the other
hand, application
date seniority is ·
inadequate~
since it i gnores the fact that the mere existence of a

pattern or practice of discrimina,tion deters application
for vacancies for which a minority member is qualified,
CA5 follows a "qualification date seniority apl?~oach", under
which the amount of seniority ~epends on when one qualified
for the positiono ~ ualification seniroity date ~8~ieFity
is neither appropriate nor required in every case, Take for
example Franks, where the qualification requirements were
mere formalities--there, full carryover seniority may be
appropriate. In other cases, as for example the general
public who have never indicated an interest in working for
Time, application date seniority may be more appropriat iJ
For this class of persons, qualification date seniority is
appropriate.
On the whole, this seems to me to be a very reasonable approach
to the pattern or practice problem in the trucking industry.
in reading the brief of

And

Time, I don°t find a fundamental challenge

to the legal bais basis for this approach,

Time does argue, as

noted above, that CA5 instead required awarding relief to all
class members regardless of whether they were
discriminationo

But as also explained

wrong on this point.

injured by

above, Time is simply

,r ime also recognizes that the rule in CA5 is

th <t that the amount of seniority a transferee deserves should be
determined by the date he would have transfered but for his employer 0 s
discrimination.

Bing v. Railway Expresso

In this case, CA5

focused on qualification date seniority, an alternative
which other courts of appeals have considered appropriate in certain
circumstanceso

See Navajo Freight Lines (CA9); see especially

@
(CA6)(cert filed, held for instant case) in

Detroit Edison Co

which CA6 found qualification date seniority appropriate despite
the fact that CA6 had earlier found qualification date seniority
inappropriate in a different case.

$~

~ ·~

~I/'

Here, on this record, it seems

to me that qualification date seniority is a reasonable approach.
Time's major attack in this area concerns the relevance of

~McDonnell

Douglas, a case with which you are qui? e

familiar and which we discussed only recently with respect to the

~Title

VII case.

McDo~ll

Douglas notes in text that a Title VII

complainant must show "(i fhat he belongs to a racial minority;

*'

(ii) that hefpplied and was

qualified for a job for which the

employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications
he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek
persons of complainant 0 s qualifications."

411

u.s.,

applicants from
at 802o

It

is also important to note that you dropped a footnote at the end
4,.

of the that passage indicating that "The

fact~ necessarily

will

vary in Title VII caes, and the specification above of the prima
facie proof

required is not necessarily applicable in every

respect to differing factual situations',"
How does the proof in the instant case compare wits the

-

allocation of proof established in MQDonnell

{[)

Douglas?

Here,

the class member must prove that he is a member of a racial

minority~at he

was qualified for an OTR job,

an~at

there

existed during his period of qualification a pattern or practice

-

-

of discrimination against members of his raceo

The pattern or

practice evidence should also show that job vacancies were filled
during

the discriminatory period by whites.

All of this

gives rise to an inference that the class member would have

been

employed as an OTR driver had it not been for the discrimination .
It should be obvious that the primary departure from the McDonnell
Douglas specification is that the class member does not have to
show that he actually applied for the jobo

But that seems to me

to be a reasonable departure in this type of a suito

It certainly

is not inconsistent with McDonnell Douglas . That case expressly noted
that a different specification might be established for different
facts,

Here, there is proof of a pattern or pract ~ce of discrimination,

sufficiently different factual

and to me that is a

circumstance to justify the departure from the McDonnell specification.
There is, to be sure, one troubling aspect to the inference
that anyone exhibiting a present interest 1n an OTR job would have
transferred if he had had the opportunity when he was initially
qualified (assuming that respondent- defendant has been u~~hl~ ~ ft,~+
Present transfer is accompanied
by carryover seniority, which is far more attractive than transfer
to the bottom of the ladder in the OTR category (which is what would
have happened had it not been for discrimination).

It is thus

probably true that more persons will express a present interest in
OTR jobs than would have done so in the past if there had been

----

no discriminationo

I simply don't think there is any way that

a federal DC can get around the problem, and it doesn°t seem

to me to present ·

J: ff:c. lbu

.{,-0

._,.,,.,;,...._.•

far more narrow equitable relief.

,f,f,f

MODIFICATION OF SENIORITY AGREEMENTS TO "SPEED UP" THE REMDY
CAS established a preference for individual discriminatees

awarded carryover seniority over employees from other terminals
for the purpose of filling vacancies at the discriminatee's home
terminal.

CAS also directed that members of the affected class

may compete against any line driver on layoff for other than temporary
vacancies on the basis of carryover seniority.

Given Franks, I can

see no serious problem with theCA's disposition in this regard.

There are three major areas that deserve to be highlighted.

-

First, should

carryover seniority extend back only to the date

that the discriminatee became qualified for an OTR job, or should it
extend back to the date the discriminatee joined the company.

Although

there is language in the opinion of CAS that can be read to mean that
a discriminatee carries over his full company seniority, regardless
of when he became qualified for OTR, there is also an indication that
CAS intended to limit carryover seniority to the period after a
discriminatee

became OTR qualified.

opinion as the United States reads it:

I suggest that you read the
one carries over only his

qualification date seniority.

[Of course,, in some instances full

company seniority and qualification date seniority will be the same-namely, the discriminatee was OTR qualified on the day he was placed
by Time in a city driver position rather than an OTR position due to
racial discrimination. ]
Second, if a discriminatee first qualified for OTR prior to the
effective date of Title VII, should carryover seniority be

allowed

to cover the full period of qualification or should it be limited to
the period following the effective date of the Act.

My conclusion

is that the DC properly limited carryover sen~ty by refusing to
credit a discriminatee for time with the compa~y prior to the effective
date of Title VII.

e
Franks makes it clear that the ~evant concept

here is "rightful

place" seniority--the position that the
but for the discrimination.

discriminatee would have held
the first day after the
requests a transfer and

r

If on

effective date of Title VII a city driver

· the request is denied for racially dis-

criminatory reasons, the remedy

eventually granted by a federal

court should put him in the position he would have been in but for

the discrimination.

That position is that he would have

gone to

OTR on the day after the effective date of the Act with no accumulated
competitive-type seniority, and as the days passed he would begin to
~cumulate

OTR seniority.

Thus, the remedy should go back only to

the date on which he was discriminated against.

Since Title VII

does not make actionable pre-Act instances of discrimination, there
is no legal justification, in my view, to

credit the discriminatee

with seniority for time served with the company prior to the effective

______

date
of Title VII.
......_
........,~

[At this point I should mention an important

qualification--namely, that the seniority system is not otherwise
violative of Title VII.

The United States challenges this seniority

system, and attempts to support the liability finding with respect to
the Union, on the

theory that the seniority system "locks in"

discriminatees and perpetuates the effects of past discrimination.
I will discuss that argument with respect to IBT, infra.
subsrcibes to

n

·-

this "lock in" : .

Unless one

theory, I can see no

reason to award pre-Act seniority carryover.]
The third area of importance is an issue we discussed

bri~fly

prior to argument--how does one determine qualification date.

The

United States was not very helpful on this point at oral argument,
especially with respect to who would bear the burden of proof.
Apparently there are certain objective criteria, such as years experience
driving the tractor trailers, and apparently some
get that experience while working for Time.

city drivers

It also seems that some

discriminatees may have come to Time initially with enough experience
to meet the qualifications for OTR.

In any event, if we do accept

accept "qualification date seniority" as the appropriate approach,
the Court opinion will have to provide some specific guidance in this
"'("' a-e a .

The Union raises a number

issues that are identical to issues

raised by Time, and my earlier discussion

obviously

apolies to IBT as well as Time.
Initially, I have some question as to why CAS found it necessary
to suggest that it found IBT guilty of discrimination.

The DC merely

enjoined the union "from interfering with relief here granted."

The

Union agreed at oral argument that it could be made a party to the
extent necessary

for the DC to award complete relief, and that

it would have to obey a court order modifying its seniority provisions
in the collective bargaining agreement to
discrimination.

remedy employer

Since the issue of monetary relief has, as noted

at oral argument, drtpped out of the case, I fail to see an exact
need to hold the Union liable for
of discrimination.

engaging in a pattern or practice

I think the answer to that puzzle is to be found in the "lock
in" theory that was discussed at oral argument and that has been
(

-

adopted, so we are told by the SG, in eight circuits.
seniority

st s

Under the

system at issue in this case, the employer allows

transfers from city drivers to OTR,

but a transferee must give up

his competitive-type transfer and start at the bottom of the seniority
ladder in OTR.

[A

transferee keeps his benefits-type seniority.]

Since you may be at the top of the seniority roster in city driving
fCD(

(CD), you will not be terribly anxious to go to the bottom of

the ladder in OTR.
understand the "lock in" theory suggested by the

As I
~

SG and the CAJs, a seniority system such as that at issue here is
viewed as perpetuating prior discrimination and thereby keeping
discriminatees from escaping the effects of discrimination.

Despite

~

the su?port the theory has found in the CAJs, I don't buy it.
Let me take a simple example.

Suppose a black applied for an OTR

job with Time in 1960 and, despite his OTR qualifications, he was
rejected for racially discriminatory reasons.
offers him a CD job, which he accepts.

Time nevertheless

On the day after the effective

date of Title VII, he reapplies for an OTR job, and the
employer (Time) is willing to make him the offer.
the job, however, because the
appro i

approximately five

place him at the bottom

He hesitates to take

seniority system will take away

years~

of competitive seniority and

of the OTR seniority ladder.

From the

viewpoint of theCA's adopting the "lock in" apprJiefih, this penalizes
job transfer and keeps the
taking the

.4.
positio~they

victims of prior discrimination from

would have had but for the discrimination.

Therefore, it is a present actionable

GliseF:Nninato~

the Union is liable for a Title VII violation.

violation, and

As applied to this

case, the seniority system is a violation of Title VII because it prevents
city drivers from using their company seniority to move into the OTR
jobs they would have had but for the employer's discrimination.
I have two problems with the theory.

First, the fact that it

makes the choice a difficult one does not mean that the seniority
system prevents the discriminatees from taking the OTR position.

In

that sense, this system is not a barrier to minority employement as
perhaps was the testing device in Griggs.

Second, and more important,

the ore-Act

discrimination on the part of the employer is itself not

actionable under Title VII, and this seems to me to be simply a way
to get to that issue by way of a back door.

After the effective date

of the Act this seniority system makes the same choices and options
available to
of race.

~ks

and whites; it does not discriminate on the basis

A black and a white, both of whom have five years CD

ooniority, must give it up if they go to OTR after the effective date
of the Act.

The fact that the black would have been in OTR for five

years had it not been for an earlier instance of employer discrimination
Ov'

is

.f.v a-\ l ,t~ ,

but it is not actionable under Title VII.

The "lock in"

theory makes it so.
[I was working on this part of the memo when you called, and so the
Union discussion section is a bit abbreviated.
suryplement tomorrow

~

I will add a brief

discussing some of theCA cases.]
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SUMMARY
The following is a summary of my views on this case, which is
a "pattern or practice" suit brought by the United States.
As to proof of pattern or practice, I think the Court should
hold that the record supports the factual findings of the lower
courts.

It would be useful to have the Court opinion indicate that

statistical evidence may, in unusual situations, be dispositive of

-----..-

the prima facie case, but that in general other evidence should be
combined with statistical evidence to make out a case.
As to the issue of remedy, I would interpret the [ambiguous]
ooinion of CAS to require evidentiary hearings on remand with respect
to whether identifiable individuals were the subject of actionable
discrimination.

You indicated on page 10 of my bench memo in this

case that it would of course be proper for the DC to establish
subclasses.

I think that the establishment of subclasses in this case

was premature.

The DC based ._ its subclass determination on the

nature of evidence that had been presented as to "degree of injury"
suffered by various members of the class.

At the liability stage of

the case, the United States had not attempted to provide detailed
information as to each member.

Moreover, to the extent that the

DC's division of the class into subclasses is based on a determination
of "degree of injury" suffered, it is premature in that the "degree
of injury" suffered will be the issue in each of the subsequent
evidentiary hearings, and thus a class member should not be allocated
to a particular subclass when the subsequent evidence on remand might
indicate .._. that he had

~

,,
suffered a greater degree of injury

than one would have initially thought to be the case

~~

..

on the

basis of the evidence presented at trial as to pattern or practice.
Since the DC's assignment of members to particular subclasses limited
fue relief they could obtain, it seems to ... me premature since the
evidentiary hearings on remand will be •z. . .w
. focused on which class
members suffered discrimination warranting what type of relief.
To uohold the DC's premature subdivision will only give the United
States an incentive to swamp the DC with individual evidence at the
first stage--was there a pattern or
Q I & j . llli:e ciJM!!Cilli!i!iiCcil eRa~

~

practice.

The evidentiary hearings as to remedy will focus on the issue

-

of "qualification date seniority," and there are obvious problems with
that concept.

It seems to me that the burden of proof with respect

to whether an employee is OTR qualified and when he became • qualified
~

should rest with the employee.

The employee should, at a minimum,

be forced to come forward with certain evidence which the employer
can rebut or negate.

But I think there is language in Franks which

;(b~~u.t;
lz"

1
,

"*1 l h that

or oractice suit.

the employer is to bear that burden in a pattern
• Franks

..-

~-

-

--

:

--~

stated:

"But petitioners

here have carried their burden of demonstrating the existence of a
discriminatory hiring pattern and practice ... by the respondents,
and the burden will be upon respondents to

~

prove that individuals

who reapply were not in fact victims of previous hiring discrimination."
At that point, Justice Brennan drops the following footnote:

"Thus

Bowman may attempt to prove that a given individual . . • was not in
fact discriminatority refused employment . . • • Evidence of a lack
of vacancies in OTR positions at the time the individual application
was filed, or evidence inicating the individual's lack of OTR q•a,.'l
qualifications--under nondiscriminatory standards actually applied

•·•

by Bowman to individuals who were in fact . hired--would of course be
relevant."
Bowman.

-

424 U.S., at 773 n. 32.

I think it is yossible to distinguish

In that case, the class member had applied for a job, and
~

the employer was thus given information as to two major points:

~ the date the individual became interested in the OTR job, and
~ what the individual thought his qualifications were.

For

the instant case, current CD class members who had applied for OTR
jobs are, it seems to me, covered by the Bowman language.
bears the burden of showing that they

~

The employer

were not qualified.

As to

those individuals who did not apply--due to the deterrent effect of
the

~attern

and practice--a strong argument can be made that they

should not be put in a position more favorable than those who did
ao~ly.

Thus, they should have the burden of coming forward with

.-e

evidence indicating when they would have applied, and their qualifications
at that point in time.

The employer would then be free to rebut

that evidence in the same manner as he could rebut the applic~ions_
in Bowman.
get around.

Except for that difference1 I think Bowman is hard to
But as a practical matter, that approach to the remedy

issue seems sufficient.
There are two other issues in the remedy area.

The first

concerns credits for seniority relative to the period prior to the
effective date of the Act.

Unless the Court goes with the "lock

in" appr{iefh to attack the seniority system itself, I can see no
reason to

~t

pre-Act seniority carryover.

Rightful place

seniority would make seniority run from the time of the violation,
which by definition has to be after the effective IK date of the Act
The final problem concerns a point raised by Just\rce White at
cral argument.

Suppose the class of black CDs currently interested

in OTR positions number 400, whereas during the period of the
oattern and practice there were only 200 vacancies.

Even if we

assume that all 400 class members would have applied for those
oositions but for the discriminatory pattern or practice, we know

obt._Me.J.
for a fact that only 200 of them could have •

t;- jobs.

Moreover,
~

as a practical matter we know that the figure would realisJtically
be less than 200, since some of the whites actually hired would
no doubt have been hired under a nondiscriminatory system.

Thus, the

remedy question for the DC is complicateo by the number of actual
vacancies during the discriminatory period.

Should the DC award

relief to all 400 class members if they each prove that they would
have applied, that

-~ e

they were qualified, and that they were

denied jobs for discriminatory

~

reasons?

reyQyf •taa. ..-1..
11• to 200 class members?

Or should the DC limit

Or should the DC limit

m~ to something less than 200 class memebers--namely, its estimate
of how many b~s would have been hired in a nondiscriminatory system.
Perhaps we don't have to address that issue at all.
rather difficult.

But it is

At a minimum, a strong argument can be made that

relief should not exceed
members can get relief.

of the violation; thus only 200
On

the other hand, deciding which 200

members should get relief is complicated, and the DC would have to
determine who was available for w~ vacancies.

And to limit relief

to less than 200 is even more complicated, since the DC would have

~

o'+a~A&J

to decid~ot only how many blacks would have a•~s jobs, but also
~

It which vacancies would have been filled by G'hites and which by

blacks.

or whether it is instead lawful under section 70J(h) .

The other issue that I mentioned in my bench memo was whether
the seniority system itself was a
~

~ ~violation

of Title VII

~

because it perpetuates the effects of prior racial discrimination
It seems to me to be clear in light of §

703(h~

that where an employer

engages in pre-Act refusals to hire on the basis of race,

and after

the effective date of the Act begins to hire blacks, the fact that
fue ·seniority system puts them at the bottom of the ladder is not

------~---------------------------------------------------

enough to make the seniority system discriminatory.

See
........

the Justice

Department statement cited in the legislative history discussion of
section 703(h) in Franks, 424 U.S. at 760 n.l6:
"Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the
time it takes effect.

-----

- ---

If, for example, .. a collective bargaining

contract provides that in the • event of layoffs, those who were
hired last must be laid off first, such a provision would not be
affected in the least by Title VII.

This would be true even in the

case where owing to . . , . . . . . discrimination prior to the effective
date of the Ill title, white workers had more

Negroes." ~In

. ., seniority than

other words, if a black applies for a job prior to the

effective date of the Act and is denied the job for racially discriminatory reasons, and then reapplies and gets the job after the effective
date of the Act, the

failure ~ f

the

sen ~ y ~stem

hi~

to credit

LfoJ4.-14c.f-

~ .. .,. .

,..d_;

with the time between the pre-Act refusal to hire and the
not in itself a violation of Title VII.
that

~

is

The only difference between

hypothetical and the instant case is that here the discriminatee

worked for the same company that discriminatorily denied him the
job [namely the

••z•D

OTR job].

He worked in one department--city

driving--rather than the department he wanted--OTR driving.

In

the hypothetical, it is possible that the discriminatee worked in
the interim for another company.

Thus, the only

& difference

between

the two cases is that in one the discriminatee worked (in a less
preferable) job for the company which discriminated

~

against himl

+
tl..

1

7
•

.,.whereas in the other the discriminatee probably worked for

d:ffe~~~
~company.

I can't _...see a significant analytical differ nee

between the two cases, and to the extent that Congress discussed
one aspect of the problem, I would expect that discussion to control
here as well.

Of course, if you want to come out against the

legality of the seniority system as applied to this class, you could
always argue--and I sa. . . .*t expect that

~

some • members of the

Court will--that Congress simply did not treat the issue of departmental
seniority.
There is a second aspect to this issue--namely, the 1972 amendments.
By the time of

~

those amendments at least two courts had treated

the issue I t of the ger

~

illegality of certain seniority systems,

and h a d - - declared the systems illegal.
at 50-51, that

The SG argues, see Brief

the Conference Report makes it clear that Congress

r"\
endor;sed
the interpretation that the courts had (in general)

given to Title VIII except to the extent that a contrary ;
intention is indicated in the 1972 amendments.

sn·

J

Thus, so the argument

runs, since some courts had found unlawful seniority systems which
perpetuated the effects of past discrimination,

there is no reason

to interpret section 703(h) to deny protection to a gene~tion of
incumbent minority workers who have worked under a discriminatory
system.

i

I must say that there is some merit to that approach, and

much is to be said in favor of the result it reaches in helping to
avoid "freezing out" of relief a whole generation of blacks.

But I

also think it is possible to distinguish the cases that had been
decided prior to the 1972 amendments, especially with respect to
the likelihood that the seniority systems at issue were intended to
discriminate against blacks,
In any event, the issue is one of congressional intent.

On the

~----------------------~

one hand, one

ask~ether--without

morei;pecific showing--Congress
~

------..)

------

could have intended to "freeze out" of relief a whole generation of

-------------'---------------------------~---------~(jj

blacks.

----

On the other hand, one ..._

asks~whether--again

without

a more specific showing--Congress . . . intended to drastically alter
pre-existing seniority rights in a
by CAS.

MIAI?M t

Although

j~the

manner accomplished

I think an argument can be made

either way on a principled basis, I think it is
otl~ ~

more

mutuiu is

tlra~dopted

by CAS--namely,

that the seniority system is itself a violation of the Act.

Of course, if the system under at.tac k was not a bona fide
seniority system, section 703(h) would offer no protectin and the
system would be subject to Title VII challenges.

January 11, 1977

7S-636 International Brotherhood v. U.S.
7S-672 T.I.M.E.-DC v. U.S.
This memorandum is dictated, after argument, to record in summary and imprecise terms my tentative reactions on the
principal issues.
1.

Proof of "pattern or practice".

The DC, relying on

both statistical and testimonial evidence, found a pattern
of discrimination.
finding.

CAS affirmed.

I would not disturb this

TIME argues that undue reliance was placed upon

statistical evidence, and in Rodriguez CAS held that such
evidence alone is sufficient to shift the burden of proof.
I would not accept that view as a general proposition.
Statistical evidence may well be relevant, and possibly even
controlling.

As a general rule, more than mere statistical

evidence should be required.

Subject to enunciating general

principles this issue can be left primarily to the District
Courts.
2.

The remedy.
(i)

This presents several difficult issues.

The plaintiff's class.

The DC divided the

general class into three subclasses according to the
"degree of injury" suffered, with different relief
accorded each subclass.

CAS reversed, holding - in effect -

2.
the division into subclasses was premature; that
/,U"tU./

<{;..-fv/~~~-:::~:v)

one broad classA inc1udihg all employees (not including
applicants or former employees) of the three categories
of discriminatees (city drivers, garagemen, and clerks).
I am not at rest on this issue.
permitted under Rule 23.

Subclasses are

I do not "buy" the SG's

argument that the class action nature of this suit would
be destroyed by any premature fragmentation of the
class.

I am inclined to think that the ultimate

re s olution, and perhaps quite fairly, would be furthered
subclasses.

But I do not view

this as a major issue.
(ii)

Issues at the remedy stage.

Regardless of

how one reads the ambiguous opinion of CAS, two questions
must be answered by the DC on remand with respect to each
member of the class who applies for an OTR job:

(a)

was he the victim of the pattern of discrimination
(i.e. was he a discriminatee?); and (b) was he qualified
for the job on his "qualification date" (see below)?
(iii) Burden of proof.

As to (a) above, the

Company should have the opportunity (but with the burden
of proof) to show an absence of discrimination with
respect to a particular member of the class.

As to

(b)above, the burden of proving qualification date and
fitness for the job should be on the employee.

3.
(iv) Qualification date seniority.

CAS, going

back to its decision in Bing, is committed to the
determination of commencement of seniority as of a
"qualification date".

Having read what CAS has said

about this, I remain unenlightened as to exactly what
this concept really is, and particularly as to how
it can be applied fairly and consistently.
Stated generally (as I am dictating this at home
without the briefs, I am being quite general), the
concept is that seniority should run from the date on
which a discriminatee was qualified for OTR driving.
In this case (as in many others) we are looking back
a decade and a half.
situations

(~·&·,a

There may be a few clear
city driver with years of prior

satisfactory OTR experience), but in the great majority
of cases relatively uneducated people who have driven
light equipment within the city, served in garages or
as clerks, have little or no competency to drive safely ·
over. the - road equipment, to make the inevitable emergency
repairs, to find their way to deliver truck loads in
the great metropolitan centers, and otherwise to perform
their duties.

The only way to avoid serious injustice

(resulting from the displacement of the seniority of
other employees) is to place the burden of proof on

...

employees to establish their qualification date.

'---~----------~

4.
Even after this is done, there, would have to be a
determination of when a vacancy was available for a
particular employee - as "bumping" is not authorized.

I have not addressed the argument that the employee

~~ t:!JT/? ~
should have applied (as in McD6nnell Douglas).

I am

inclined to believe that in a "class action pattern
case", this element of McDonnell is inapplicable.

3.

Pre-1965 Relief.

Despite apparent holdings of

Courts of Appeals, I am not inclined to allow seniority at the expense of other employees - for service prior to
the effective date of Title VII.

4.

Union Liability.

Although I think the Union was a

necessary party to assure full implementation of injunctive
relief, I am not fully persuaded that it was a party to the
discrimination merely by virtue of the collective bargaining
agreemenrs provisions with respect to seniority.

L.F.P., Jr.
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.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 4, 1977

Re:

and 75-672 - International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. United States, et al.

75~636

Dear Potter:
Please join me.

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

..

lfp/ss

5/4/77

Rider, •T.I.M.E.

Add a footnote to the sentence quoting
in the text substantially as follows:

P. 21

McDonnel~·Douglas

We also noted in McDonnell-Douglas that:
"There are societal as well as personal
interests on both sides of the Lemployeremployee] equation. The broad, overriding,
interest, shared by employer-employee, and
consumer is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially
neutral employment and personnel decisions.
In the implementation of such decisions, it
is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates
no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise." Id., at 801.

Note to Justice Stewart:

We tend to lose sight, I think,

of what really must be the overriding purpose of any
legislation:

namely, the ultimate public interest.

That interest is served by nondiscriminatory employment
px&

practices, but it is disserved if - in the application

of Title VII, incompetent or inefficient employees displace
persons¥ who are better qualified to serve the public.
This sort of balance has to be a rough one.

But it seems

to me that our cases tend to overlook the ultimate public
interest.
time.

It cannot hurt to mention this from time to

ec/// 5/9/77

Justice Powell-This latest draft in the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters case makes all but two of your suggested changes.
FIRST:

On page 32 of your copy you suggested the

addition of the word "purposefully."
I called PS's clerks to

find out why.

This change was not made.
They noted that on

the facts of the case before us the Government was trying to
make out a "pattern or practice" suit by showing disparate

~reatment,

and

whene~

they (i.e., the majority opinion)

refers to the very case before us they use the word purposef ul.
PS's clerks note that there may be other cases in which the
Government will try to establish a "pattern or practice suit"
based on discriminatory impac~, in other words a Griggs type
case on a pattern or practice basis.
~uld

In such a suit, purpose

not have to be shown, and they did not want to suggest that

it had to be shown.
does not refer to

The statement on page 32 is general and
T.I.M.E. directly.

It may well be that PS discussed this with you, and I
think it is

reasonable to leave out the word purposefully at

that point.
SECOND:
was not made.
with you.
in

The suggested addition on page 42 of your copy
PS's clerks thought that PS had discussed this

PS feels that this point does not directly fit

that footnote.

given

th~act

I see no reason to press for its addition

that PS made your suggested textual changes on p. 41.

lfp/ss

5/5/77

Rider A, n. 21 (T. I.M.E.)

Add a footnote to the sentence quoting McDonnell-Douglas in
the text substantially as follows:

We also noted in McDonnell-Douglas that:
"Thereaare societal as well as personal interests
on both sides of the [employer-employee] equation.
The broad overriding, interest, shared by employer,
employee~nand consumer: is efficient and trustworthy
workmanship assured through fair and racially
neutral employment and personnel decisions. In
the implementation of such decisions, it is abundantly
clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise." Id., at 801.

Note to Justice Stewart:
Wettendtto lose sight, I think, of what really must be
the overriding purpose of any legislation:
ultimate public interest.

namely, the

That interest is served by non-

discriminatory employment practices, but it is disserved if in the application of Title VII, incompetent or inefficient
employees are employed or displace employees who are better
qualified to serve the public.

The balance has to be a

rough one, but it seems to me that our cases tend to overlook
the ultimate public interest.

It cannot hurt to mention this

from time to time.
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MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases bring here several important questions under ~~
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as /_....,_ , L _ _ 1
amended, 42 U.S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V). ~ ""-"' /7/~
The issues grow out of alleged unlawful employment practices __ .
J
1
engaged in by an employer and a union. The employer is ~ ~
a common carrier of motor freight with nationwide operations,
~
. f.
and the union represents a large group of its employees. The ~~
District Court and the Court of Appeals held that the em./
ployer had violated Title VII by engaging in a pattern and ~
practice of employment discrimination against Negroes and
Spanish-surnamed Americans, and that the union had violated
~-. J _ /.
the Act by agreeing with the employer to create and maintain ' .,~, '~fA.FU1 .,
a seniority system that perpetuated the effects of past racial 9~
<:"
and ethnic discrimination. In addition to the basic questions
J •
presented by these two rulings, other subsidiary issues _.,
/. _
must be resolved if violations of Title VII occurred-issues r~
concerning the nature of the relief to which aggrieved in- I 1
_
.
,divicluals may be entitled,
;-~
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TEAMSTERS v. UNITED STATES

I
The United States brought an action in a Tennessee federal
court against the petitioner T. I. M. E.-D. C. (the company)
pursuant to § 707 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-6 (a). 1 The complaint charged that the
company had followed discriminatory hiring, assignment,
and promotion policies against Negroes at its terminal in
Nashville, Tenn. 2 The Government brought a second action against the company almost three years later in a
federal district court in Texas, charging a pattern and
1 At the time of suit the statute provided as follows:
"(a) Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe
that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of
resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this subehapter, and that the pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended
to deny the full exercise of the rights herein described, the Attorney
Grneral may bring a civil action in the appropriate district court of the
llnited Stat'es by filing with it a complaint (1) signed by him (or in his
absence the Acting Attorney General), (2) setting forth facts pertaining
to such pattern or practice, and (3) requesting such relief, including an
application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or
other order against the person or persons responsible for such pattern or
practice, as he deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights
herein described."
Section 707 was amended by § 5 of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 107, 42 U.S. C. §2000e-6 (c) (Supp. V), to give
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, rather than the Attorney
General, the authority to bring "pattern or practice" suits under that
~rc tion agmnst private-sector employers. In 1974, an order was entered in
this action substituting the EEOC for the United States but retaining the
Umted States as a party for purposes of jurisdiction, appealability, and
related matters. See 42 U.S. C.§ 2000e-6 (d) (Supp. V).
2
The named defendant in this suit was T . I. M. E. Freight, Inc., a
predecessor ofT. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc. T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc., is a nationwide system produced by 10 mergers over a 17-year period. See United
States v. T. I. M. E.-D . C., Inc., 517 F . 2d 299, 304, and n. 6 (CA5) . It
rnrrrntly ha" 51 trrminals and operates in 26 States and ~hree Canadia,u

, lfOVI!lCE'.'=:.
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practice of employment discrimination against Negroes and
Spanish-surnamed persons throughout the company's transportation system. The petitioner International Brotherhood
of Teamsters (the union) was joined as a defendant in that
suit. The two actions were consolidated for trial in the
Northern District of Texas.
The central claim in both lawsuits was that the company
had engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminating against
minorities in hiring so-called line drivers. Those Negroes and
Spanish-surnamed persons who had been hired, the Government alleged, were given lower paying, less desirable jobs as
servicemen or local city drivers, and were thereafter discriminated against with respect to promotions and transfers. 3 In
this connection the complaint also challenged the seniority
system established by the collective-bargaining agreements
between the employer and the union. The Government
sought a general injunctive remedy and specific "make whole"
relief for all individual discriminatees, which would allow
them an opportunity to transfer to line-driver jobs with full
company seniority for all purposes.
The cases went to trial 4 and the District Court found that
Line drivers, also known as over-the-road drivers, engage in longdistance hauling between company terminals. They compose a separate
ba rgaining unit at T . I. M . E .-D. C. Other distinct bargaining units
include servicemen, who service trucks, unhook tractors and trailers, and
perform similar t asks; and city operations, composed of dockmen, hostlers,
and city drivers who pick up and deliver freight within the immediate
area of a particular terminal. All of these employees were represented by
t he petitioner International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
4
Following t he receipt of evidence, but before decision, the Government
and the company consented to the entry of a Decree in Partial Resolution
of Suit. The consent decree did not constitute an adjudication on the
meri ts. The company agreed, however, to undertake a minority recruiting
program; to accept appli cations from all Negroes and Spanish-surnamed
Americans who mquired about employment, whether or not vacancies
ex1stcd, and to keep such applications on file and notify applicants of job
openings; to keep spPcific employment and recruiting records open to
8
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the Government had shown "by a preponderance of the evidence that T. I. M. E.-D. C. and its predecessor companies
were engaged in a plan and practice of discrimination in
violation of Title VII .... " 5 The court further found that
the seniority system contained in the collective-bargaining
contracts between the company and the union violated Title
VII because it "operate[d] to impede the free transfer of
minority groups into ana within the company." Both the
company and the union were enjoined from committing
further violations of Title VII.
inspection by the Government and to submit quarterly reports to the
District. Court; and to adhere to certain uniform employment qualifications
respecting hiring and promotion to line driver and other jobs.
The decree further provided that future job vacancies at any T. I. M. E.D. C. terminal would be -filled first "[b]y tho8e persons who may be found
by the Court, if any, to be individual or class discriminatees suffering the
present effects of past discrimination because of race or national origin
prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Any remaining
vacancies could be filled by "any other persons," but the company obligated
Jtself to hire one Negro or Spanish-surnamed person for every white person
hired at any terminal until the percentage of minority workers at that
terminal equaled the percentage of minority group members in the population of the metropolitan area surrounding the terminal. Finally, the
rompany agreed to pay $89,500 in full settlement of any backpay obligations. Of this sum, individual paymehts not exceeding $1,500 were to be
paid to "alleged individual and class discriminatees" identified by the
Government.
The Decree in Partial Resolution of Suit narrowed the scope of the
litigation, but the District Court still had to determine whet.her unlawful
discrimination had occurred. If so, the Court had to identify the actual
discriminatees entit.Ied to fill future job vacancies under the decree. The
validity of the collective-bargaining contract's seniority system also remained for decision, as did the question whether any discriminatees should
be awarded additional equitable relief such as retroactive seniority.
6 The District Court's Memorandum Decision in United States v.
T. I . M. E.-D. C. , Inc., C1v . No. 5-868 (Oct. 19, 1972), is not offioially
;reported. It is unofficially reported at 6 FEP Cases 690 and 6 EPfi

. S979.
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With respect to individual relief the court accepted the
Government's basic contention that the "affected class" of
discriminatees included all Negro and Spanish-surnamed incumbent employees who had been hired to fill city operations
or serviceman jobs at every terminal that had a line-driver
operation. 6 All of these employees, whether hired before or
a._fter the effective date of Title VII, thereby became entitled
to preference over all other wpl jcants wit.b respect to consideration for future vacancies in line-driver job§.7 Finding that
members of the affected class had been injured in different degrees, the court created three subclasses. Thirty persons who
had produced "the most convincing evidence of discrimination
and harm" were found to have suffered "severe injury." The
court ordered that they be offered the opportunity to fill linedriver jobs with competitive seniority dating back to July 2,
1965, the effective date of Title VII. 8 A second subclass included four persons who were "very possibly the objects of
discrimination" and who "were likely harmed," but as to
whom there had been no specific evidence of discrimination
and injury. The court decreed that these persons were entitled to fill vacancies in line-driving jobs with competitive
seniority as of January 14, 1971, the date on which the Government had filed its systemwide lawsuit. Finally, there were
over 300 remaining members of the affected class as to whom
there was "no evidence to show that these individuals were
either harmed or not harmed individually." The court ordered that they be considered for line-driver jobs u ahead of"
The Government did not seek relief for Negroes and Spanish-surnamed
Americans hired at a particular terminal after the date on which that
terminal first employed a minority group member as a line driver.
7 See sup ra, at 3-4, n. 4.
s If an employee in this class had joined the company after July 2, 1965,
thf:'n the date of his initial employment rather than the effective date of
Title VII was to determine his competitive seniority.
9 As with the other subclasses, there were a few individuals in the third
.group who were found to have been discriminated against with respect to··
6
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any applicants from the general public but behind the two
other subclasses. Those in the third subclass received no
retroactive seniority; their competitive seniority as line drivers
would begin with the date they were hired as line drivers.
The court further decreed that the right of any class member
to fill a line~driver vacancy was subject to the prior recall
rights of laid~off line drivers, which under the collective-bargaining agreements then in effect extended for three years. 10
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the
basic conclusions of the District Court: that the company had
engaged in a pattern or practice of employment discrimination
.and that the seniority system in the collective-bargaining
agreements violated Title VII as applied to victims of prior
discrimination. United States v. T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc.,
517 F. 2d 299. The appellate court held, however, that the
relief ordered by the District Court was inadequate. Rejecting the District Court's attempt to trisect the affected class,
the Court of Appeals held that all Negro and Spanish-surnamed incumbent emplOyees wer:r-entitled to bid for future
line-driver jobs on the basis of tlieir com an seniorit , and
that once a c ass member had filled a JO , e cou use his\
full company seniority-even if it predated the effective date 'i}
of Title VII-for all purposes, including bidding and layoff.
This award of retroactive seniority was to be limited only by
a "qualification date" formula, under which seniority could not
be awarded for periods prior to the date when ( 1) a line-drivjobs other than line driver. There is no need to discuss them separately
in this opinion.
10 This provision of the decree was qualified in one significant respect.
Under the Southern Conference Area OVJer~the-Road Supplemental Agreement between the employer and the union, line drivers employed at
terminals in certain southern States work under a "modified" seniority
::;ystem. Under the modified system an employee's seniority is not confined
strictly to his home terminal. If he is laid off at his home terminal he can
move to another terminal covered by the Agreement and retain his
Repiority1 either by filling a vacancy at the Qther terminal or by "bumping''
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ing position was vacant,11 and (2) the class member met (or
would have met, given the opportunity) the qualifications
for employment as a line driver. 12 Finally, the Court of
Appeals modified that part of the District Court's decree
that had subjected the rights of class members to fill
future vacancies to the recall rights of laid-off employees.
Holding that the three-year priority in favor of laid-off workers "would unduly impede the eradication of past discrimination," id., at 322, the Court of Appeals ordered that class
members be allowed to compete for vacancies with laid-off
employees on the basis of t-he class members' retroactive seniority. Laid-off line drivers would retain their prior recall rights
with respect only to "purely temporary" vacancies. lbid. 13
a junior line driver out of his job if there is no vacancy. The modified
system also requires that any new vacancy at a covered terminal be offered
to laid-off line drivers at all other covered terminals before it is filled by
any other person. The District Court's final decree, as amended slightly
by the Court of Appeals, 517 F. 2d, at 323, altered this system by requiring
that any vacancy be offered to all members of all three subclasses
before it may be filled by laid-off line drivers from other terminals.
11 Although the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case did not
specifically mention the requirement that a vacancy exist, it is clear
from earlier and later opinions of that court that this requirement is a
part of the Fifth Circuit's "qualification date" formula. See, e. g.,
Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F. 2d 40, 63 n. 29 (CA5),
rev'd on other grounds, ante, at - , cited in United States v. T. I. M. E.D . C., 517 F. 2d, at 318 n. 35; Sagers v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 529
F . 2d 721, 731-734 (CA5 1976).
12 For example, if a class member began his tenure with the company
on January 1, 1966, at which time he was qualified as a line driver and a
line-driving vacancy existed, his competitive seniority upon becoming a
line driver would date back to January 1, 1966. If he became qualified
or if a vacancy opened up only at a later date, then that later date would
be used .
1 3 The Court of Appeals also approved (with slight modification) the
part of the District Court's order that allowed class members to filt
vacancies at a particular terminal ahead of line drivers laid off at other
terminals. Sre supra, at 6-7, n. 10,
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The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District
Court to hold the evidentiary hearings necessary to apply
these remedial principles. We granted both the company's
and the union's petitions for certiorari to consider the significant questions presented under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 425 u. s. 990.
II
In this Court the company and the union contend that
·their conduct did not violate Tftle VII in any respect, asserting first that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to show that the company engaged in a "pattern or
practice" of employment 'discrimination. · The union further
contends that the seniority system contained in the collectivebargaining agreements in no way violated Title VII. If these
contentions are correct, it is unnecessary, of course, to reach
any of the issues concerning remedies that so occupied the
attention of the Court of Appeals.

A
Consideration of the question whether the company engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminatory hiring prac~
tices involves controlling legal principles that are relatively
clear. The Government's theory of d1scnmination was sifuply
that the company, in violation of § 703 (a) of Title VII/~
14 Section 703 (a) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a ) (1970 ed. and
Supp. V), provides:
" (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer"( 1) t o fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminat e against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's·
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
"(2 ) to limit, segregat e, or classify his employees or applicants for
rmployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
~t utus as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex.
or nrttional ori(J'in;"

75-636 & 75-672-0PINION
TEAMSTERS v. UNITED STATES

9

~gularly

treated Negroes and Spanish-surnamed Americans
less favorably than white persons. The disparity in treatment
allegedly involved the refusal to recruit, hire, transfer, or
promote minority group members on an equal basis with
white people, particularly with respect to line-driving positions. The q!tjmate factual issues are thus sim.ply w~er
there was a pattern or ractice of such dis arate tre tment
an , 1f so, whetl:ier e ifferences were "racially premised."
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 805 n. 18. 1 5
As the plaintiff, the Government bore the initial burden of
making out a prima facie case of discrimination. Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 425; McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802. And, because it alleged a

15 "Disparate treatment" such as alleged in the present case is the most
easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it
can in some situations e m erre . rom t e mer
t rea ment , ee, e. g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropo'litan Housing
lfev. Corp ., U. S. - , - . Undoubtedly disparate treatment was
the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII .
See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec . 13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)
("What the bill does ... is simply to make it an illegal practice to use
race as a factor in denying employment. It provides that men and
women shall be employed on the basis of their qualifications, not as
Catholic citizens, not as protestant citizens, not as Jewish citizens, not as
colored citizens, but as citizens of the United States").
ims of dis arate treatment may be distinguished from claims that
stress "dis arate 1m act ."
e latter involve em loyment practices th
are facially neutral in their treatment o 1 erent groups ut t at in fact
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified bt
busmess necessity. See infra, at 22 . Proof of discriminatory motive, we
have held, is not required under a disparate impact theory . Compare, e. g.,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co ., 401 U. S. 424, 430-432, with McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802-806. See generally Schlei & Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 1- 12 (1976); Blumrosen, Strangers
in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co . and the Concept of Employment
Disc rimination, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 59 (1972). Either theory may, of course,
· QP applied to a part icular set of facts.
·
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systemwide pattern or practice of resistance to the full en~
joyment of Title VII rights, the Government ultimately had
to prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or "acci~
dental" or sporadic discriminatory acts. It had to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimination
as the
n 's standard operating pr~ure-the regular
rather than the unusual prac 1ce.
We agree with the Distnct Court and the Court of Appeals
that the Government carried its burden of proof. As of
March 31, 1971, shortly after the Government filed its com~
plaint alleging systemwide discrimination, the company had
6,472 employees. Of these, 314 (5%) were Negroes and 257
( 4%) were Spanish-surnamed Americans. Of the 1,828 line
drivers, however, there were only 8 (0.4%) Negroes and 5
(0.3%) Spanish-surnamed persons, and all of the Negroes
had been hired after the litigation had commenced. With one
exception-a man who worked as a line driver at the Chicago
terminal from 1950 to 1959-the company and its predecessors
did not employ a Negro on a regular basis as a line driver until
1969. And, as the Government showed, even in 1971 there
were terminals in areas of substantial Negro population where

I

16 The " pattern or practice" language in § 707 (a) of Title VII, supra,
at 2 n. 1, was not intended as a term of art, and the words reflect only
their usual meaning. Senator Humphrey explained:
" [A] pattern or practice would be present only where the denial of
rights consist::; of something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but
is repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature. There would be a pattern
or practice if, for example, a number of companies or persons in the same
industry or line of business discriminated, if a chain of motels or restaurants
practiced racial discrimination throughout all or a significant part of its
system, or if a company repeatedly and regularly engaged in acts prohibited
by the statute.

"The point is that single, inoignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by
a ~ingle business would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice . . . . "'
110 Cong. Rrc. 14270 (1964) .
This interpretation of ".pattern or 12ractice" aJ?pears throughout th~

I
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all of the company's line drivers were white. 17 A great major...
ity of the N~groes (83%) and Spanish-surnamed Americans
(78%) who did work for the company held the lower-paying
city operations and serviceman jobs,t 8 whereas only 39% of
the nonminority employees held jobs in those categories.
The Government bolstered its statistical evidence with the
testimony of individuals who recounted over 40 specific in ..
stances of discrimination. Upon the basis of this testimony
the Distnct Court found that "[n] umerous qualified black
and Spanish-surnamed American applicants who sought linedriving jobs at the company over the years had their requests
ignored, were given false or misleading information about requirements, opportunities, and application procedures, or were
legislative history of § 707 (a), and is consistent with the understanding of
the identical words as used in similar federal legislation. See id., at 12946
(remarks of Sen. Magnuson) (referring to§ 206 (a) of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 206 (a)); id., at i3081 (remarks of Sen. Case); id.,
at 14239 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 15895 (remarks of Rep.
Celler). See also United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F. 2d
418, 438, 441 (CA5); United States v. ironworkers Local86, 443 F . 2d 544,
552 (CA9); United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F. 2d 221,
227 (CA5); United States v. Mayton, 335 F. 2d 153, 158-159 (CA5).
11 In Atlanta., for instance, Negroes composed 22.35% of the population
in the surrounding metropolitan area and 51.31% of the population in the
city proper. The company's Atlanta terminal employed 57 line drivers.
All were white. In Los Angeles, 10.84% of the greater metropolitan
population and 17.88% of the city population were Negro. But at the
company's two Los Angeles terminals there was not a single Negro among
the 374 line drivers. The proof showed similar disparities in San Francisco,
Denver, Nashville, Chicago, Dallas, and at several other terminals.
18 Although line-driver jobs pay more than other jobs, and the District
f'ourt found them to be "considered the most desirable of the driving-jobs/'
it is by no means clear that all employees, even driver emplo)"ees, would
prefer to be line drivers. See infra, at 41-42, and n. 51. Of course, Title
VII provides for equal opportunity to compete for any job, whether it is
thought better or worse than another. See, e. g., United States v. Hayes
lnternat'l Corp., 456 F. 2d 112, 118 (CA5); United States v. National
1md Co ., 438 F . 2d 935,939 (CA8).
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not considered and hired on the same basis that whites were
considered and hired." Minority employees who wanted to
transfer to line-driver jobs met with similar difficulties. 19
The company's principal response to this evidence is that
statistics can never in and of themselves prove the existence
of a pattern or practice of discrimination, or even establish
a prima facie case shifting to the employer the burden of rebutting the inference raised by the figures. But, as even our
brief summary of the evidence shows, this was not a case in
which the Government relied on "statistics ·alone." · The individuals wTiOtestifiea about tlieir personal experiences with
the company brought the cold numbers convincingly to life.
In any event, our cases make it unmistakably clear that
"[s] tatistical analyses have served and will continue to serve
an important role" in cases in which the existance of discrim·
ination is a disputed issue. Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620. See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, at 805. Cf. Washington
v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 241-242. We have repeatedly approved the use of statistical proo to establish a prima facie
case of racial discrimination · ·Jury selection cases, see, e. g.,

I

71
,

'

Two examples are illustr ive:
George Taylor, a Negr , worked for the company as a city driver in
Los Angeles, beginning te in 1966. In 1968, after hearing that a white
c1ty driver had tran erred to a line-driver job, he told the terminal
manager that he al would like to consider line driving. The manager
replied that there would be "a lot of problems on the road ... with
different people, Caucasian, et oetera," and stated "I don't feel the
company is rea y for this right now. . . . Give us a little time. It will
eome around, ou know." Mr. Taylor made similar requests some months
later and go similar responses. He was never offered a line-driving job
or an appli ation.
Feliber
Trujillo worked as a dockman at the company's Denver
termina When he applied for a line-driver job in 1967, he was told by a
person el officer that he bad one strike against him. He asked what that
wa.'-1 d was told: "You're a Chicano, and as far as we know, there isn't
~- \;h rrpo <l_rivet in the system.''
·
19
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Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346; Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U. S. 475; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587. Statistics are
equally competent in proving employment discrimination. 20
20 Petitioners argue that statistics, at least those comparing the racial
eomposition of an employer's work force to the composition of the population at large, should never be given decisive weight in a Title VII case
because to do so would conflict with § 703 (j) of the Act, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000 (e)-2 (j). That section provides:
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require
any employer ... to grant preferential treatment to any ... group
because of the race . . . or national. origin of such . . . group on account
of an imbalance which may exil;lt. with respect to the total number or
percentage of any race . . . or national origin employed by any employer . . . with the total number or percentage of persons of such
race .. . or national origin in any community, State, section, or other .
area, or in the available work force in any community, state, section, or
other area."
The argument fails in this case because the statistical evidence was not
offered or used to support an erroneous theory that Title VII requires an ,
r mployer's work force to be racially balanced. Statistics showing racial or
rthnic' imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only because such
1mbidance Is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent
explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring
practices will in time result. in a work force more or less representative of
the -racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from
which employees are hired . Evidence of longlasting and gross disparity
between the composition of a work force and that of the general population thus may be significant even though § 703 (j) makes clear that Title
VII imposes no requirement that a work force mirror the general population. See, e. g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local36, 416 F. 2d
123, 127 n. 7. Considerations such as small sample size may, of course,
detract from the value of such evidence, see, e. g., Mayor of Philadelphia v.
Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620-621, and evidence showing
that the figures for the general population might not accurately reflect the
pool of qualified job applicants would also be relevant. Ibid. See generally Schlei & Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law, 1161-1193
(1976) .
"Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the courts have
frequently relied upon statistical evidence to prove a violation. . . . In
many cases the only available avenue of proof is the use of raci~ statistics .

7
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tion only that statistics are not
irrefutable; \
me in infinite variety and, like any other kind of evi·
,dence heir usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts
and circumstances. See, e. g., Hester v. Southern R. Co., 497
F. 2d 1374, 1379'--1381 (CA5).
In addition to its general protest against the use of statistics
in Title VII/ cases,tthe company cla.ims that in this case the
statistics revealing racial imbalance are misleading because
they fail to take into account the company's particular busi·
ness situation as of the effective date of Title VII. The com·
pany concedes that its line drivers were virtually all white in
July 1965, but it claims that thereafter business conditions
were such that its work force dropped. Its argument is that
low personnel turnover, rather than post-Act discrimination,
accounts for more recent statistical disparities. It points to
substantial minority hiring in later years, especially after 1971,
as showing that any pre-Act patterns of discrimination were
broken.
The argument would be a forceful one if this were an em· ~
ployer who, at the time of suit, had done virtually no new
hiring since the effective date of Title VII. But it is not.
Although the company's total number of employees apparently
dropped somewhat during the late 1960's, the record shows
that many line drivers continued to be hired throughout this
period, and that almost all of them were white. 21 To be sure,
to uncover clandestine and covert discrimination by the employer or union
involved.. .. " United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F. 2d 544, 551
(CA9). See also, e. g., Pettway v . American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F. 2d
211, 225 n. 34 (CA5); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457
F. 2d 1377, 1382 (CA4); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451
F. 2d 418, 442 (CA5); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F. 2d
421, 426 (CA8); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc ., 431 F. 2d 245,
247 (CAlO) .
zl Between July 2, 1965, and January 1, 1969, hundreds of line drivers
were hired syst('mwide, either · from the outside or from the ranks of
f'mployees filling other jobs within the company. None was a Negro.
fJovernm~nt Exit 2.04...
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there were improvements in the company's hiring practices.
The Court of Appeals commented that "T. I. M. E.-D. C.'s
recent minority hiring progress stands as a laudable good faith
effort to eradicate the effects of past discrimination in the area
of hiring and initial assignment." 22 517 F. 2d, at 316. But
the District Court and the Court of Appeals found upon substantial evidence that the com any had en a ed in a course
of discrimination that continued well after the effective ate
of Title vn~e com'Pany's later changes in its recent hiring and promotion policies could be little comfort to the victims of the earlier ~t-Act discrimination, and could not
erase its previous illegal conduct or its obligation to afford
relief to those who suffered because of it. Cf. Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, at 413-423. 23
22 For example, in 1971 the company hired 116 new line drivers, of
whom 16 were Negro or Spanish-surnamed Americans. Minority employees composed 7.1% of the company's systemwide work force in 1967
and 10.5% in 1972. Minority hiring increased greatly in 1972 and 1973,
presumably due at least in part to the existence of the consent decree.
See 517 F. 2d, at 316 n. 31.
2 3 The company's narrower attacks upon the statisHcal evidenc~tha.t
there was no precise delineation of the areas referred to in the general
population statistics, that the Government did not demonstrate that
minority populations were located close to terminals or that transportation
was available, that the statistics failed to show what portion of the
minority population was suited by age, health, or other qualifications to
hold trucking jobs, etc.-are equally lacking in force. At best, these
attacks go only to the accuracy of the comparison between the composition
of the company's work force at various terminals and the general population of the surrounding communities. They detract little from the Government's further showing that Negroes and Spanish-surnamed Americans who
were hired were overwhelmingly excluded from line-driver jobs. Such
employees were willing to work, had access to the terminal, were healthy
and of working age, and often were at least sufficiently qualified to hold
city-driver jobs. Yet they became line drivers with far less frequency
than whites. Sf'e, e. g., Pre-trial Stipulatjon 14, summarized at 517 F. 2d,
at 312 n. 24 (of 2,919 whites who held driving jobs in 1971, 1,802 (62%)
wert~ line driver::; and 1,117 (:38%) were city drivers; of 180 Negroes and
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The District Court and the Court of Appeals, o
e basis
of substantial evidence, held that the Governme had proved
a prima facie case of s stematic and
eyon t e effective date of
discrimmation, continuing we
'Title VII. The company's attempts to rebut that conclusion
were held to be inadequate. 24 For the reasons we have summarized, there is no warrant for this Court to disturb the findings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals on this
basic issue. See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U. S. 403, 408-409;
Faulkner v. Gibbs, 338 U. S. 267, 268; United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745, 751; United States v. Commercial Credit
Co., 286 U. S. 63, 67; United States v. Chemical Foundation,
Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 14; Baker v. Schofield, 243 U. S. 114, 118;
Towson v. Moore, 173 U. S. 17, 24.
;o;panish-surnamed Americans who held driving · jobs, 13 (7%) were line
olrivers and 167 (93%) were City drivers).
In any event, fine tuning of the statistics could not have obscured the
gl11ring absence of minority line drivers . As the Court of Appeals remarked, the company's inability to rebut the inference of discrimination
came not from a misuse of statistics but from "the inexorable zero:" 517
F. 2d, at 315.
24 The company's evidence, apart from the showing of recent changes in
hiring and promotion policies, consisted mainly of general statements that
1t hired only the best qualified applicants. But "affirmations of good
faith in making individual selections are insufficient to dispel a prima facie
case of sys.tematic exclusion." Alexander v: Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 632.
The company also attempted to show that all of the witnesses who
testified to specific instances of discrimination either were not discriminated
against or suffered no injury. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
the trial judge was not bound to accept this testimony and that it committed no error by relying inst,ead on the other overpowering evidence in
the case. 517 F. 2d, at 315. The Court of Appeals was also correct in
the view that proof that specific individuals were not harmed by the
<'ompany's discriminatory conduct was appropriately left to proceedings to
det rrminP individual relief. In a suit brought by the Government under
§ 707 (a) of the Act the District Court's initial concern is in deciding
whPt 11l'r the Government has proved that the defendant has engaged in .!\>
See infra, at 32-35.
1 11\tt Prn or practic~ of discrimin atory conduct.
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B
The District Court and the Court of Appeals also found
that the seniority system contained in the collective-bargainmg agreements between the company and the union operated
to violate Title VII of the Act.
For purposes of
ulating benefits, such as vacations, pensions, and other fringe ene s, an em loyee's seniority under
this system runs from the date he joins the company, and
takes into account his total service in all jobs and bargaining
units. For com,.Eetitive purp~s, however, such as determining the oraer in whiCTi empfoyees may bid for particular
jobs, are laid off, or are recalled from layoff, it~ bargainingunit senioilil;: that contr_ols. Thus, a line driver's seniority,
for purp";'ses orbidding for particular runs 25 and protection
against layoff, takes into account only the length of time he
has been a line driver at a particular terminal. 26 The practical effect is that a city driver or serviceman who transfers
to a line-driver job must forfeit all the competitive seniority
he has accumulated in his previous bargaining unit and start
at the bottom of the line-drivers' "board."
The vice of this arrangement, as found by the District
Court and the Court of Appeals, was that it "locked" minority
workers into inferior jobs and perpetuated prior discrimination by discouraging transfers to jobs as line drivers. While
the disincentive applied to all workers, including whites, it
was Negroes and Spanish-surnamed persons who, those courts
found, suffered the most because many of them had been
denied the equal opportunity to become line drivers when they
2 ~ Certain long-distance runs, for a. variety of reasons, are more desirable
rhan others. The best runs are chosen by the line drivers at the top of
rhf' "board"-a list of drivers arranged in order of their bargaining-unit

4Cll!OrJty .

~n

Both bargaining-unit seniority and company seniority rights are
limit•cd to service at one particular terminal, except as modified
f)\' thC' Southern Conference Area Over-the-Road Supplemental Agreement •
.-;('<' ~u wn. at 6- 7, n. 10.
~(' nerally
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were initially hired, whereas whites either had not sought or
were refused line-driver positions for reasons unrelated to their
race or national origin.
The linchpin of the theory embraced by the District Court
· and the Court of Appeals was that a discrimina.tee who must
forfeit his competitive seniority in order finally to obtain a
line-driver job will never be able to "catch up" to the seniority
level of his contemporary who was not subject to discrimination.27 Accordingly, this continued, built-in disadvantage to
the prior discriminatee who transfers to a line-driver job was
held to constitute a continuing violation of Title VII, for
which both the employer and the union who jointly created
and maintain the seniority system were liable.
The union, while acknowledging tha.t the seniority system may in some sense perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination , asserts that the system is immunized from a finding
of illegality by reason of § 703 (h) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-2 (h), which provides in part:
uNotwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for·
an employer to apply different standards of compensation,
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority ... system, . . .
provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race ... or national
. . ..• ."
ongm
27 An example would be a Negro who was QWilified to be a line driver
in 1958 but who, because of his race, was assigned instead a job as a city
dn ver, and is allowed to become a line driver only in 1971 . Because he ·
loses his competitive seniority when he transfers jobs, he is forever junior
to white line drivers, hired between 1958 and 1970. The whites, rather
tha n the Negro, will henceforth enjoy the preferable runs and the greater
protection against layoff. Alt hough the original discrimination occurred
111 1958-before the effective date of Title VII-the seniority system
nrlf'rat~ to carry the ~ffects of the earlier discrimination into the present.
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It argues that the seniority system in this case is "bona
fide " within the meaning of § 703 (h) when judged in light
of its history, intent, application, and all of the circumstances
under which it was created and is maintained. More specifically, the union cla.ims that the central purpose of
§ 703 (h) is to ensure that mere perpetuation of pre-Act discrimination is not unlawful under Title VII. And, whether
or not § 703 (h) immunizes the perpetuation of post-Act discrimination , the union claims that the seniority system in
t his case has no such effect. Its position in this Court,
as has been its position throughout this litigation, is that
the seniority system presents no hurdle to post-Act discriminatees who seek retroactive seniority to the date they would
have become line drivers but for the company's discrimination. Indeed, the union asserts that under its collective-bargaining agreements the union will itself take up the cause of
t he post-Act victim and attempt, through grievance procedures,
to gain for him full "make whole" relief, including appropriate seniority.
The Government responds that a seniority system that perpetuates the effects of prior discrimination-pre- or post-Actcan never be "bona fide" under § 703 (h); at a minimum Title
VII prohibits those applications of a seniority system that
perpetuate the effects on incumbent employees of prior discriminatory job assignments.
The issues thus joined are open ones in this Court. 28 We
~wa

-

Concededly, the view that § 703 (h) does not immunize seniority
'Ystems that perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination has much
support. It was appa rently first adopted in Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc. ,
279 F . Supp. 505 (ED Va. ) . The court there held that "a departmental
~eni ori t y system that has its genesis in racial discrimination is not a bona
fide seniority system." ld., at 517 (first emphasis added) . The Quarles
view has ~i nce enjoyed wholesale adoption in the Courts of Appeals. See,
~; g., Local 189, United Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F . 2d 980,
987-988 (CA5); Umted States v. Sheet Metal Work ers Local 36, 416
F. 2d 123, 133-134, n. 20 (CAS) ; United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp .,
·28
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considered§ 703 (h) in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,
supra, but there decided only that § 703 (h) does not bar the
award of retroactive seniority to job applicants who seek relief
from an employer's post-Act hiring discrimination. We stated
that "the thrust of [ § 703 (h)] is directed toward defining what
is and what is not an illegal discriminatory practice in in~
stances in which the post-Act operation of a seniority system
is challenged as perpetuating the effects of discrimination occurring prior to the effective date of the Act." 424 U. S., at
761. Beyond noting the general purpose of the statute, however, we did not undertake the task of statutory construction
required in this case.
(1)

Because the company discriminated both before and after
the enactment of Title VII, the seniority system is said to
have operated to perpetuate the effects of both pre- and postAct discrimination. Post-Act discriminatees, however, may
obtain full "make whol~' relie't,"incillai;g retroactive seniority
under Franks v. Bowman, supra, without attacking the legality of the seniority system as applied to them. Franks made
clear and the union acknowledges that retroactive seniority
may be awarded as relief from an employer's discriminatory
hiring and assignment policies even if the seniority system
agreement itself makes no provision for such relief. 29 424
446 F . 2d 652, 658-659 (CA2) ; Unit ed States v. Chesapeake & Ohio R .
Co., 471 F . 2d 582, 587-588 (CA4). Insofar as the result in Quarles and
in the cases t hat followed it depended upon findings that the seniority
systems were themselves " racially discriminatory" or had their "genesis in
racial discnmination," 279 F . Supp., at 517, the decisions can be viewed
as resting upon the proposition that a seniority system that perpetuates·
the effects of pre-Act discrimination cannot be bona fide if an intent to
discriminate entered into its very adoption.
20 Article 38 of the National Master Freight Agreement between
T I. M. E.-D. C. and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in effect
as of the date of t he systemwide lawsuit provided :
"The Emplo:r"Cr and the Union agree not to discriminate against any
i.nd.ividual with respect. to h.is hirin~, com~nsation, terms or cond.itiQnS of:

I
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U.S., at 778-779. Here the Government has proved that the
company engaged in a post-Act pattern of discriminatory
hiring, assignment, transfer, and promotion policies. Any
Negro or Spanish-surnamed American injured by those policies
may receive all appropriate relief as a direct remedy for this
discrimination.ao
(2)
What remains for review is the judgment that the seniority
system unlawfully perpetuated the effects,of pre-Act discrim~
ination. We must decide, in short, whether § 703 (h) validates otherwise bona fide seniority systems that afford no con~
structive seniority to victims discriminated against prior to
the effective date of Title VII, and it is to that issue that we
now turn.
The primary purpose of Title VII was "to assure equality
of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially
stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority
citizens." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, at 800.
See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, at 417-418;
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. , 415 U.S. 36, 44; Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., supra, at 429-431. To achieve this purpose,
Congress "proscribe[d] not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operaemployment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, nor will they limit, segregate or classify employees in any
way to deprive any individual employee of employment opportunities
because of his race, color, religion , sex, or national origin."
Any discrimination by the company would apparently be a grievable
breach of this provision of t he contract.
30 To the extent. that the legality of the seniority system insofar as it
perpetuatrs post-Act di~rriminnt.ion r.emains at issue in this case, our holding today in United Air Lines v. Evans, post, at - , is dispositive. Evmns
hold;; that under § 7m (h) the application of a bona fide seniority system
to a post-Act discriminatee does not constitute a separate violation of
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tion." Griggs, 401 U. S., at 431. Thus, the Court has re~
peatedly held that Title VII may be violated by policies or
practices that are neutral on their fs;,ce and in intent but that
nonetheless discriminate in ef'fect against a particular group.
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,- U.S.-,-; Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 246-247; Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, supra, at 422, 425; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
supra, at 802 n. 14; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra.
One species of practices "fair in form but discriminatory
in operation" are those that perpetuate the effects of prior
discrimination. 31 As the Court held in Griggs, supra: "Under
the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face,
and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if
they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices." 401 U. S., at 430.
Were it not for§ 703 (h), the seniority system in this case
would seem to fall under the Griggs rationale. The heart of
the system is its allocation of the choicest jobs, the greatest
protection against layoffs, and other advantages to those
employees who have been line drivers for the longest time.
Where, because of the employer's prior intentional discrimination, the line drivers with the longest tenure are without
exception white, the advantages of the seniority system flow
disproportionately to them and away from Negro and Spanish-surnamed employees who might by now have enjoyed
those advantages had not the employer discriminated before
81 Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F. 2d 1047 (CA5), provides
an apt illustration. There a union had a policy of excluding persons not
related to present members by blood or marriage. When in 1966 suit was
brought to challenge this policy, all of the union's members were white,
largely as a result of pre-Act, intentional racial discrimination. The court
observed: "While the nepotism requirement is applicable to black and
white alike and is not on its face discriminatory, in a completely white
union the present effect of its continued application is to forever deny to
""egroes and Mexican-Americans any real opportunity for membership! 1
~07 F . 2d.! at 10.)4,
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the passage of the Act. This disproportionate distribution of
advantages does in a very real sense "operate to 'freeze' the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."
Ibid. But both the literal terms of § 703 (h) and the legislative history of Title VII demonstrate that Congress considered
this very effect of many seniority systems and extended a
measure of immunity to them.
Throughout the initial consideration of H. R. 7152, later
enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, critics of the bill
charged that it would destroy existing seniority rights. 82 The
consistent response of Title VII's congressional proponents
and of the Justice Department was that seniority rights would
not be affected, even where the employer had discriminated
prior to the Act. 33 An interpretative memorandum placed in
the Congressional Record by Senators Clark and Case stated:
"Title VII would have no effect on established seniority
rights. Its effect is prospective and not retrospective.
Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating
in the past and as a result has an all-white working
force, when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes,
or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes:
are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the
expense of the white workers hired earlier." 110 Cong.
Rec. 7213 (1964) (emphasis added). 84
E. g., H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 65-66, 71 (1963)
(minority report); 110 Cong. Rec. 486-488 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Hill);
id., at 2726 (remarks of Rep. Dowdy); id., at 7091 (remarks of Sen.
Stennis).
·
33 In addit ion to the material cited in Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S., at
759-762, see 110 Cong. Rec. 1518 (1964) (remarks of Rep . Celler); id.,
'at 6549 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 6564 (remarks of 8en.
Kuchel) .
3 4 Senators Clark and Case were the "bipartisan captains" responsible
32
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A Justice Department statement concerning Title VII, placed
in t~e Congressional Record by Senator Clark, voiced the same
'conclusion:
"Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights exist~
ing at the time it takes effect. If, for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in the event of
layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first,
such a provision would not be affected in the least by
Title VII. This would be true even in the case where
owing to discrimination prior to the effective date of the
title, white workers had more seniority than Negroes."
ld., at 7207 (emphasis added). 85
While these statements were made before § 703 (h) was
added to Title VII, they are authoritative indicators of that
section's purpose. Section 703 (h) was enacted as part of the
Mansfield-Dirksen compromise substitute bill that cleared the
for Title VII during the Senate debate. Bipartisan captains were selected
for each title of the Civil Rights Act by the leading proponents of the Act
in both parties. They were responsible for explaining their title in detail,
defending it, and leading discussion on it. See 110 Cong. Rec. 6528 (1964)
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey); Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7
.B. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 431,444-445 (1966).
35 The full text of the statement is set out in Franks v. Bowman, 424
U. S., at 760 n. 16. Senator Clark also introduced a set of answers to
questions propounded by Senator Dirksen, which included the following
exchange :
"Question. Would the same situation prevail in respect to promotions,
when that management. function is governed by a labor contract calling for
promotions on the basis of seniority? What of dismissals? Normally,
labor cont racts call for 'last hired, first fired.' If the last hired are Negroes,
is the employer discriminating if his contract requires they be first fired
and the remaining employees are white?
" Answer. Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under·
a 'last hired, first fired' agreement a Negro happens to be the 'last hired,'
he can still be 'first fired' as long as it is done because of his status as 'last
hired' and not because of his race.'' 110 Cong. Rec. 7217 ( 1964) . S~
fra,nk~, ~upra1 at 760 n, 16.
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way for the passage of Title VII. 36 The drafters of the compromise bill stated that one of its principal goals was to resolve
the ambiguities in the House-passed version of H. R. 7152.
See, e. g., id., at 11935-11937 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen); id.,
at 12707 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). As the debates indicate, one of those ambiguities concerned Title VII's impact
on existing collectively bargained seniority rights. It is apparent that § 703 (h) was drafted with an eye toward meeting the earlier criticism on this issue with an explicit provision
embodying the understanding and assurances of the Act's proponents : namely, that Title VII would not outlaw such
differences in treatment among employees as flowed from a
bona fide seniority system that allowed for full exercise of
seniority accumulated before the effective date of the Act.
It is inconceivable that§ 703 (h), as part of a compromise bill,
was intended to vitiate the earlier representations of the Act's
supporters by increasing Title VII's impact on seniority systems. The statement of Senator Humphrey, noted in Franks,
supra, at 761, confirms that the addition of § 703 (h) "merely
clarifies {Title VII's] present intent and effect." 110 Cong.
Rec. 12723 (1964).
In sum, the unmistakable purpose of§ 703 (h) was to make
clear that the routine application of a bona fide seniority
system would not be unlawful under Title VII. As the legislative history shows, this was the intended result even where
the employer's pre-Act discrimination resulted in whites having greater existing seniority rights than Negroes. Although
a seniority system inevitably tends to perpetuate the effects of
pre-Act discrimination in such cases, the congressiqnal judgment was that Title VII should not outlaw the use of existing
seniority lists and thereby destroy or water down the vested
seniority rights of employees simply because their employer
had engaged in discrimination prior to the passage of the Act.
:w See Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S., a.t 761; Vass, Title VII: Legislative
'Histo ry, 7 B. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 431 1 435 (1966).
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To be sure, § 703 (h) does not immunize all seniority sys..
terns. It refers only to "bona fide" systems, and a proviso
requires that any differences in treatment not be "the result
of an intention to discriminate because of race ... or national
origin .. .. " But our reading of the legislative history compels us to reject the Government's broad argument that no
seniority system that tends to perpetuate pre-Act discrimination can be "bona fide." To accept the argument would require us to hold that a seniority system becomes illegal simply
because it allows the full exercise of the pre-Act seniority
rights of employees of a company that discriminated before
T itle VII was enacted. It would place an affirmative obligation on the parties to the seniority agreement to subordinate
those rights in favor of the Claims of pre-Act discriminatees
without seniority. The consequence would be a perversion of
the congressional purpose. We cannot accept the invitation to
disembowel § 703 (h) by reading the word "bona fide" as the
Government would have us do. 37 Accordingly, we hold that
an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination. Congress did not intend to
make it illegal for employees with vested seniority rights to
continue to exercise those rights, even at the expense of preAct discriminatees.
That conclusion is inescapable even in a case, such as this
37 For the same reason, we reject the contention that the proviso in
§ 703 (h) , which bars differences in treatment resulting from "an intention
to disrriminate," applies to any application of a. seniority system that may
perpetuate past di ~c rimin ation. In this regard the language of the Justice
Department memorandum introduced at the legislative hearings, see supra,
ilt 24, is especia.!ly pertinent: "It is perfectly clear that when a worker is
laid off or denied a chance for promotion because he is 'low man on the
totem pole' he is not bcmg discriminated against because of his race . . . .
Any differences in t reatment based on established seniority rights would"
not br based on race and would not be forbidden by the title." 110 Cong;..
Hre . 7207 (1964) .
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one, where the pre-Act discriminatees are incumbent employees who accumulated seniority in other bargaining units. Although there seems to be no explicit reference in the legislative
history to pre-Act discriminatees already employed in less
desirable jobs, there can be no rational basis for distinguishing
their claims from those of persons initially denied any job but
hired later with less seniority than they might have had in the
absence of pre-Act discrimination. 38 We rejected any such
distinction in Franks, finding that it had "no support anywhere in Title VII or its legislative history," 424 U. S., at
768. As discussed above, Congress in 1964 made clear that
a seniority system is not unlawful because it honors employees' existing rights, even where the employer has engaged in pre-Act discriminatory hiring or promotion practices.
It would be as contrary to that mandate to forbid the exercise
of seniority rights with respect to discriminatees who held
inferior jobs as with respect to later-hired minority employees
who previously were denied any job. If anything, the latter
group is the more disadvantaged. As in Franks," '[i]t would
indeed be surprising if Congress gave a remedy for the one
[group] which it denied for the other.'" !d., quoting Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187. 311
38 That Title VII did not proscribe the denial of fictional seniority to
pre-Act discriminatees who got no job was recognized even in Quarles v.
Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (ED Va.), and its progeny.
Quarles stressed the fact that the references in the legislative history were
to employment seniority rather than departmental seniority. 279 F.
Snpp., at 516. In Local 189, United 'Paperwor"kers v. United States, 416
F . 2d 980 (CA5), another leading case in this area, the court observed:
"No doubt, Congress, to prevent 'reverse discrimination' meant to protect
certain seniority rights that could not have existed but for previous racial
discrimination . For example a Negro who had been rejected ·by an
employer on racial grounds before passage of the Act could not, after· being
hirt>d, claim to outrank whites who had been hired before him but after
his original rt>jPction, ewn though the Negro might have ·had senior status
but for the past discrimination." 416 F. 2d, at 994.
80
In addition, there is no reason to suppose that Congress intended in
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The seniori!l_ system in thls case is entirely bona fide. It
ttpplies equJly to all races and etiinic groups. To the ex..
tent that it "locks" employees into nonline-driver jobs, it
does so for all. The city drivers and servicemen who are dis..
couraged from transferring to line-driver jobs are not all
Negroes or Spanish-surnamed Americans; to the contrary, the
overwhelming majority are white. The placing of line drivers
in a separate bargaining unit from other employees is rational,
in accord with the industry practice, and consistent with
NLRB precedents! 0 It is conceded that the seniority system
· did not have its genesis in racial discrimination, and that it
was negotiated and has been maintained free from any illegal
purpose. In these circumstances, the single fact that the
system extends no retroactive seniority to pre-Act discriminatees does not make it unlawful.
Because the seniority system was protected by § 703 (h),
the union's conduct in agreeing to and maintaining the system
1964 to extend less protection to legitimate departmental seniority systems
than to plant-wide seniority systems. Then as now, seniority was measured
in a number of ways, including length of time with the employer, in a
particular plant, in a department, in a job, or in a line of progression.
See Aaron, Reflectjons on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority
ltight.s, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1534 (1962); Cooper & Sobel, Seniority
and Testing under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach too
Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1602'
(1969). The legislative history contains no suggestion that any one system
was preferred.
40 See Georgia Highway E:tpress, 150 N. L. R. B. 1649, 1651: "The
l3oard has long held that local drivers and over-the-road drivers constitute·
separate appropriate units where they are shown to be clearly defined,
homogeneous, and functionaJly distinct groups with separate interests which
can effectively be represented separately for bargaining purposes. . . . In
view of the different duties and functions, separate supervision, and different
bases of payment, it is clear that the over-the-road drivers have divergent
interests from those of the employees in the [city operations] unit ... and
r;hould. not be \ncluded in that unit."
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did not violate Title VII. On remand, the District Court's
injunction against the union must be vacated. 41

III
Our conclusion that the seniority system does not violate
Title VII will necessarily affect the remedy granted to
individual employees on remand of this litiga.tion to the
District Court. Those employees who suffered only pre-Act
discrimination are not entitled to relief, and no person may
be given retroactive seniority to a date earlier than the effective date of the Act. Several other questions relating to the
appropriate measure of individual relief remain, however, for
our consideration.
The petitioners argue generally that the trial court did
not err in tailoring the remedy to the "degree of injury" suffered by each individual employee, and that the Court of
Appeals' "qualifica.tion date" formula sweeps with too broad
a brush by granting a remedy to employees who were not
shown to be actual victims of unlawful discrimination. Specifically, the petitioners assert that no employee should be entitled to relief until the Government demonstrates that he was
an actual victim of the company's discriminatory practices;
that no employee who did not apply for a ·line-driver job
should be granted retroactive competitive seniority; and that
no employee should be elevated to a line-driver job ahead
of any current line driver on layoff status. We consider each
of these contentions separately.

A
The petitioners' first contention IS m substance that the
Government's burden of proof in a pattern or practice case
.tl The union will properly remain in this litigation as a defendant so
that full relief may be awarded the victims of the employer's post-Ad
discrimination . Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19 (a) . See EEOC v. Mac,.¥_illan J}loedel Containers/ Inc., 503' F. ' 2d 1086, 1095 (CA6). ~
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must be equivalent to that outlined in McDonnell Douglas v.
Green, supra. Since the Government introduced specific evi~
dence of company discrimination against only some 40 employ~
ees, they argue that the District Court properly refused to
award retroactive seniority to the remainder of the class of
minority incumbent employees.
In McDonnell Douglas the Court considered "the order
and allocation of proof in a private non~class action challeng~
ing employment discrimination." 411 U. S., at 800. We
held that an individual Title VII complainant must carry the
initial burden of proof by establishing a prima facie case of
racial discrimination. On the specific facts there involved,
we concluded that this burden was met by showing that a
qualified applicant, who was a member of a racial minority
group, had unsuccessfully sought a job for which there was
a vacancy and for which the employer continued thereafter
to seek applicants with similar qualifications. This initial
showing justified the inference that the minority applicant
was denied an employment opportunity for reasons prohibited
by Title VII, and therefore shifted the burden to the employer
to rebut that inference by offering some legitimate, nondis~
criminatory reason for the rejection. Id., at 802.
The company and union seize upon the McDonnell Douglas
pattern as the only means of establishing a prima facie case of
individual discrimination. Our decision in that case, how~
ever, did not purport to crea.te an inflexible formulation. We
expressly noted that "the fa,cts will necessarily vary in Title
VII cases, and the specification . . . of the prima facie proof
required from '[a plaintiff] is not necessarily applicable in
every respect to differing factual situations." 411 U. S., at
802 n. 13. The importance of McDonnell Douglas lies not in
its specification of the discrete elements of proof there required, but in its recognition of the general principle tha,t any
T itle VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering
evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment

7
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decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under
the Act. 42
In Franks v. Bowman the Court applied this principle in
the context of a class action. The Franks plaintiffs proved,
to the satisfaction of a district court, that Bowman Transportation Company "had engaged in a pattern of racial discrimination in various company policies, including hiring, transfer, and discharge of employees." 424 U. S., at 751. Despite
this showing, the trial court denied seniority relief to certain
members of the class of discriminatees because not every individual had shown that he was qualified for the job qe_sought
and tha.t a vacancy had been available. We held tha.t the
trial court had erred in placing this burden on the individual
plaintiffs. By "demonstrating the existence of a discriminatory hiring pattern and practice" the plaintiffs had made out a
prima facie case of discrimination against the individual class
members; the burden theEJ2re slti!,_ted to the emplo,TI)r ".!:,o
prove that individuals wh rea) 1 were not in fact victims
. S., at 772. The
of prevwus hiring d1scrim ation." 4
Fran rs case t 1us 1 ustrates another means by which a Title
VII plaintiff's initial burden of proof can be met. The class
there alleged a broad-based policy of employment discrimination; upon proof of that allegation there were reasonable
grounds to infer that individual hiring decisions were made in
" 2 The McDonnell Douglas case involved an individual complainant
seeking to prove one instance of unlawful discrimination. An employ'6r's
isolated decision to reject. an applicant who belongs to a racial minority
does not. show that. the rejection was racially based. Although the
McDonne'll Douglas formula does not require direct proof of discrimination, it does demand that the alleged discriminatee demonstrate at. least
t hat his rejection did not result from the two most common legitimate
reasons on whieh an employer might rely to reject a job applicant: an
absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in
the job sought. Elimination of these reasons for the refusal to hire is
>Ufficient, ab~ent other ~xplanation, to crea.t e an inference that the decision
WH~ a di;;crhninatory one.

l
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pursuit of the discriminatory policy and to require the em..
ployer to come forth with evidence dispelling that inference! 3
Although not all class actions will necessarily follow the
Franks model, the nature of a pattern or practice suit ~rings
it sauarel~thln Q.'!!:, holdW:g in Franks. The plaintiff in a
pattern or practice action is the Government, and its initial
burden is to demonstrate that ·unlawful discrimination has
been a regular procedure or p6licy,[followed by an employer
or group of employers. See pp. 9-10, and n. 16, supra. At the
initial, "liability" stage of a pa.ttern or practice suit the Government is not required to offer evidence that each person for
whom it will ultimately seek relief was a victim of the employer's ·discriminatory policy. Its burden is to establish a
prima facie case that such a policy existed. · The burden then
-shifts to the employer to defeat the prima ·facie showin of a
pattern or practice y emons ra mg at e overnment's
proof is either inaccurate or insignificant. An employer might
~ 3 The holding in Franks 'that proof of a discriminatory pattern and prac~ (
tice creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of"individual relief is consistent with the manner in which presumptions are created generally. Presumptions shifting the burden of proof are often created to reflect judicial
evalua.tions of probabilities and to conform with a pa.r ty's superior access
to the proof. See C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence
§§ 337, 343 (E. Cleary ed. 1972); James, Burdens of Proof, 47 Va. L. Rev.
· 51, 61 (1961). See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209,
These factors were present in Franks. Although the prima. facie case did
not conclusively demonstrate that all of the employer's decisions were part
of the proven discriminatory pattern and practice, it did create a greater
hkelihood that any single decision was a component of the overall pattern.
Moreover, the finding of a pattern or practice changed the position of the
·employer to that of a proven wrongdoer. Finally, the employer was in the
best position to show why any individual employee was denied an employment opportunity. Insofar as the reasons related to available vacancies
or the employer's evaluation of the applicants' qualifications, the company's records were the most relevant items of proof. If the refusal to
hire was based on other factors, the employer and its agents knew best
what thot;e factors were and the extent to which ther influenced the
qf'rision-making proces..-:.

I
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show, for example, that the claimed discriminatory pattern i&
a product of pre-Act hiring rather than unlawful post-Act
discrimination, or that during the period it is alleged to have
pursued a discriminatory policy it made too few employment
decisions to justify the inference that it had engaged in a
regular practice of discrimination. 44
If an employer fails to rebut the inference that arises from
the Government's prima facie case, a trial court may then
conclude tha,t a violation has occurred and determine the appropriate remedy. Without any further evidence from the
Government, a court's finding of a pattern or practice justifies
an award of prospective relief. Such relief might take the
form of an injunctive order against continuation of the discriminatory practice, an order that the employer keep records
of its future employment decisions and file periodic reports
with the court, or any other order "necessary to ensure the
full enjoyment of the rights" protected by Title Vll. 4 5
When the Government seeks individual relief for the victims
of the discrim"i'illitory practice, a district court must usually
conduct additional proceedings after the liability phase of the
H The employer's defen~e must, of course, be designed to meet the prima
facie case of the Government. We do not mean to suggest that there are
any particular limits on the type of evidence an employer may use. The
point Js t.hat at the liability stage of a pattern o'r practice trial the focus
often will not be on individual hiring decisions, hut on a pattern of
discriminatory decisionmaking. While a pattern 'might he demonstrated
by examining the discrete decisions of which it is composed, the Government's suits have more commonly involved proof of the expected result
of a regularly followed discrimina ory policy. In such cases the employer's
burden is to provide a nondiscriminatory explanation for the apparently
disc riminatory result. See n. 20, and cases cited therein, supra.
45 The federal courts have freely exerCised their broad equitable discretion to devise prospective relief designed to assure that employers found
•o be in violation of § 707 (a) eliminate their discriminatory practices and
the effects therefrom. See, e. g., cases cited in n. 48, infra. In this case
prospective relief was incorporated In the parties' consent decree. See
"l.pra, at :~-4 : n. 4.
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trial to determine the scope of individual relief. The peti..
~ '.Jtioners' contention in this case is that if the Government h a s - (
not, in the course of proving a pattern or practice, already
brought forth specific evidence that each individual was discriminatorily denied an employment opportunity, it must
carry that burden at the second, "remedial" sta.ge of trial.
That basic contention was rejected in the Franks case. As
~~ ~
was true of the particular facts in Franks, and as is typical of
Title VII pattern or practice suits, the question of individual
relief does not arise until it has been proved that the employer
has followed an employment policy of unlawful discrimination ..
The force of that proof does not dissipate at the remedial stage
of the trial. The employer cannot, therefore, claim that there
is no reason to believe that its individual employment decisions were discriminatorily based; it has already been shown to
have maintained a policy of discriminatory decisionmaking. _
The proof of the pattern or practice supports
iijference·
that any particular employment decision, during the period
which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in
pursuit of that policy. The Government need only show that
an individual alleged discriminatee unsuccessfully a lied for
a job 4 0 and was a likely victim of the roven ISCrtmination.
As in Franks, the bur en t en rests on the employer to emonstrate that the individual applicant was denied an employment opportunity for lawful reasons. See 424 U. S., at 773·
u. 32.
In Part II-A, supra, we have held that the District Court.
and Court of Appeals were not in error in finding that the
Government had proved a systemwide pattern and practice
of racial and ethnic discrimination on the part of the company.
On remand, therefore, every post-Act applicant 47 for a line-

v-1~
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Nonapplicants are discussed in Part III-B, infra.
Employees who initially applied for line-driver jobs and were hired in
· >ther jobs before the effective date of the Act, and who did not later apply
to r transfer to line-driver jobs, are part of the grout> of nonapplicant&;
10

17

rlisrn ~srd

in fm,

15-636 & 15-672--0PINION

TEAMSTERS v. UNITED STATES

3S

driver position will be presumptively entitled to relief, subject
to a showing by the company that its earlier refusal to place
the applicant in a line-driver job was not based on its policy
of discrimination.' 8
B
The Court of Appeals' 11 qualification date" formula for relief did not distinguish between incumbent employees who
had applied for line-driver jobs and those who had not. The
appellate court held that where there has been a showing of
classwide discriminatory practices coupled with a seniority
system that perpetuates the effects of that discrimination, an
individual member of the class need not show that he unsuccessfully applied for the position from which the class had
been excluded. In support of its award of relief to all nonapplicants, the Court suggested that 11 as a practical matter ...
a member of the affected class may well have concluded that
an application for transfer to an all White position such as
fline driver] was not worth the candle." 517 F. 2d, a.t 320.
The company contends that a grant of retroactive seniority
to these nonapplicants is inconsistent with the make-whole
purpose of a Title VII remedy and impermissibly will require
the company to give preferential treatment to employees
solely because of their race. The thrust of the company's
contention is that unless a minority-group employee actually
applied for a line-driver job, either for initial hire or for
transfer, he has suffered no injury from whatever discrimination might have been involved in the refusal of such jobs to
those who actually applied for them.
The Government argues in response that there should be
uo 11 immutable rule" that nonapplicants are nonvictims, and
contends that a determination whether nonapplicants have
•$ Any nondiscriminatory justification offered by the company will be
:-ubject to further evidence by the Government that the purported reason
lm an applicant '~; rejection was in fa.ct a pretext for unlawful ctiscrimina.'!vll
}lfDcmnell /)ouglaRs v. Green, supra, at 804-806.

\
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euft'ered from unlawful discrimination will necessarily vary
depending on the circumstances of each particular case. The
Government further asserts that under the specific facts of
'this case, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that all
qualified nonapplicants were likely victims and were therefore
presumptively entitled to relief.
The question whether seniority relief may be awarded to
nonapplicants was left open by our decision in Franks, since
the class at issue in that case was limited to "identifiable
applicants who were denied employment . . . after the effective date of ... Title VII." 424 U. S., at 750. We now
decide tha.t an incumbent employee's failure to apply for a joblS not an inexorable bar to an award of retroactive seniority.
We further hold that evidentiary hearings will
req uired m
this case to · ·
licants an o ortunity to

be

treated as applican sand therefore are presumptively entitled
to seniority relief.
(1)
Analysis of this problem must begin with the premise that
the scope of a district court's remedial powers under Title VII
IS determined by the purposes of the Act.
Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, supra, at 417. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
supra, and again in Albemarle, the Court noted that a primary
objective of Title VII is prophylactic: to achieve equal employment opportunity and to remove the barriers that have
operated to favor white male employees over othe1r employees.
401 U. S., at 429'-430; 422 U. S., at 417. The prospect of
retroactive relief for victims of discrimination serves this
purpose by providing the "'spur or catalyst which causes
employers and unions to self-examine and to seM-evaluate
their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so
far as possible. the last vestiges' " of their disc:riminatory
practices. Albemarle, supra, at 417-418. An equally imporrant purpose of the Act is "to make persons whole :for injuries

,.-,
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$Uffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.'!
ld., at 418. In determining the specific remedies to be
afforded, a district court is "to fashion such relief as the particular circumstances of a case may require to effect restitution." Franks v. Bowman, supra, at 764.
Thus, the Court has held that the purpose of Congress in
vesting broad equitable powers in Title VII courts was "to
make possible the 'fashion [ing] [of] the most complete relief
possible,' " and that the district courts have "not merely the
power but the duty to rendet a decree which will so far as
possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as
well as bar like discrimination in the future." Albemarle,
supra, at 421, 418. More specifically, in Franks we decided
that a court must ordinarily award a seniority remedy unless
there exist reasons for denying relief "'which if applied gen:.
erally, would not frustrate the central purposes of eradicating
discrimination and making persons whole for injuries suffered.' " 424 U. S., at 771, quoting Albemarle, supra, at 421.
Measured against these standards, the company's assertion ~
that a person who has not actually applied for a job can
never be awarded seniority relief cannot prevail. The effects
of and the injuries suffered from discriminatory employment
practices are not always confined to those who were expressly
denied a requested employment opportunity. A consistently
enforced discriminatory policy can surely deter job applications from those who are aware of it and are unwilling to subject themselves to the humiliation of explicit and certain
rejection.
If an employer should announce his policy of discrimination by a sign reading "Whites Only" on the hiring-office door,
his victims would not be limited to the few who ignored the
sign and subjected themselves to personal rebuffs. The same
message can be commumcated to potential applicants more
subtly but just as clearly by an empioyer's actual practices-by his consistent discriminatory treatment of actual appli::.

?7

75- 636 & 75-672-0PINION
TEAMSTERS v. UNITED. ·sTATES
·~

'oimts, by the manner in which he publicizes v~cancies, his rebf!uitment, techniques, his responses to casual or tentative
inquires, and even by the racial or ethnic composition of that
part of his workforce from which he has discriminatorily
excluded members of minority groups. 40 When a person)s
desire for a job is not translated into a formal
i
on
solely because of his unwillingness to engage in futlie esture
he is as much a victim of discrimination as is e who goes
through
the motions of submitting
an ,application.
'
l
.
-.
In cases decided uhdet the National Labor Relations Act,
the model for Title VII's remedial provisions, Albemarle;
mpra, at 419; Franks, supra, at 769, the National Labor Rela~~IJM, a.*' 419';" PrtJ1¥1Je8, 8ttprtt;, at 769, tse "NatieR!M I.ab9P ll.ila ..
tions Board, and the courts in enforcing its orders, have rec~
ognized that the failure to submit a futile application doe~
:not bar an award of relief to a person claiming that he was
C!enied employment because of union affiliation or activitY.
In NLRB v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp. , 316 U. S.
105, this Court enforced an order of the Board directing an
employer to hire, with retroactive benefits, former employees
who had not applied for newly available jobs because of the
employer's well-known policy of refusing to hire union mem6

•

~

.

49 The far-ranging effects of subtle discriminatory .Practices have not.
escaped the scrutiny of the federal courts, which have not hesitated to
p rovide relief from practices designed to discourage job applications from
minority-group m~mbe rs. See, e. g., Franks _v. J.1owman Transportation
Co., 495 F. 2d 398, 418-419 (CA5) (public recruitment and advertising), rev'd on other grounds, 424 U. S. 747; Carter v. Gallagher, 452
F . 2d 315 (CA8) (recruitment) ; United States v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., 451 F. 2d 418, 458 (CA5) (posting of job vacancies and job qualification requirements) ; United States v . Local No. 8, JAB , S, 0 , &
R . 1., 315 F. Supp . 1202, 1238, 1245-1246 (WD Wash.) (dissemination of information), aff'd, 443 F . 2d 544 (CA9) . While these measures may hf' cffrctiw m preventing the deterrence of future appli ca nt~-,
they rtfford -no· rrlief to t hose persons who in the past desired- jobs but
were ititiirtidated and discouraged by employment discriminatioh.
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hers. See In re Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 26
N. L. R. B. 1182, 1208, 1231. Similarly, when an application
would have been no more than a vain gesture in light of employer discrimination, the Courts of Appeals ha.ve enforced
Board orders reinstating striking workers despite the failure
of individual strikers to apply for reinstatement when the
strike ended. E. g., NLRB v. Park Edge Sheridan Meats,
Inc., 323 F. 2d 956 (CA2); NLRB v. Valley Die Cast Corp.,
303 F. 2d 64 (CA6); Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., v.
NLRB, 119 F. 2d 903 (CAS). See also Piasecki Aircraft Corp.
v. NLRB , 280 F. 2d 575 (CA3); NLRB v. Anchor Rome MiUs,
228 F. 2d 775 (CA5); NLRB v. Lummus Co., 210 F. 2d 377
(CA5). Consistent with the NLRA model, several Courts of
Appeals have held in Title VII cases that a nonapplicant can
be a victim of unlawful discrimination entitled to make-whole
relief when an applica.tion would have been a useless act serving only to confirm a discriminatee's knowledge that the job
he wanted was unavailable to him. Acha v. Beame, 531 F. 2d
648, 656 (CA2); Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F. 2d
226. 231- 233 (CA4); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F. 2d
441 , 451 (CA5); United States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 479
F. 2d 354, 369 (CA8).
The denial of Title VII relief on the ground that the claim-,
ant had not formally applied for the job could exclude from
the Act's coverage the victims of the most entrenched forms
of discrimination. Victims of gross and pervasive discrimination could be denied relief precisely because the unlawful practices had been so successful as totally to deter job applications from members of minority groups. A per se prohibition
of relief to nonapplicants could thus put beyond the reach
of equity the most invidious effects of employment discrimination- those that extend to the very hope of self-realization.
Such a pe'r se limitation on the equitable powers granted to
courts by Title VII would be manifestly inconsistent with the
"historic purpose of equitr to 'secur[e] comvlete justice'" and'
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with the duty of courts in Title VII cases " 'to rende
which will so far as possible eliminate the · riminatory
effects of the past.' " Albemarle Paper Co. . Moody, supra,
at 418.
(2)
To conclude that a person's failure to submit an application
for a job does not inevitably and forever foreclose his entitlement to seniority relief under Title VII is a far cry, however,
from holding that nonapplicants are always entitled to such
relief. A nonagplicant must show that he was a potential
victim ofunlawftii diScrimination. Because he is necessarily
cl~mg ihatlle=was deterred from applying for the job by the
employer's discriminatory practices, his is the not always easy
burden to prove that he would have applied for
a
it not been for those practices. Cf. M t. Healthy City School
District Board of Education v. Doyle, U. S. - , - .
When this burden is met, the nonapplicant is in a position
analogous to that of an applicant and is entitled to the
presumption discussed in Part III-A, supra.
The Government contends that the evidence it presented
in this case at the liability stage of the trial identified all nonapplicants as victims of unlawful discrimination "with a fair
degree of speeific~ourt of Appeals' determination at qualifled nonapplicant"iare presumptively entitled to a award of seniority should ac rdingly be affirmed.
In suppor of this contention the
vernment cites its proof
an practice of discrimination as eviof an exten
dence that an application from a minority employee for a
line-driver job would have been a vain and useless act. It
/ urther argues that since the class of nonapplicant discriminatees is limited to incumbent employees, it is likely that
every class member was aware of the futility of seeking a linedriver job and was therefore deterred from filing both an initial and a followu p application. 50
.5o

ThP l.itnitatiqn to incumbent employees is also said tQ serve the
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We cannot agree. While the scope and duration of the
company's discriminatory policy can leave little doubt that
the futility of seeking line-driver jobs was communicated to
ihe company's minority employees, that in itself is insufficient.
The known prospect of discriminatory rejection shows only
that employees who wanted line-driving jobs may have been
deterred from applying for them. It does not show which of
the nonapplicants actually wanted such jobs. There are dif·
ferences between city and line-driving jobs,.51 for example, but
~Y of the latter is not so self-evident as to warrant
a conclusion that all employee~ would prefer to be line drivers
if given a free choice. 52 Indeed, a substantial number of white
function that actual job applications serve in a case like Franks: providing
a means of distinguishing members of the excluded minority group from
minority members of the public at large. While it is true that incuril•
bency in this case and actual applications in Franks both serve to narrow
what might otherwise be an impossible task, the status of nonincumbent
applicant and nonapplicant incumbent differ substantially. The refused
applicants in Franks had been denied an opportunity they clearly sought,
and the only issue-to be resolved was wlietnert he aenial was pursuant to
a proven discriminatory practice. Resolution of the nonapplicant's claim,
however, requires two distinct determinations: that he would have applied
but for discrimination and that he would have been discriminatorily
rejected had he applied. The mere fact of incumbency does not resolve
the fir~:~t i:ssue, although it may tend to support a. nonapplicant's claim to
the extent that it shows he was willing o wor as a nver, t at e was
fa miliar with the tasks of line drivers, etc. An incumbent's claim that he
would have applied for a line-driver job would certainly be more superfici ally plausible than a similar claim by a member of the general public
who may never have worked in the truckin ·
tr or heard d
T. I. M. E.-D. C. prior to suit. We have in this case no occasion to
er w e er or m what Circumstances nonincumbent nonapphcants
f the employees for whom the Government soug
'!riving jobs, nearly one-third held city-driver positions.
2
'" The company 's line drivers generally earned more annually than its
dt y drivers, but the difference varied from under $1,000 to more than $5,000
'•!~>pending on the terminal and the year. In 1971 city drivers at t~

~~
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~
/
t~?
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'city drivers who were not subjected to the company's discriminatory practices were apparently content to retain their
city jobs. 63
In order to fill this evidentiary gap, the Government argues
that a nonapplicant's current willingness to transfer into a
line-driver position confirms his past desire for the job. An
employee's response to the court-ordered notice of his entitle·california. terminals, "LOS" and San Francisco, earned substantially more
than the line drivers at those terminals. In addition to earnings, line
drivers have the advantage of not being required to load and unload their
trucks. City drivers, however, have regular working hours, are not
required to spend extended periods away from home and family, and do
not face the hazards of long-distance driving at high speeds. As the Government acknowledged at argument, the jobs are in some sense "parallel"some may prefer one job and some may prefer another.
The District Court found generally that line-driver jobs "are considered \
the most desirable of the 'driving jobs." That finding is not challenged
here, and we see no reason to disturb it. We observe only that the
· differences between city and line driving were not such that it can be said
~ • ~
with confidence that all minority employees free from the threat of dis~
i21:!~
criminatory treatment· would have chosen to give up cit.y for line driving/
•
63 In addition to the futility of application, the Court of Appeals seems to
~ ~
have relied on the minority employees' accumulated seniority in nonlinedriver positions in concluding that nonapplicants had been unlawfully del) ' ~
terred from applying. See 517 F. 2d, at 318,320. The Government adopts
~
that theory here, argui~g that a nonappli.cant who has accrued time at the
c~.
company would be unhkely to have a.pphed for transfer because he would ~ v-~
have had to forfeit all of his competitive seniority and the job security
/} ~
• • jJ _ •
that went with it. In view of our conclusion in Part II-B, supra, this ~
argument detracts from ra:t her than supports a nona.pplicant's entit.lement
to relief. To the extent. that an incumbent was deterred from applying by
~-'
his desire to retain his competitive seniority, he simply did not want a
- {
I
line-driver job requiring him to start at the bottom of the "board." Those
J-t'
7--D~
1 (...L.L nonapplicru1ts who did not apply for transfer because t.hey were unwilling
to give up their previously acquired seniority suffered only from a lawful
~
...
dE'terrent imposed on all E'mployees regardlE'SS of race or ethnicity. The
nonapplicant's remedy in such cases is limited solely to the relief, if any,
to which hE' may be entitled because of the discrimina.tion he encountered
tt,t. a tim_e wh~n he wanted to take a, starting line-driver job.

-.

""'

h-1

'15-636 & 75-6'12--0PINION
TEAMSTERS v. UNITED STATES

43

ment to relief 54 demonstrates, according to this argument, that
the employee would have sought a line-driver job when he
first became qualified to fill one, but for his knowledge of the
company's discriminatory policy.
This assumption falls short of satisfying the appropriate
burden of proof. An employee who transfers into a linedriver unit is normally placed at the bottom of the seniority
"board." He is thus in jeopardy of being laid off and must,
at best, suffer through an initial period of bidding on only the
least desirable runs. See supra, at 15-16, and n. 25. Nonapplicants who chose to accept the appellate court's post hoc
invitation, however, would enter the line-driving unit with
retroactive seniority dating from the time they were first
qualified. A willingness to accept the job security and bidding power afforded by retroactive seniority says little about
what choice an employee would have made had he previously
been given the opportunity freely to choose a starting linedriver job. While it may be true that many of the nonapplicant employees desired and would have applied for line-driver
jobs but for their knowledge of the company's policy of discrimination, the Government must carry its burden of proof,
with respect to each specific individual, at the remedial hearings to be conducted by the District Court on remand. 55

c
The task remaining for the District Court on remand will
not be
a simple one. Initially, the court will have to
M The District Court's final order required that the company notify each
minority employee of the relief he was entitled to claim. The employee was
then required to indicate, within 60 days, his willingness to accept the relief.
Under the decision of the Court of Appeals, the relief would be qualification date seniority.
1ss While the most convincing proof would be some overt act such as a t~
pre-Act application for a line-driver job, the District Court may find
'
evidence of an employee's informal inquiry, expression of interest, or even
•mexpressed desire credible and convincing. The question is a factual one
\01: rletennination by the trial judge.
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make a substantial number of individual determina.tions in
deciding which of the minority employees were actual victims
of the company's discriminatory practices. After the victims
have been identified, the cour.t must, as nea.rly as possible,
" 'recreate the conditions and relationships. that would have
been had there been no' " unlawful discrimination. Franks v.
Bowman, supra, 424 U.S., at 71:)9. This process of recreating
the past will necessarily involve a degree of approximation and
impreCisiOn. Because the ..class of victims may include some
who did not apply for line-driver jobs as well as those who
did, and because more than orie minority employee may have
been denied each line-driver vacancy, the court will be required
to balance the equities of each minority employee's situation
in allocating the limited number of vacancies that were
discriminatorily refused to class members.
Moreover, after the victims have been identified and their
rightful place determined, the District Court will again be
faced with the delicate task of..._a.djusting the remedial interests
o discriminatees and the le · 'mate x ctations of other
emp o~ In t e prejudgment consent decree, see supra, at
~' the company and the Government agreed that
minority employees would assume line-driver positions that
have been discriminatorily denied to them by exercising a firstl)riority rightJto/job vacancies at the company's terminals.
The decree did not determine what constituted a vacancy, but
in its final order the trial court defined "vacancy" to exclude
any position that became available while there were laid-off
employees awaiting an opportunity to return to work.
Employees on layoff were given a preference to fill whatever
openings might occur at their terminals during a three-year
period after they were laid off. 51' The Court of Appeals
GG Paragraph 9 (a.) of the trial court's final order provided:
"A 'vacancy' a,: used in this Order, shall include any opening which ·is
caused by th<> tram;f<>r or promotion to a position outside the bargainingmit, d,eath,, re::;i$na.tion or fin~! discharge of an inc~Amb~vtl or by an
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re.iected the preference and held that all but "purely temporary" vacancies were to be filled according to an employee's
seniority, whether as a member of the class discriminated
Increase in operations or business 'where, ordinarily, additional employees
would be put to work. A vacancy shall not exist where there are laid
off employees on the seniority roster where the opening occurs. Such laid
off employees shall have a preference to fill such laid off positions when
these again become open without competition from the individuals granted
telief in this case.
11
However, if such layoff continues for three consecutive years the position
will be deemed as 'vacant' with the right of all concerned to compete for'
the position, using their respective seniority dates, including those provided
for in this Order."
The trial court's use of a three-year recall right is apparently derived
from provisions in t.he collective-bargaining agreements. Article 5 of the
National Master Freight Agreement ("NMFA") establishes the seniority·
rights of employees covered by the Agreement. Under Art. 5, "[s]eniority
rights for employees shall prevail . . . . Seniority shall be broken by·
discharge, voluntary quit, [or] more than a three (3) year layoff." § 1.
As is evident, the three-year layoff provision in the Master Agreement
determines only when an .employee shall lose dll of his accumulated·
seniority; it does not determine either the order of layoff or the order of
recall. Subject to other terms of t.he Master Agreement, NMFA Art. 2,
§ 2, "the extent to which seniority shall be applied as well as the methods
and procedures of such application" are left to the Supplemental Agreements. /d. , § 1. The Southern Conference Area Over-the-Road Supplemental Agreement, covering line drivers in the Southern Conference, also
provides for a complete loss of seniority rights after a three-year layoff,
Art. 42, § 1, and further provides that in the event of a reduction in force·
"the last employee hired shall be laid off first and when the force is again
increased, the employees are to be returned to work in the reverse order
in which they were laid off," id., § 3. This order of layoff and recall,
however, is limited by the Master Agreement in at least two situations
involving an influx of employees from outside a terminal. NMFA Art. 5,
§ 3 (a) ( 1) (merger with a solvent company), § 5 (b) (2) (branch closing·
with transfer of operations to another branch). In these cases the Master
Agreement provides for "dovetailing" the seniority rights of active and
laid-off employees a.t. the two facilities involved. Ibid.; see also NMFA
Art. 15 (honoring Military Selective Service Act of 1967). The Mastt'r
A~reem~t also· reco(Di'U that "cqpestions of accrual, :i.m.ten~retation ,11m:·
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against or as an incumbent line driver on layoff. 517 F. 2d.,
at 321-323.
As their final contention concerning the remedy, the company and the union argue that the trial court correctly made
that adjustment by granting a preference to laid-off employees,
and that the Court of Appeals erred in disturbing it. The
petitioners therefore urge the reinstatement of that part of
the trial court's final order pertaining to the rate at which
victims will assume their rightful places in the line-driver
hierarchy. ~
Although not directly controlled by the Act,"8 the extent to
7

a.pplication of seniority rights may arise which are not covered by the
•general rules set forth;'' and provides a procedure for resolution of unforei'een seniority problems. NMFA Art . 5, § 7. Presumably § 7 applies to
persons claiming discriminatory denial of jobs and seniority in violation of
Art. 38, which prohibits racial discrimination as well as classification of
employees so as to deprive them of employment opportunities on account
of race. See supra, at 2I n. 29. The District Court apparently did not
consider these provisions when it determined the recall rights of employees
on layoff.
57 In their briefs the petitioners also challenge the trial court's modification of the interterminal transfer rights of line drivers in the Southern
'Conference. See supra, at 6-7, n. 10. This question was not presented in
either petition for certiorari and therefore is not properly before us.
Rules of the Supreme Court. 23.1 (c). Our disposition of the claim that
is presented, however, will permit the trial court to reconsider any part
of the balance it struck in dea.ling with this issue.
:58 The petitioners argue that to permit a victim of discrimination to ·use
hi:; rightful place seniority to bid on a line-driver job 'before the recall of
all employees on layoff, would amount to a racial or ethnic preference in
violation of § 703 (j) of the Act. Section 703 (j) provides no support for
this argument.. It provides only that Title VII does not require an
rmployer to grant preferential treatment to any racial group in order to
rectify an imbalance between the racial composition of the employer's
workforce and the racial make-up of the population at large. See supra,
at 13 n. 20. To allow ident.ifiable victims of unlawful discrimination to
participate in a layoff recall is not the kind of "preference" prohibited by
§ 703 (j). If a discriminatee is ultimately allowed to secure a position
h~ fore a laid-off line driver 1 a questiqn we do nqt pow decide1 he will do

I
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which the legitimate expectations of nonvictim employees
should determine when victims are restored to their rightful
place is limited by basic principles of equity. In devising and
implementing remedies under Title VII, no less than in formulating any equitable decree, a court must draw on the
"qualities of mercy and practicality [that] have made equity
the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between
the public interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321,
329-330. Cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177,
195--196, modifying and remanding, In re Phelps Dodge Corp.,
19 N. L. R. B. 547, 600; Franks v. Bowman, supra, at 798-799.
Especially when immediate implementation of an equitable
remedy threatens to impinge upon the expectations of innocent parties, the courts must "look to the practical realities
and necessities inescapably involved in reconciling competing
mterests," in order to determine the "special blend of what is
necessary, wha.t is fair, and what is workable." Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 201, 200 (opinion of BuRGER, C. J.).
Because of the limited fa.cts now in the record, we decline
to strike the balance in this Court. The District Court did
not explain why it subordinated the interests of class members
t o the contractual recall expectation of other employees on
layoff. When it made that determination, however, it was
considering a class of more than 400 minority employees, all
of whom had been granted some preference in filling linedriver vacancies. The overwhelm1ng majority of these were
in t he District Court's subclass three, composed to those
employees with respect to whom neither the Government nor
the company had presented any specific evidence on the questiOn of unlawful discrimination. 'Thus, when the court considered the problem of what constituted a line-driver "vacancy"

~o

beca u:se of the bidding power inherent in his rightful place seniority,
and not· because of a preference based on race. See Franks v. Bowman,
~·ttp ra at. 792 (PowELL, .J., concurring in pa.rt and dissenting in part) ,

1{ ·
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to be offered to class members, it ma.y have been influenced
by the relatively small number of proven victims and the
large number of minority employees about whom it had no
information. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals redefined "vacancy" in the context of what it believed to be a class
of more than 400 employees who had actually suffered from
discrimination at the behest of both the company and the
union, and its determination may well have been influenced
by that understanding. For the reasons discussed in this
opinion, neither court's concept was completely valid.
After the evidentiary hearings to be conducted on remand,
both the size and the composition of the class of minority
employees entitled to relief will be altered substantially.
Until those hearings have been conducted and both the number of identifiable victims and the consequent extent of necessary relief have been determined, it is not possible to evaluate
abstra.ct cla.ims concerning the equitable bala.nce that should
be struck between the statutory rights of victims and the
contractual rights of nonvictim employees. That determination is best left, in the first instance, to the sound equitable
discretion of the trial court. 50 See Franks v. Bowman, supra,
at 779; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, at 416. We
observe only that when the court exercises its discretion in
dealing with the problem of laid-off employees in light of the
facts developed at the hearings on remand, it should clearly
state its reasons so that meaningful review may be had on
appeal. See Franks v. Bowman, supra, at 774; Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, a.t 421 n.14.
For all the reasons we have discussed, the judgment of the
~ " Other

factors, surh as the number of victims, the number of non-

y ictnn rmployees affected and the alternatives available to them, and the

economic circumstances of the industry may also be relevant in the exeri'ise of the District Court 's discretion. See Franks v. Bowman, supr~
+24 U S., llt. 796 n. 17 (PowELL, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Court of Appeals is va-cated, and the case is remanded to the
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
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MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases bring here several important questions under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. ( 1970 ed. and Supp. V).
The issues grow out of alleged unlawful employment practices
engaged in by an employer and a union. The employer is
a common carrier of motor freight with nationwide operations,
and the union represents a large group of its employees. The
District Court and the Court of Appeals held that the employer had violated Title VII by engaging in a pattern and
practice of employment discrimination against Negroes and
Spanish-surnamed Americans, and that the union had violated
the Act by agreeing with the employer to create and maintain
a seniority system that perpetuated the effects of past racial
and ethnic discrimination. In addition to the basic questions
presented by these two rulings, other subsidiary issues
must be resolved if violations of Title VII occurred-issues
concerning the nature of the relief to which aggrieved in ..
dividuals may be entitled.
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I
The United States brougl).t an action in a Tennessee federal
court against the petitioner T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc. (the company) pursuant to§ 707 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-6 (a). 1 ·The complaint charged that the
company had fopowed discriminatory hiring, assignment,
and promotion po~icies against Negroes at its terminal in
Nashville, Tenn. 2 The Government brought a second action against the company almost three years later in a
federal district court in Texas, charging a pattern and
1 At the time of suit the statute provided as follows:
" (a) Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe
that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of
resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this subchapter, and that t.he pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended
to deny the full exercise of the rights herein d('Scribed, the Attorney
General may bring a civil action in the appropriate district court of the
Pnited States by filing with it a complaint (1) signed by him (or in his
absence the Acting Attorney General), (2) setting forth facts pertaining
to such pattern or practice, and (3) requesting such relief, including an
application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or
other order against the person or persons responsible for such pattern or
prnct.ice, as he deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights
herein described."
Section 707 was amended by § 5 of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 107, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-6 (c) (Supp. V), to give
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, rather than the Attorney
General, the aut.hority to bring "pa.ttern or practice" suits under that
o:rction against private-sector employers. In 1974, an order was entered in
this action substituting the EEOC for the United States but. retaining the
United States as a part~· for purposes of jurisdiction, appealability, and
relat.rd matters. See 42 U.S. C.§ 2000e-6 (d) (Supp . V).
2
The named defendant. in this suit was T . I. M. E. Freight, Inc., a
predecessor of T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc. T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc., is a nationwide ;;~·stem produced by 10 mergers over a 17-year period. See United
States v. T. I. M. E.-D. C .. Inc .. 517 F. 2d 299, 304, and n. 6 (CA5). It
eurrently ha,; 51 terminals and operates in 26 States and three Canadian
provinces.
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practice of employment discrimination against Negroes and
Spanish-surnamed persons throughout the company's transportation system. The petitioner International Brotherhood
of Teamsters (the union) was joined as a defendant in that
suit. The two actions were consolidated for trial in the
Northern District of Texas.
The central claim in both lawsuits was that the company
had engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminating against
minorities in hiring so-called line drivers. Those Negroes and
Spanish-surnamed persons who had been hired, the Government alleged, were given lower paying, less desirable jobs as
servicemen or local city drivers, and were thereafter discriminated against with respect to promotions and transfers. 3 In
this connection the complaint also challenged the seniority
system established by the collective-bargaining agreements
between the employer and the union. The Government
sought a general injunctive remedy and specific "make whole"
relief for all individual discriminatees, which would allow
them an opportunity to transfer to line-driver jobs with full
company seniority for all purposes.
The cases went to trial 4 and the District Court found that
Line drivers , also known as over-the-road drivers, engage in longdistance hauling between company t.erminals. They compose a separate
bargaining unit at T . I. M . E.-D. C . Other distinct bargaining units
includr servicemen, who service trucks, unhook tractors and trailers, and
perform similar tasks; and city operations, composed· of dockmen, hostlers,
and city drivers who pick up and deliver freight wit.hin the immediate
area of a pa.rticular terminal. Air of these employees were represented by
tlie petitioner International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
4
Following the receipt of evidence, but before decision, the Government
and t.he company consent ed tD the entry of a Decree in Partial Resolution
of Suit. The consent decree did not constitute an adjudication on the
merits. Tho company agrred; however, to undertake a minority recruiting
program : t o accept applications from all Negroes and Spanish-surnamed
Amrricans wh o inquired about employment, whether or not vacancies·
'<'Xist('d; and to keep such applications on file and notify applicants of job
'O p('nings > to keep specific employment and recruiting records open ttl
3
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the Government had shown "by a preponderance of the evidence that T. I. M. E.-D. C. and its predecessor companies
were engaged in a plan and practice of discrimination in
violation of Title VII ...." 5 The court further found that
the seniority system contained in the collective-bargaining
contracts between the company and the union violated Title
VII because it "operate[d] to impede the free transfer of
minority groups into and within the company." Both the
company and the union were enjoined from committing
further violations of Title VII.
inspection by the Government and to submit quarterly reports to th~
District Court; and to adhere to certain uniform employment qualifications
rt>spccting hiring and promotion to line driver and other jobs.
The decree further provided that future job vaca.ncies at any T . I. M. E.D. C. terminal would be filled first "[b] y those persons who may be found
by the Court, if any, to be individual or class discriminatees suffering the
presmt effects of past discrimination because of race or national origin
prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Any remaining
vacancies could be filled by "any other persons," but the company obligated
itself to hire on,e Negro or Spanish-surnamed person for every white person
hired at any terminal until the percentage of minority workers at that
terminal equaled the percentage of minority group members in the population of the metropolitan area surrounding the terminal. Finally, the
company agreed to pay $89,500 in full settlement of any backpay obligations. Of this sum, individual payments not exceeding $1,500 were to be
paid to "alleged individual and class discrim.inatees" identified by the
Government.
The Decree in Partial Resolution of Suit narrowed the scope of the
litigation, but the District Court still had to determine whet.her unlawful
discrimination had occurred. If so, the Court had to identify the actual
discriminatees entitled to fill future job vacancies under the decree. The
validity of the collective-bargaining contract's seniority system also remained for decision, as did the question whether any discriminatees should
be awarded additional equitable relief such as retroactive seniority.
6 The District Court's Memornndum Decision in United States v.
T . I . M. E.-D. C., Inc., Civ. No. 5-868 (Oct. 19, 1972), is not officially
reported. It is unofficially reported at 6 FEP Cases 690 and 6 EPD

, 8979.
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With respect to individual relief the court accepted the
Government's basic contention that the "affected class" of
discriminatees included all Negro and Spanish-surnamed incumbent employees who had been hired to fill city operations
or serviceman jobs at every terminal that had a line-driver
operation. 6 All of these employees, whether hired before or
after the effective date of Title VII, thereby became entitled
to preference over all other applicants with respect to consideration for future vacancies in line-driver jobs. 7 Finding that
members of the affected class had been injured in different degrees, the court created three subclasses. Thirty persons who
had produced "the most convit1cing evidence of discrimination
and harm" were found to hav~ suffered "severe injury." The
court ordered that they be offered the opportunity to fill linedriver jobs with competitive seniority dating back to July 2,
1965, the effective date of Title VII. 8 A second subclass included four persons who were "very possibly the objects of
discrimination" and who "were likely harmed," but as ta
whom there had been no specific evidence of discrimination
and injury. The court decreed that these persons were entitled to fill vacancies in line-driving jobs with competitive
seniority as of January 14, 1971, the date on which the Government had filed its systemwide lawsuit. Finally, there were
over 300 remaining members of the affected class as to whom
there was "no evidence to show that these individuals were
either harmed or not harmed individually." . 'The court ordered that they be considered for line-driver jobs 0 ahead of
6 The Government did not seek relief for Negroes and Spanish-surnamed
Americans hired at a particular terminal after the date on which that
t rrminal first employed a minority group ·member as a 'line driver.
7 See supra, at 3-4, n. 4.
8 If an employee in this class had joined the company after 'July 2, 1965,
then the date of his initial employment rather than the effective date o'f
Title Vli was to determine his competitive seniority.
9 As with the other subclasses, there were a few individuals in the third
·group w® were found to J1ave been tliscriminated against with respect to
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any applicants from the general public but behind the twe
other subclasses. Those in the 'thira subclass received no
retroactive seniority; t~eir competitive seniority as line drivers
would begin with the date they were hired as line drivers.
·The court further decreed that the"right of any class member
to fill a line-driver vacancy was subject to the ·prior recall
rights of laid-off line drivers, which under the collective-bar..
gaining agreements then in effect extended for three years. 10
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the
basic conclusions of the District Court: that the company had
engaged in a pattern or practice of employment discrimination
and that the seniority system in the collective-bargaining
agreements violated Title V11 as applied to victims of prior
discrimination. United States v. T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc.,
517 F. 2d 299. The appe11ate court held, however, that the
relief ordered by the District Court was inadequate. Rejecting the District Court's attempt to trisect the affected class,
the Court of Appeals held that all Negro and Spanish-surnamed incumbent employee8 were entitled to bid for future
line-driver 'jobs on the basis of their company seniority, and
that once a class member had filled a job, he could use his
full company seniority-even if it predated the effective date
of Title V1I-for all purposes, including bidding and layoff.
'This award of retroactive seniority was to be limited only by
a "qualification date" formula, under which seniority could not
be awarded for periods prior to the date when ( 1) a line-drivjobs other than line driver. ' There is no need to discuss them separately
in this opinion.
10 This provision of the decree was qualified in one significant respect.
Under the Southern Conference Area O~r-the-Road Supplemental Agreement between the employer and the union, line drivers employed at
trrminals in certain southern States work under a "modified" seniority
system. Under the modified sy~tem an employee's seniority is not confined
strictly to his home terminal. If he is laid off at his home terminal he can
move to another terminal covered by the Agreement. and retain his
-seniority, dther by filling a vacancy at the other terminal or by "bumping••

75-636 & 75-672-0PINION
TEAMSTERS v. UNITED STATES

7

ing position was vacant, 11 and (2) the class member met (or
would have met, given the opportunity) the qualifications
for employment as a line driver. 12 Finally, the Court of
Appeals modified that part of the District Court's decree
that had subjected the rights of class members to fill
future vacancies to the recall rights of laid-off employees.
Holding that the three-year priority in favor of laid-off work'ers "would unduly impede the eradication of past discrimin~
tion," id., at 322, the Court of Appeals ordered that class
members be allowed to compete for vacancies with laid-off
employees on the basis of t.he class members' retroactive senior~
ity. Laid-off line drivers would retain their prior recall rights
with respect only to "purely temporary" vacancies. 1bid. 13
a junior line driver out of his job if there is no vacancy. The modified
system also requires that any new vacancy at a covered terminal be offered
to laid-off line drivers at all other covered temiinals ·before it is filled 'by
any other pe~on. The District Court's final decree, as amended slightly
by the Court of Appeals, 517 F. 2d, at 323, altered this system by requiring
that any vacancy be offered to all members of all three subclasses
before it may be filled ' by laid -<iff line drivers from other terminals.
11 Although the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case did not
specifically mention the requirement that a vacancy exist, it is clear
from earlier and later opinions of that court that this requirement is a
pal't of the Fifth Circuit's "qualification date" formula. See, e. g.,
Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F. 2d 40, 63 n. 29 (CA5),
rev'd on other grounds, ante, at - , cited in United States v. T. I . M. E.D . C., 517 F. 2d, at 318 n. 35; Sagers v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 529
F. 2d 721,731-734 (CA5 1976).
12 For example, if a class member btlgan his tenure with the company
on January 1, 1966, at which time he was qualified as a line driver and a
line-driving vacancy existed, his competitive seniority upon becoming a
line driver would date back to January 1, 1966. If he became qualified
or if a va{)ancy opened up only at a later date, then that later date would
be used.
u The Court of Appeals also approved (with slight modification) the
part of the District Court's order that allowed class members to fill
vacancies at a particular terminal ahead of line drivers laid off at other
t erminals. See supra, at 6-7, n. 10.
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The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District
Court to hold the evidentiary hearings necessary to apply
these remedial principles. We granted both the company's
and the union's petitions for certiorari to consider the significant questions presented under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 425 u. s. 990.
II
In this Court the company and the union contend that
their conduct did not violate Title VII in any respect, asserting first that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to show that the company engaged in a "pattern or
practice" of employment discrimination. The union further
contends that the seniority system contained in the collectivebargaining agreements in no way violated Title VII. If these
contentions are correct, it is unnecessary, of course, to reach
any of the issues concerning remedies that so occupied the
attention of the Court of Appeals.
I

I

A
Consideration of the question whether the company engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminatory hiring practices involves controlling legal principles that are relatively
clear. The Government's theory of discrimination was simply
that the company, in violation of § 703 (a) of Title VII, 14
regularly and purposefully ,treated Negroes and Spanish14 Section 703 (a) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1970 ed. and
Supp. V), provides:
"(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
"(2) to 1imit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
Pmployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
~t a.tus as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin."

75-636 & 75-672-0PINION
TEAMSTERS v. UNITED STATES

9

surnamed Americans less favorably than white persons. The
disparity in treatment allegedly involved the refusal to recruit,
hire, transfer, or promote minority group members on an equal
basis with white people, particular,ly with respect to linedriving positions. The ultimate factual issues a.re thus simply
whether there was a pattern or practice of such disparate treatment and, if so, whether the differences were "racially
premised." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
805 n. 18.15
As the plaintiff, the Government bore the initial burden of
making out a prima facie case of discrimination. Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 425; McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802. And, because it alleged a
"Disparate treatment" such as alleged in the present case is the most
Msily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it
can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment. See, e. g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropo'litan Housing
U. S. - , - . Undoubtedly disparate treatment was
Dev. Corp., the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII.
See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)
("What the bill does . . . is simply to make it an illegal practice to use
race as a factor in denying employment. It provides that men and
women shall be employed on the basis of their qualifications, not as
Catholic citizens, not as protestant citizens, not as Jewish citizens, not as
colored citizens, but as citizens of the United States").
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that
stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices that
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by
business necessity. See infra, at 22. Proof of discriminatory motive, we
have held, is not required under a disparate impact theory . Compare, e. g.,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-432, with McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802-806. See generally Schlei & Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 1-12 (1976); Blumrosen, Strangers
in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment
Discrimination, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 59 (1972). Either theory may, of course,
be applied to a particular set of facts.
15
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~ystemwide pattern or practice of resistance to the full en.
joyment of Title VII rights, the Government ultimately had
to prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or "acci~
dental" or sporadic discriminatory acts. It had to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimination
was the company's standard operating procedure-the regular
rather than the unusual practice.16
We agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals
that the Government carried its burden of proof. As of
March 31, 1971, shortly after the Government filed its complaint alleging systemwide discrimination, the company had
6,472 employees. Of these, 314 (5%) were Negroes and 257
( 4%) were Spanish-surnamed Americans. Of the 1,828 line
drivers, however, there were only 8 (0.4%) Negroes and 5
(0.3%) Spanish-surnamed persons, and all of the Negroes
had been hired after the litigation had commenced. With one
exception-a man who worked as a line driver at the Chicago
terminal from 1950 to 1959-the company and its predecessors
did not employ a Negro on a regular basis as a line driver until
1969. And, as the Government showed, even in 1971 there
were terminals in areas of substantial Negro population where
16 The "pattern or practice" language in § 7Cfl (a) of Title VII, supra,
at 2 n. 1, was not intended as a term of art, and the words reflect only
their usual meaning. Senator Humphrey explained:
" [A] pattern or practice would be present only where the denial of
rights consists of something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but
is repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature. There would be a pattern
or practice if, for example, a number of companies or persons in the same
industry or line of business discriminated, if a chain of motels or restaurants
practiced racial discrimination throughout all or a significant part of its
system, or if a company repeatedly and regularly engaged in acts prohibited
by the statute.

"The point is that single, insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by
a single business would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice ... :•·
IlO Cong. Rec. 14270 (1964) .
Thi!'l interpretation of "pattern or practice" appears thro~hout the
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ttll of the company's line drivers were white. 17 A great major.
jty of the Negroes (83%) and Spanish-surnamed Americans
(78%) who did work for the company held the lower-paying
city operations and serviceman jobs/8 whereas only 39% of
the nonminority employees held jobs in those categories.
The Government bolstered its statistical evidence with the
testimony of individuals who recounted over 40 specific in·
stances of discrimination. Upon the basis of this testimony
the District Court found that "[n] umerous qualified black
and Spanish-surnamed American applicants who sought line•
driving jobs at the company over the years had their requests
ignored, were given false or misieading information about re·
quirements, opportunities, and application procedures, or were
iegislative history of § 707 (a), and is consistent with the Understanding of
the identical words as used in similar federal legislation. See id., at 12946
(remarks of Sen. Magnuson) (referring to § 206 (a.) of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 206 (a)); id., at i3081 (remarks of Sen. Case); id.,
nt 14239 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 15895 (remarks of Rep.
Celler). See also United States v. iacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F. 2d
418, 438, 441 (CA5); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F. 2d 544,
552 (CA9); United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F. 2d 221,
227 (CA5); United States v. Mayton, 335 F. 2d 153, i58-i59 (CA5).
17 In Atlanta, for instance, Negroes composed 22.35% of the population
in the surrounding metropolitan area and 51.31% of the population in the
cit~' proper. The company;s Atianta terminal employed 57 line drivers.
All were white. In Los Angeies, i0.84% of the greater metropolitan
population and 17.88% of the city population were Negro. But at the
company's two Los Angeles terminals there was not a single Negro among
the 374 line drivers. The proof showed similar disparities in San Francisco,
Denver, Nashville, Chicago, Dallas, and at several other terminals.
18 Although line-driver jobs pa.y more than other jobs, and the District
Court found them to be "considered the most desirable of the driving-jobs,"
It is by no means clear that all employees, even driver employees, would
'p refer to be line drivers. See infra, at 41-42, and n. 51. Of course, Title
VII provides for equal opportunity to compete for any job, whether it is
thought better or worse than another. See, e. g., United State& v, Hayes
internat'l Corp., 456 F. 2d 112, 118 (CA5); United States v, N(Jtional
Ln1.d Co ,J438 F . 2d 935, 939 (CA8).
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not considered and hired on the same basis that whites were
considered and hired." Minority employees who wanted to
transfer to line-driver jobs met with similar difficulties. 19
The company's principal response to this evidence is that
statistics can never in and of themselves prove the existence
of a pattern or practice of discrimination, or even establish
a prima facie case shifting to the employer the burden of rebutting the inference raised by the figures. But, as even our
brief summary of the evidence shows, this was not a case in
which the Government relied on "statistics alone." The individuals who testified about their personal experiences with
the company brought the cold numbers convincingly to life.
In any event, our cases make it unmist~tkably clear that
" [ s] tatistical analyses have served and will continue to serve
an important role" in cases in which the existance of discrimination is a disputed issue. Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educat'ional Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620. See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, at 805. Cf. Washington
v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 241-242. We have repeatedly approved the use of statistical proof, where it reached proportions
comparable to those in this case, to establish a prima facie
19

Two examples are illustrative:
George Taylor, a Negro, worked for the company as a city driver in
Los Angeles, beginning late in 1966. In 1968, after hearing that a white
city driver had transferred to a line-driver job, he told the terminal
manager that he also would like to consider line driving. The manager
replied tha.t there would be "a lot of problems on the road ... with
different people, Caucasian, et cetera," and stated "I don't feel the
company is ready for this right now. . . . Give us a little time. It will
come around, you know." Mr. Taylor made similar requests some months
later and got similar responses. He was never offered a line-driving job
or an application.
Feliberto Trujillo worked as a dockman at the company's Denver
t rrmina.l. When he applied for a line-driver job in 1967, he was told by~
personnel officer that he had one strike against him. He asked what that
was and was told: "You're a Chicano, and a& far as we knowt there i!ln~
•. Chirano driver in the syst•em,''
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case of racial discrimination in jury selection cases, see, e. g.,
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346; Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U . S. 475 ; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587. Statistics are
equally competent in proving employment discrimination. 20
to Petitioners argue that statistics, at least those comparing the racial
composition of an employer's work force to the composition of the population at large, should never be given decisive weight in a Title VII case
bf:'cause to do so would conflict with § 703 (j) of the Act, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000 (e) - 2 (j) . That section provides:
" Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require
any employer ... to grant preferential treatment to any ... group
ll<'c:mse of the raoo . .. or national origin of such ... group on account
of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
peref:'ntage of any race .. . or national origin employed by any employer . . . with the total number or percentage of persons of such
ra ce . .. or national origin in any community, State, section, or other
arra, or in the available work force in any community, state, section, or
other area."
The argument fails in this case because the statistical evidence was not
offered or used to support an erroneous theory that Title VII requires an
employer's work force to be racially balanced. Statistics showing racial or
ethnic imbrdance are probative in a case such as this one only because such
imbalan ce is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination ; absent
explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring
practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of
the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from
which employees are hired. Evidence of longlasting and gross disparity
betwern the composition of a work force and that of the general population thus may be significant even though § 703 (j) makes clear that Title
VII imposes no requirement that a work force mirror the general population. Sre, e. g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local36, 416 F . 2d
123, 127 n. 7. Considerations such as small sample size may, of course,
drtract from the value of such evidence, see, e. g., Mayor of Philadelphia v.
Rducational }]quality L eague, 415 U. S. 605, 620-621, and evidence showing
that the figures for the general population might not accurately reflect the
pool of qualified job applica nts would also ·be relevant. Ibid. See generally Srhlei & Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law, 1161-1193
(1976) .
"Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the courts have
frrqu rntly relied upon statistical evidence to proVle a violation. . . . In
]llany caseF> the only available avenue of proof ·is the ·use of -.racial statistics;
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We caution only that statistics are not irrefutable; they come
in infinite variety and, like any other kind of evidence, they
may be rebutted. In short, their usefulness depends on all of
the surrounding facts and circumstances. See, e. g., Hester v.
Southern R. Co., 497 F. 2d 1374, 1379-1381 (CA5).
In addition to its general protest against the use of statistics
in Title VII cases, the company claims that in this case the
statistics revealing racial imbalance are misleading because
they fail to take into account the company's particular business situation as of the effective date of Title VII. The company concedes that its line drivers were virtually all white in
July 1965, but it claims that thereafter business conditions
were such that its work force dropped. Its argument is that
low personnel turnover, rather than post-Act discrimination,
accounts for more recent statistical disparities. It points to
substantial minority hiring in later years, especially after 1971,
as showing that any pre-Act patterns of discrimination were
broken.
The argument would be a forceful one if this were an employer who, at the time of suit, had done virtually no new
hiring since the effective date of Title VII. But it is not.
Although the company's total number of employees apparently
dropped somewhat during the late 1960's, the record shows
that many line drivers continued to be hired throughout this
period, and that almost all of them were white. 21 To be sure,
to uncover clandestine and covert discrimLn-a.tion by the employer or union
involved. . . ." United States v. Ironwork.rs Local 86, 443 F. 2d 544, 551
(CA9). See also, e. g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F. 2d
211, 225 n. 34 (CAS); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457
F. 2d 1377, 1382 (CA4); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co ., 451
F. 2d 418, 442 (CA5) ; Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F. 2d
421, 426 (CA8) ; Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F . 2d 245,
247 (CAlO) .
21 Between July 2, 1965, and January 1, 1969, hundreds of line driverS'
were hired systemwide, either from the outside or from the ranks of
employees filling other jobs within the company. None was a, Negro.
Government Exh. 204.
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there were improvements in the company's hiring practices.
The Court of Appeals commented that HT. I. M. E.-D. C.'s
recent minority hiring progress stands as a laudable good faith
effort to eradicate the effects of past discrimination in the area
of hiring and initial assignment." 22 517 F. 2d, at 316. But
the District Court and the Court of Appeals found upon substantial evidence that the company had engaged in a course
of discrimination that continued well after the effective date
of Title VII. The company's later changes in its hiring and
promotion policies could be little comfort to the victims of
the earlier post-Act discrimination, and could not erase its
previous illegal conduct or its obligation to a.fford relief to those
who suffered because of it. Cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, supra, at 413-423. 28
For example, in 1971 the company hired 116 new line drivers, of
whom 16 were Negro or Spanish-surnamed Americans. Minority employees composed 7.1% of the company's systemwide work force in 1967
and 10.5% in 1972. Minority hiring increased greatly in 1972 and 1973,
presumably due at least in part to the existence of the consent decree.
See 517 F. 2d, at 316 n. 31.
23 The company's narrower attacks upon the statistical evidence-that
there was no precise delineation of the areas referred to in the general
population statistics, that tbe Government did not demonstrate that
minority populations were located close to terminals or that transportation
was available, that the statistics failed to show what portion of the
minority population was suited by age, health, or other qualifications to
hold trucking jobs, etc.-are equally lacking in force. At best, these
attacks go only to the accuracy of the comparison between the composition
of the company's work force at various terminals and the general population of the surrounding communities. They detract little from the Government's further showing that Negroes and Spanish-surnamed Americans who
were hired were overwhelmingly excluded from line-driver jobs. Such
employees were willing to work, had access to the terminal, were healthy
and of working age, and often were at least sufficiently qualified to hold
-city-driver jobs. Yet they became line drivers with far less frequency
than whites. See, e. g., Pre-trial Stipulation 14, summarized at 517 F. 2d,
at 312 n. 24 (of 2,919 whites who held driving jobs in 1971, 1,802 (62%)
were line drivers and 1,117 (38%) were city driversi of 180 Negroes and
22
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The District Court and the Court of Appeals. on thP hasis
of substantial evidence, held that the Government had proved
a prima facie case of systematic and purposeful employment
discrimination, continuing well beyond the etlect.i ve daLe of
Title VII. The company's attempts to rebut that conclusion
were held to be inadequate. 24 For the reasons we have summarized, there is no warrant for this Court to disturb the findings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals on this
basic issue. See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U. S. 403, 408-409;
Faulkner v. _Gibbs, 338 U. S. 26~, 268; United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745, 751; United States v. Commercial Credit
Co., 286 U. S. 63, 67; United States v. Chemical Foundation,
Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 14; Baker v. Schofield, 243 U. S. 114, 118;
Towson v. Moore, 173 U. S. 17, 24.
Spanish-surnamed Americans who held driving jobs; 13 (7%) were line
drivers and 167 (93%) were city drivers).
In any event, fine tuning of the statistics could not have obscured the
~lnring absrnce of minority line. drivers . As ·the Court of Appeals remarked, the company's inability to rebut the inference of discrimination
l'ame not from a misuse of statistics· but from "the inexorable zero." 517
F . 2d, at 315.
2 4 The company's evidence, apart from the showing of recent changes in
hiring and promotion policies, consisted mainly of general statements that
it hired only the· best qualified applicants. But "affirmations of good
faith in making individual selections are insufficient to dispel a prima facie
case of systt>ma.tic exclusion'." Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 632.
The rompany also attempted to show that all of the witnesses Who
testified to specific insta nces of discrimination either were not discriminated
against or suffered no injury. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
the trial judge was not bound to accept this testimony and that it committed no error by relying inst•ead on the other overpowering evidence in
the case. 517 F. 2d, at 31'5. The Court of Appeals was also correct in
·the view that proof that specific individuals were not harmed by the
company's discriminatory conduct was appropriately left to proceedings to
determine individual relief. In a suit brought by the Government under
§ 707 (a) of thr Art, the District Court's initial concern is in deciding
whether the Government has proved that the defendant has engaged in fl.
Jntttern or practice of dif'criminatory conduct. Sec infra , at 32-35,
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B
The District Court and the Court of Appeals also found
that the seniority system contained in the collective-bargaining agreements between the company and the union operated
to violate Title VII of the Act.
For purposes of calculating benefits, such as vacations, pensions, and other fringe benefits, an employee's seniority under
this system runs from the date he joins the company, and
takes into account his total service in aU jobs and bargaining
units. For competitive purposes, however, such as determining the order in which employees may bid for particular
jobs, are laid off, or are recalled from layoff, it is bargainingunit seniority that controls. Thus, a line driver's seniority,
for purposes of bidding for particular runs 25 and protection
against layoff, takes into account only the length of time he
has been a line driver at a particular terminal. 26 The practical effect is that a city driver or serviceman who transfers
to a line-driver job must forfeit all the competitive seniority
he has accumulated in his previous bargaining unit and start
at the bottom of the line-drivers' "board."
The vice of this arrangement, as found by the District
Court and the Court of Appeals, was that it "locked" minority
workers into inferior jobs and perpetuated prior discrimination by discouraging transfers to jobs as line drivers. While
the disincentive applied to all workers, including whites, it
was Negroes and Spanish-surnamed persons who, those courts
found , suffered the most because many of them had been
denied the equal opportunity to become line drivers when they
25 Certain long-distance runs, for a variety of reasons, are more desirable
than others. The best runs are chosen by the line drivers at the top of
thr "board"-a list of drivers arranged in order of their bargaining-unit

~C' niority .
~ ,;Both

bargaining-unit seniority and company seniority rights are
limit('d to service at one particular terminal, except as modified
,,~· the Southern Conference Area Over-the-Road Supplemental A~eement.
~c ·e supra, at 6-7, n. 10.
~P n r rally
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were initially hired, whereas whites either had not sought or
were refused line-driver positions for reasons unrelated to their
race or national origin.
The linchpin of the theory embraced by the District Court
and the Court of Appeals was that a discriminatee who must
·forfeit his competitive seniority in order finally to obtain a
line-driver job will never be able to "catch up" to the seniority
level of his contemporary who was not subject to discrimination.27 Accordingly, this continued, built-in disadvantage to
the prior discriminatee who transfers to a line-driver job was
held to constitute a continuing violation of Title VII, for
which both the employer and the union who jointly created
and maintain the seniority system were liable.
The union, while acknowledging tha.t the seniority system may in some sense perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination, asserts that the system is immunized from a finding
of illegality by reason of § 703 (h) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-2 (h), which provides in part:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to apply different standards of compensation,
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority ... system, . . .
provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race ... or national
origin ... ."
2r An example would be a Negro who was qualified to be a line driver
in 1958 but who, because of his race, was assigned instead a job as a city
driver, and is allowed to become a line driver only in 1971. Because he
loses his competitive seniority when he transfers jobs, he is forever junior
to white line drivers hired between 1958 and 1970. The whites, rather
t han the Negro, will henceforth enjoy the preferable runs and the greater
protection against layoff. Although the original discrimination occurred
in 1958---before the effective date of Title VII-the seniority system
operates to carry the effects Qf the e<ulier discrimination into the present,
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It argues that the seniority system in this case is 11bona
fide" within the meaning of § 703 (h) when judged in light
of its history, intent, application, and all of the circumstances
under which it was created and is maintained. More specifically, the union claims that the central purpose of
§ 703 (h) is to ensure that mere perpetuation of pre-Act discrimination is not unlawful under Title VII. And, whether
or not § 703 (h) immunizes the perpetuation of post-Act discrimination, the union claims that the seniority system in
this case has no sucb effect. Its position in this Court,
as has been its position throughout this litigation, is that
the seniority system presents no hurdle to post-Act discriminatees who seek retroactive seniority to the date they would
have become line drivers but for the company's discrimination. Indeed, the union asserts that under its collective-bargaining agreements the union will itself take up the cause of
the post-Act victim and attempt, through grievance procedures,
to gain for him full 11 make whole" relief, including appropri~
ate seniority.
'The Government responds that a seniority system that perpetuates the effects of prior discrimination-pre- or post-Act-can never be 11 bona fide" under § 703 (h); at a minimum Title
VII prohibits those applications of a seniority system that
perpetuate the effects on incumbent employees of prior dis'criminatory job assignments.
The issues thus joined are open ones in this Court. 28 We
2s Concededly, the view that § 703 (h) does not immunize seniority
'systems that perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination ·has much
support. It was apparently first adopt€d in Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,
'279 F. Supp. 505 (ED Va.) . The court there held that "a departmental
seniority system that has its genesis in racial discrimination is not a bona
fide seniority system." !d., at 517 (first emphasis added). The Quarles
view has since enjoyed wholesale adoption in the Courts of Appeals. See,
e. g., Local 189, United Paperworkers v. · United States, 416 F. "2d 980,
'987-988 (CA5) ; United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416
F . 2d 123; 133-134, n. 20 (CAS) ; · United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,

1~30
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considered§ 703 (h) in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,
424 U. S. 747, but there decided only that § 703 (h) does not
bar the award of retroactive seniority to job applicants who
seek relief from an employer's post-Act hiring discrimination.
We stated that "the thrust of [ § 703 (h)] is directed toward
defining what is and what is not an illegal discriminatory practice in instances in which the post-Act operation of a seniority
Bystem is challenged as perpetuating the effects of discrimina-tion occurring prior to the effective date of the Act." 424
U. S., at 761. Beyond noting the general purpose of the
statute, however, we did not undertake the task of statutory
~onstruction required in this case.
(1)
Because the company discriminated both before and after
the enactment of Title VII, the seniority system is said to
have operated to perpetuate the effects of both pre- and postAct discrimination. Post-Act discrimina.tees, however, may
obtain full "make whole" relief, including retroactive seniority
under Franks v. Bowman, supra, without attacking the legal·
ity of the seniority system as applied to them. Franks made
clear and the union acknowledges that retroactive seniority
may be awarded as relief from an employer's discriminatory
hiring and assignment policies even if the seniority system
agreement itself makes no provision for such relief. 211 424
446 F. 2d 652, 658-659 (CA2); United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.
Co., 471 F . 2d ' 582, 587=-588 (GA4). Insofar as the result in Quarles and
in the cases that foUowed it depended upon findings that the seniority
systems were themselves "racially discriminatory"· or had their "genesis in
racial discrimination," 279 F. Supp., at 517, the decisions can be viewed
as resting upon the proposition that a seniority system that perpetuates
the effects of pre-Act discrimination cannot be bona fide if an intent to
discriminate entered into its very adoption.
29 Article 38 of the National Master Freight Agreement between
T . I. M. E.-D. C. and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in effect
ns of the date of the systemwide lawsuit provided:
" The Employer and the Union agree not to discriminate against any
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U. S., at 778-779. Here the Government has proved that the
company engaged in a post-Act pattern of discriminatory
hiring, assignment, transfer, and promotion policies. Any
Negro or Spanish-surnamed American injured by those policies
may receive all appropriate relief as a direct remedy for this
discrimination. 30
(2)
What remains for review is the judgment that the seniority
system unlawfully perpetuated the effects of pre-Act discrimination. We must decide, in short, whether § 703 (h) validates otherwise bona fide seniority systems that afford no constructive seniority to victims discriminated against prior to
the effective date of Title VII, and it is to that issue that we
now turn.
individual with respect to his hiring, compensation, terms or conditions of
employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, ol'
national origin, nor will they limit, segregate or classify employees in any
way to deprive any individual employee of employment opporturuties
because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Any discrimina.tion by the company would apparently be a grievable
breach of this provision of the contract.
30 The legality of the seniority system insofar as it perpetuat es post~ Act
discrimination still remains at issue in this case, in light of the injunctjon
entered aga inst the union . See supra, at. 4. Our decision today in United
Air Lines v. Evans. post. at - , is large!~· dispositive of this issue. E vans
l10ld:; that t he opera tion of n seniority s~·stem is not unlawful under Title
VII even t hough it perpetuates po;;t-Act di ~c rimimttion that hm; not been
the subject of a t imely charge by the discriminatee. Herr, of course, the
Government has sued to remedy the post-Act discrimination directly, and
t here i::; no claim that any rr lief would be time-barred . But. that is simply
an addi t ional reason not to hold the seniority system unlawful, since such
a holding would in no way enlarge thr relief to be awarded. Section
703 (h ) on it ~:~ face immuni zes all bona fide seniority systems, and does not.
di ~ti n gui sh between the perpet ual ion of pre- and post-Act discrimination .
Moreover, if a K<> niorit y ~ystem that pNpetuat es pre-A ct or timr-barred
disc rimination for which t he employee is currently without recourse is
lawfu l, then Hurrly such <t ::;ystem is lawful where t he original discrimirk'lrt ion may ::>Lill be remedied.
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The primary purpose of Title VII was "to assure equality
of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially
stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority
citizens." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, at 800. 31
See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, at 417-418;
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44; Griggs. v.
Duke Power Co., supra, at 429-431. To achieve this purpose,
Congress "proscribe[d] not only overt discrimination but alsp
practices that are fair · in 'form but discriminatory in operation." Griggs, 401 U. ·s., at 431. Thus, the Court has -repea.t edly held that a prima facie · Title VII violation may· be
established by policies or practices that are neutral on their
face and in intent but that nonetheless discriminate in effect
against a particular group. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
- U . S . - , - ; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246247; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, at 422, 425;
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, at 802 n. 14;
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra.
One species of practices 'rfair in form but discriminatory
in operation" are those that perpetuate the effects of prior
discrimination. 32 As the Court held in Griggs, supra: "Under
31
We also noted in McDonnell DouglCl8 that:
"There are societal as well as personal interests on both sides of the
[employer-employee] equation. The broad, overriding interest, shared by
employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assurli'd through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel
decisions. In the implementation of such decisions, it. is abundantly clear
that Title VII tolerate:> no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise." 411
U. S., at 801.
32 Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F. 2d 1047 (CA5), provides
an apt illustration. There a union had a p<>licy of excluding persons not
related to present members bY blood or marriage. When· in 1966 suit. was
brought to challenge this policy, all of the · union's members were white,
largely as a result of pre-Act, intentional racial discrimination. The court
observed: "While the nepotism requirement is applicable to · bla{)k and
white Ill~ and is not on its fa,ce 'discrimina.tory, in .a completely white
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the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face,
and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if
they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices." 401 U. S., at 430.
Were it not for § 703 (h), the seniority system in this case
would seem to fall under the Griggs rationale. The heart of
the system is its allocation of the choicest jobs, the greatest
protection against layoffs, and other advantages to those
employees who have been line drivers for the longest time.
Where, because of the employer's prior intentional discrimination, the line drivers with the longest tenure are without
exception white, the advantages of the seniority system flow
disproportionately to them and away from Negro and Spanish-surnamed employees who might by now have enjoyed
those advantages had not the employer discriminated before
the passage of the Act. This disproportionate distribution of
advantages does in a very rea] sense "operate to 'freeze' the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices:''
Ibid. But both the literal terms of § 703 (h) and the legisla·
tive history of Title VII demonstrate that Congress considered
this very effect of many seniority systems and extended a
measure of immunity to them.
Throughout the initial consideration of H. R. 7152, later
enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, critics of the bill
charged that it would destroy existing seniority rights. 33 The
consistent response of Title VII's congressional proponents
and of the Justice Department was that seniority rights would
not be affected, even where the employer had discriminated
union the present effect of its continued application is to forever deny to
Negroes and Mexican-Americans any real opportunity for membership:"
407 F. 2d, at 1054.
33 E. g., H . R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess., 65-66, 71 (1963)
(minority report) ; 110 Cong. Rec. 486-488 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Hill);
id., at 2726 (remarks of Rep. Dowdy); id. 1 at 7091 (remarks of Sen.
'Stennis).
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prior to the Act. 34 An interpretative memorandum placed in.
the Congressional Record by Senators Clark and Case stated:
uTitle VII would have no effect on established seniority
rights. Its effect is prospective and not retrospective.
Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating
in the past and as a result has an all-white working
force, when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a non~
discriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes,
or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes
are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the
expense of the white workers hired earlier." 110 Cong.
Rec. 7213 (1964) (emphasis added.). 35
A Justice Department statement concerning Title VII, placed
in the Congressional Record by Senator Clark, voiced the same
conclusion:
uTitle VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes effect. If, for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in the event of
layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first,
such a provision would not be affected in the least by
Title VII. This would be true even in the case where
owing to discrimination prior to the effective date of the
34 In addition to the material cited in Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S., at
759-762, see 110 Cong. Rec. 1518 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); id.,
at 6549 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 6564 (remarks of Sen,

Kuchel).
35 Senators Clark and Case were the "bipartisan ca.ptajns" responsible
for Title VII during the Senate debate. Bipartisan captains were selected
for each title of the Civil Rights Act by the leading proponents of the Act
in both parties. They were responsible for explaining their title in detail,
defending it, and leading discussion on it. See 110 Cong. Rec. 6528 (1964)
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey); Vass, Title VII: Legislative llistocy, 1
D. C . Ind. & Com.. L. Rev. ~3t,, 444-445 (1966.) ..

75-636 & 75-672-0PINION
TEAMSTERS v. UNITED STATES

25

title, white workers had more seniority than Negroes."
ld., at 7207 (emphasis added). 36
While these statements were made before § 703 (h) was
added to Title VII, they are authoritative indicators of that
section's purpose. Section 703 (h) was enacted as part of the
Mansfield-Dirksen compromise substitute bill that cleared the
way for the passage of Title VII. 37 The drafters of the compromise bill stated that one of its principal goals was to resolve
the ambiguities in the House-passed version of H. R. 7152.
See, e. g., id., at 11935-11937 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen); id.,
at 12707 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). As the debates indicate, one of those ambiguities concerned Title VII's impact
on existing collectively bargained seniority rights. It is apparent that § 703 (h) was drafted with an eye toward meeting the earlier criticism on this issue with an explicit provision
embodying the understanding and assurances of the Act's proponents: namely, that Title VII would not outlaw such
differences in treatment among employees as flowed from a
bona fide seniority system that allowed for full exercise of
seniority accumulated before the effective date of the Act.
ao The full tex-t of the statement is set out. in Franks v. Bowman, 424
U. S., at 760 n. 16. Senator Clark also introduced a set of answers to

fJUestions propounded by Senator Dirksen, which included the following
exchange:
"Qurf:tion. Would the same situation prevail in respect to promotions,
when that management function is governed by a. labor contract calling for
promotions on the basis of seniority? What of dismissals? Normally,
labor contracts call for 'last hired, first fired.' If the last hired are Negroes,
i~ the employer discriminating if his contract requires they be first fired
and the remaining employees are white?
"Answer. Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under
a 'last hired, first fired' agreement a Negro happens to be the 'last hired,'
he can still be 'first fired' as long as it is done because of his status as 'last
hired' and not because of his race." 110 Cong. Rec. 7217 (1964). See
Franks, supra, at 760 n . 16.
:H See Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S., at 761; Vass, Title VII: Legislative
History, 7 B. C . Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 431,435 (1966).
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It is inconceivable that § 703 (h), as part of a compromise bill,
was intended to vitiate the earlier representations of the Act's
supporters by increasing Title VII's impact on seniority systems. The statement of Senator Humphrey, noted in Franks,
supra, at 761, confirms that the addition of § 703 (h) "merely
clarifies [Title VII's] present intent and effect." 110 Cong.
Rec. 12723 (1964).
In sum, the unmistakable purpose of§ 703 (h) was to make
clear that the routine application of a bona fide seniority
system would not be unlawful under Title VII. As the legislative history shows, this was the intended result even where
the employer's pre-Act discrimination resulted in whites having greater existing seniority rights than Negroes. Although
a seniority system inevitably tends to perpetuate the effects of
pre-Act discrimination in such cases, the congressional j udgment was that Title VII should not outlaw the use of existing
seniority lists and thereby destroy or water down the vested
seniority rights of employees simply because their employer
had engaged in discrimination prior to the passage of the Act.
To be sure, § 703 (h) does not immunize all seniority systems. It refers only to "bona fide" systems, and a proviso
requires that any differences in treatment not be "the result
of an intention to discriminate because of race ... or national
origin ...." But our reading of the legislative history compels us to reject the Government's broad argument that no
seniority system that tends to perpetuate pre-Act discrimination can be "bona fide." To accept the argument would require us to hold that a seniority system becomes illegal simply
because it allows the full exercise of the pre-Act seniority
rights of employees of a company that discriminated before
Title VII was enacted. It would place an affirmative obligation on the parties to the seniority agreement to subordinate
those rights in favor of the claims of pre-Act discriminatees
without seniority. The consequence would be a perversion of
the congressional purpose. We cannot accept the invitation to
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disembowel § 703 (h) by reading the words "bona fide" as the
Government would have us do. 3 8 Accordingly, we hold that
an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination. Congress did not intend to
make it illegal for employees with vested seniority rights to
continue to exercise those rights, even at the expense of preAct discriminatees.
That conclusion is inescapable even in a case, such as this
one, where the pre-Act discriminatees are incumbent employees who accumulated seniority in other bargaining units. Although there seems to be no explicit reference in the legislative
history to pre-Act discriminatees already employed in less
desirable jobs, there can be no rational basis for distinguishing
their claims from those of persons initially denied any job but
hired later with less seniority than they might have had in the
absence of pre-Act discrimination. 80 We rejected any such
aH

For the same reason, we reject the content ion that the proviso in

§ 703 (h), which bars differences in treatment resulting from "an intention
to discriminate," applies to any application of a. seniority system that may
perpetuate pa8t discrimination . In this regard the language of the Justice
Dcpartmrnt mrmorandum introduced at the legislative hearings, see supra,
at 24, is e8pccially pertinent: "It is perfectly clear that when a worker is
laid off or denied a. chance for promotion because he is 'low man on the
to1em pole' h<' is not being discriminated against ·because of his race . . . .
Any differC'nces in treatment ·based on established seniority rights would
not br ba.~ed on race and would not ·be folibidden ·by the title.~' 110 CoiJg.
Rec. 7207 (1964).
3 u That Title VII clid not proscribe the denial of fictional seniority to
pre-Act discriminatees who got no job was recognized even .in Quar.les v.
Phillip Morris. Jnc. , 279 F. Supp. 505 (ED Va.), and its progeny.
Quarles st r!:'f'sed the fact that the references in the legislative history were
to employment seniority rather than departmental seniority. 279 F.
::iupp., at 516. In [-ocal 189, .United Paperworkers v. United States, 416
F . 2d 980 (CA5), another leading case in this area, th~ co~rt observed:
"No doubt, Congress, to prevent 'reverse dis~riminatio~' meant to protect
certain sC'niority rights that could not hav~ existedbut.for previous racial
discrimi11<1tion. For example a Negro who had .been r~jected by an
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distinction m Franks, finding that it had "no support anywhere in Title VII or its legislative history," 424 U. S., at
768. As discussed above, Congress in 1964 made clear that
a seniority system is not unlawful because it honors employees' existing rights, even where the employer has engaged in pre-Act discriminatory hiring or promotion practices.
It would be as contrary to that mandate to forbid the exercise
of seniority rights with respect to discriminatees who held
inferior jobs as with respect to later-hired minority employees
who previously were denied any job. If anything, the latter
group is the more disadvantaged. As in Franks," '[i]t would
indeed be surprising if Congress gave a remedy for the one
[group] which it denied for the other.'" !d., quoting Phelp8
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187."0

(3)
The seniority system in this case is entirely bona fide. It
applies equally to all races and ethnic groups. To the extent that it "locks" employees into nonline-driver jobs, it
·does so for all. The city drivers and servicemen who are discouraged from transferring to line-driver jobs are not all
Negroes or Spanish-surnamed Americans; to the contrary, the
employer on racial grounds before passage of the Act could not, after being
hired, claim to outrank whites who had been hired before him but after
his original rejection, even though the Negro might have had senior status
but for the past discrimination." 416 F. 2d, at 994.
40 In addition, there is no reason to suppose that Congress intended in
1964 to extend less protection to legitimate departmental seniority systems
than to plant-wide seniority systems. Then as now, seniority was measured
in a number of ways, including length of time with the employer, in a
particular plant, in a department, i·n a job, or in a line of progression.
See Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and· Enforceability of Seniority
Rights, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1534 (1962); Cooper & Sobel, Seniority
and Testing under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to
Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1602
(1969). The legislative history contains no suggestion· that•any one' system.
was preferred.
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overwhelming majority are white. The plabing of lihe driver&
in a separate bargaining unit from other employees is rational,
in accord with the industry practice, and consist~nt with
NLRB precedents.u It is conceded that the seniority system
did not have its genesis in racial discrimination, and that it
was negotiated and has been maintained free from any illegal
purpose. In these circumstances, the single fact that the
system extends no retroactive seniority to pre-Act discriminatees does not make it unlawful.
Because the seniority system was protected by § 703 (h),
the union's conduct in agreeing to and maintaining the system
did not violate Title VII. On remand, the District Court's
injunction against the union must be vacated. 42

III
Our conclusion that the seniority system does not violate
Title . VII will necessarily affect the remedy granted to
individual employees on remand of this litiga.tion to the
bistrict Court. Those employees who suffered only pre-Act
discrimination are not entitled to relief, and no person may
be given retroactive seniority to a date earlier than the effective date of the Act. · Several other questions relating to the
appropriate measure of individual relief remain, however, for
our consideration.
41 Ser Georgia Highway Express, 150 N. L. R. B. 1649, 1651: "The
l:loard has long held that local drivers and over-the-road drivers constitute
separa.t.e appropriate units where they are shown to be cl-early defined,
homogeneous, and functionally distinct groups with separate interests which
can effectively be represented separately for bargaining purposes. . . . In
view of the different duties and functions, separate supervision, and different
bases of payment, it is clear that the over-the-road drivers have divergent
interests from those of the employees in the [city operations] unit . . . and
should not. be included in t hat unit."
42 Thr union will propr rly remain in this litigatjon as a defendant so
that full relief may be awarded the victims of the employer's post-Act
discrimination. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19 (a) . See EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers1 lnc.1 503 F. 2d 10861 1095 (CA6) .
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The petitioner~ afgJle generally that th~ triaJ court diq
not err in tailoring the remedy to the "qegree of injury" suf:
fered by each individual employee, and that the Court of
Appeals' "qualification d~te" formula sweeps with too broad
a brush by granting a remedy to employees who were no~
shown to be actual victims of unlawful discrimination. Spe..
cifically, the petitioners assert that no employee should be en..
titled to relief until the Government demonstrates that he wa:s
an actual victim or the company's discriminatory practices;
that no employee who did not apply for a line-driver job
!Should be granted retroactive competitive seniority; and that
no employee should be elevated to a line-driver job ahead,
of any current line driver on layoff status. We consider each
of these contentions separately.
A
The petitioners' first contention is in substance that the
Government's burden of proof in a pattern or practice case
must be equivalent to that outlined in McDonnell Douglas v.
Green, supra. Since the Government introduced specific evidence of company discrimination against only some 40 employees, they argue that the District Court properly refused to
award retroactive seniority to the remainder of the class of
minority incumbent employees.
In McDonnell Douglas the Court considered "the order
and allocation of proof in a private, non-class action challenging employment discrimination." 411 U. S., at 800. We
held that an individual Title VII complainant must carry the
initial burden of proof by establishing a prima facie case of
racial discrimination. On the specific facts there involved,
we concluded that this burden was . met by showing that a
qualified applicant, who was a member of a racial minority
group , had unsuccessfully sought a job for which there was
a vacancy and for which the employer continued thereafter
to se~k applicants with similar qualificationS; This initia:i
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showing _justified the inference that the minority applicant
was denied an employment opportunity for reasons prohibited
by Title VII. and therefore shifted the burden to the employer
to rebut that inference by offering some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the rejectiot1. !d., at 802.
The company and union seize upon the McDonnell Douglas
pattern as the only means of establishing a prima facie case of
individual discrimination. Our decision in that case, however, did not purport to create an inflexible formulation. We
expressly noted that " [ t] he facts necessarily will va.r y in Title
VII cases, and the specification . . . of the prima facie proof
required from ·[a plaintiff] is not necessarily applicable in
every respect to differing factual situations." 411 U. S., at
802 n. 13. The importance of McDonnell Douglas lies not ill
its specification of the discrete elements of proof there required, but in its recognition of the general principle that any
Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering
evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment
decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under
the Act. '~
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. the Court applied
this principle in the context of a class action. The Franks
plaintiffs proved , to the satisfaction of a district court, that
Bowman Transportation Company "had engaged in a pattern
4

43 The McDonnell Dour/las case involved an individual complainant
seeking to prove one instance of unlawful discrimination. An employer's
isolated decision to reject an applicant who belongs to a racial minority
does not show that the rejection was racially based. Although the
McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of discrimination, it. does demand that the alleged discriminatee demonstrate at least
that his rejection did not result from the two most common legitima.te
reasons on which an employer might rely to reject a job applicant: an
absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in
the job sought. Elimination of these reasons for the refusal to hire is
sufficient , a b~e n t other €xplanation, to create an inference that the d,ecisiOlll
wa~ a d,isCJ·iminatory one.
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of racial discrimination in various company policies, including
the hiring, transfer, and discharge of employees." 424 U. S.,
at 751. Despite this showing, the trial court denied seniority
relief to certain members of the class of discriminatees because
not every individual had shown that he was qualified for the
job he sought and that a vacancy had been available. We held
that the trial court had erred in placing this burden on the
individual plaintiffs. By "demonstrating the existence of a
discriminatory hiring pa.t tern and practice" the plaintiffs had
made out a pr;i ma facie case of discrimination against the
individual class members; the burden therefore shifted to the
employer "to prove that individuals who reapply were not in
fact victims of previous hiring discrimina.tion." 424 U. S., at
772. The Franks case thus illustrates another means by which
a Title VII pla.intiff's initial burden of proof can be met. The
class there alleged a broad-based policy of employment discrimination; upon proof of that a.Uega.tion there were reasonable grounds to infer that individual hiring decisions were
made in pursuit of the discrimina.t ory policy and to require the
employer to come forth with evidence dispelling that
inference:14
"'"{The holding in Franks that proof of a discriminatory pattern and pra.ctice creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of individual relief is consistent with the manner in which presumptions are created generally. Presumptions shifting the burden of proof are often created to reflect ·judicial
evaluations of probabilities and to conform with a party's superior access
to the proof. See C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence
§§ 337, 343 (E. Cleary ed. 1972) ; James, Burdens of Proof, 47 Va. L. Rev.
51, 61 ( 1961). See also K eyes v. School Dist. No. 1. 41a U.S. 189, 208-209,
These factors were present in Franks. Although the prima facie case did
not conclusively demonstrate that all of the employer's decisions were part
of the proven discriminatory pa.ttern and practice, it did create a greater
likelihood that any single decision was a component of the overall pattern.
Moreover, the finding of a patt.ern or practice changed the position of the
('mployer to that. of a proven wrongdoer. Finally, the employer was in the
bf'St position to show why any individual employee was denied an employmrnt opportunity. Insofa r a.~ the reawns related to available vacancies
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Although not all class actions will necessarily follow the
Franks model, the nature of a pattern or practice suit brings
it squarely within our holding in Franks. The plaintiff in a
pattern or practice action is the Government, and its initial
burden is to demonstrate that unlawful discrimination has
been a regular procedure or policy followed by an employer
br group of employers. See pp. 9-10, and n. 16, supra. At the
initial, "liability" stage of a pattern or practice suit the Government is not required to offer evidence that each person for
whom it will ultimately seek relief was a victim of the employer's discriminatory policy. Its burden is to establish a
prima facie case that such a policy existed. The burden then
shifts to the employer to defeat the prima facie showing of a
pattern or practice by demonstrating that the Governmenes
proof is either inaccurate or insignificant. An employer might
show, for example, that the claimed discriminatory pattern is
a product of pre-Act hiring rather than unlawful post-Act
discrimination, ot' that during the period it is alleged to have
pursued a discriminatory policy it made too few employment
decisions to justify the inference that it had engaged in a
regular practice of discrimination. 45
or the employer's evaluation of the applicant's qualifications, t.he company's records were the most relevant items of proof. If the refusa.J to
hire was based on other factors, the employer and its agents knew best
what those factors were and the extent to which they iniluenced the
decision-making process.
45 The employer's defense must, of course, be designed to meet the prima,
facie case of the Government. We do not mean to suggest tha.t there are
any pa.rticular limits on the type of evidence an employer may use. The
point is that at the liability stage of a pattern or practice trial the focus
often wilt not be on individual hiring decisions, but on a pattern of
discriminatory decisionmaking. While a pattern might be demonstrated
by examining the discrete decisions of which it is composed, the Government's stlits have more commonly involved proof of the expected result
of a regula.rly followed discriminatory policy. In such cases the employer's
b urden is to provide a nondiscriminatory explanation ior the apparently
d iscriminatory result. See n. 20, and cases cited therein , suprc.
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If an employer fails to rebut the inference that arises fro~
the Government's prima facie case, a trial court may then
conclude that a violation has occurred and determine the ap~
propriate remedy. Without any further evidence from the
Government, a court's finding of a pattern or practice justifies
an award of prospective-relief. Such relief might take· the
form of an injunctive order against continuation of the ·discriminatory practice, an ·order that the employer keep records
of its future employment · decisions and Q.le periodic reports
with the court, o~ any other order "necessary to ensure the
full enjoyment of the rights" protected by Title VII.~ 6
When the Government seeks individual relief for the victims
of the discriminatory practice, a district court must usually
conduct additional proceedings after the liability phase of the
trial to determine the scope Of individual relief. · The peti~
tioners' contention in this case is that if the Government has
not, in the course of proving a pattern or practice, already
· brought forth specific evidence tha.t each individual was die~
criminatorily denie·d an employment opportunity, ·it must
carry that burden at the second, "remedial" stage of ttial.
·That basic contention was rejected in the Franks case. As
was true of the particular facts in Franks, and as is typical of
·Title VII pattern or practice suits, the question of individual
relief does not a.rise until it has been proved that the employer
has followed an employment policy of unlawful discrimination.
'The force of that proof does not dissipate at the remedial stage
of the trial. 'The employer cannot, therefore, claim that there
is no reason to believe that its individual employment deci~
sions were discriminatorily based; it has already been shown to
have maintained a policy of discriminatory decisionmaking.
The federal courts have freely exercised their broad equitable discre~
tion to devise prospective relief designed to assure tha.t employers found
to be in violation of § 707 (a) eliminate their discriminatory practices and
the effects therefrom. See, e. g., cases cited in n. 48, infra. In this case
prospective relief was incorporated in the parties' consent decree. See
mpra, 1.\t 3-41 n, 4:.
46
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The proof of the pattern or practice supports an inference
that any particula.r employment decision, during the period in
which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in
pursuit of that policy. The Government need only show that
an alleged individual discriminatee unsuccessfully applied for
a job H and therefore was a potential victim of the proven
discrimination. As in Franks, thf' burden then rests on the
employer to demonstrate that the individual applicant was
denied an employment opportunity for lawful reasons. See
424 U.S., at 773 n. 32.
In Part II-A, supra, we have held that the District Court
and Court of Appeals were not in error in finding that the
Government had proved a systemwide pattern and practice
of racial and ethnic discrimination on the part of the company.
On remand, therefore, every post-Act minority group applicant "8 for a line-driver position will be presumptively entitled
to relief, subject to a showing by the company that its earlier
refusal to place the applicant in a line-driver job was not
based on its policy of discrimination.40

B
The Court of Appeals' "qualification date" formula for relief did not distinguish between incumbent employees who
had applied for line-driver jobs and those who had not. The
appellate court held that where there has been a showing of
classwide discriminatory practices coupled with a seniority
system that perpetuates the effects of that discrimination, an
Nonapplicants are discussed in Part III-B, infra.
Employees who initially applied for line-driver jobs and were hired in
other jobs before the effective date of the Act, and who did not later apply
for transfer to line-driver jobs, are part of the group of nonapplicants
discussed infra.
40 Any nondiscriminatory justification offered by the company will be
'ubject to further evidence by the Government that the purported reason
for an applicant's rejection was in fact a pretext for unlawful discrirnina~
tion . McDonnell Douglas v. Green, supra, at 804-806.
47
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individual member of the class need not show that he unsuccessfully applied for the position from which the class had
been excluded. In support of its award of relief to all nonapplicants, the Court suggested that "as a practical matter ...
a member of the affected class may well have concluded that
an application for transfer to an all White position such as
[line driver] was not worth the candle." 517 F. 2d, at 320.
The company contends that a grant of retroactive seniority
to these nonapplicants is inconsistent with the make-whole
purpose of a Title VII remedy and impermissibly will require
the company to give preferential treatment to employees
solely because of their race. The thrust of the company's
contention is that unless a minority-group employee actually
applied for a line-driver job, either for initial hire or for
transfer, he has suffered no injury from whatever discrimination might have been involved in the refusal of such jobs to
those who actually applied for them.
The Government argues in response that there should be
no "immutable rule" that nonapplicants are nonvictims, and
contends that a determination whether nonapplicants have
suffered from unlawful discrimination will necessarily vary
depending on the circumstances of each particular case. The
Government further asserts that under the specific facts of
this case, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that all
qualified nonapplicants were likely victims and were therefore
presumptively entitled to relief.
The question whether seniority relief may be awarded to
nonapplica.nts was left open by our decision in Franks, since
the class at issue in that case was limited to "identifiab1e
applicants who were denied employment ... after the effective date ... of Title VII." 424 U. 8., at 750. We now
decide that an incumbent employee's failure to apply for a job
is not an inexorable bar to an award of retroactive seniority.
Individual nonapplicants must be given an opportunity to
sustain their heavy burden of proving that 'they should be
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treated as applicants and therefore are presumptively entitled
to seniority relief.
(1)
Analysis of this problem must begin with the premise that
the scope of a district court's remedial powers under Title VII
is determined by the purposes of the Act. Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, supra, at 417. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
supra, and again in Albemarle, the Court noted that a primary
objective of Title VII is prophylactic: to achieve equal employment opportunity and to remove the barriers that have
operated to favor white male employees over other employees.
401 U. S., at 429-430; 422 U. S., at 417. The prospect oi
retroactive relief for victims of discrimination serves this
purpose by providing the " 'spur or catalyst which causes
employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate
their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, -so
far as possible, the last vestiges' " of their discrimina.t ory
practices. Albemarle, supra, at 417-418. An equally important purpose of the Act is "to make persons whole for injuries
suffered on account of unlawful employment 'discrimination:"
1d., at 418. In determining the specific remedies to be
afforded, a district court is "to fashion such relief as 'the particular circumstances of a case may require to effect restitution." Franks, supra, at 764.
Thus, the Court has held that the purpose of Congress in
vesting broad equitable powers in Title VII courts was "to
make possible the 'fashion [ing] [of] the most complete relief
possible.' " and tha.t the district courts have " 'not merely the
power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as
possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as
well as bar like discrimination in the future.' " Albemarle,
.supra, at 421 , 418. More specifically, in Franks we decided
that a court must ordinarily award a seniority remedy unless
there exist reasons for denying relief "'which, if applied genL'rally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes ·of
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eradicating discriminfltion ... and making persons whole for
injuries suffered.'" 4~4 U. S., at 771, quoting Albemarle,
~upra, at 421.
Measured against these stand~ds, the company's assertion
that a person who has not actually applied for a job can
never be awarded seniority relief cannot prevail. The effects
of and the injuries suffered from discriminatory employment
practices are not always confined to those who were expressly
denied a requested employment opportunity. A consistently
enforced discriminatory policy can surely deter job applications from those who are aware of it and are unwilling to subject themselves to the humiliation of explicit and certain
rejection.
If an employer should announce his policy of discrimination by a sign reading "Whites Only'' on the hiring-office door,
his victims would not be limited to the few who ignored the
sign and subjected themselves to personal rebuffs. The same
messa.ge can be communicated to potential applicants more
subtly but just as clearly by an employer's actual practicesby his consistent discriminatory treatment of actual applicants, by the manner 'in which he publicizes vacancies, his recruitment techniques, his responses to casual or tentative
inquiries, and even by the racial or ethnic composition of that
part of his workforce from which he has discriminatorily
excluded members of minority groups. ~ 0 When a person's
The far-ranging effects of subtle discriminatory practices have not
escaped the scrutiny of the federal courts, which have provided relief
from pra.rtices designed to discourage job applica.tions from minority-group
members. See, e. g .. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 495 F. 2d
398, 418-419 (CA5) (public recruitment and advertising), rev'd on other
ground;;, 424 U. S. 747; Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d 315, 319 (CA8)
(recruitment); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F . 2d 418,
458 (CA5) (po:>ting of job vacancies and job qualification requirements);
United States v. Local No.8, JAB, S, 0. & R . / ., 315 F. Supp. 1202, 1238,
1245-1246 (WD Wash.) (dissemination of information), aff'd, 443 F . 2d
544 (CA9). While thesr measures may be effective in preventing the
deterrence of future applicants, ther a:ffotd no relief to those p.ersons w~
00
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desire for a job is not translated into a formal application
solely because of his unwillingness to engage in a futile gesture
he is as much a victim of discrimination as is he who goes
through the motions of submitting an application.
In cases decided under the National Labor Relations Act,
the model for Title VII's remedial provisions, Albemarle,
supra, at 419; Franks, supra, at 769, the National Labor Rela·
tions Board, and the courts in enforcing its orders, have recognized that the fa.ilure to submit a futile application does
not bar an award of relief to a person claiming that he was
denied employment because of union affiliation or activity.
In NLRB v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 316 U. S.
105, this Court enforced an order of the Board directing an
employer to hire, with retroactive benefits, former employees
who had not applied for newly available jobs because of the
employer's well-known policy of refusing to hire union members. See In re Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 26
N. L. R. B. 1182, 1208, 1231. Similarly, when an application
would have been no more than a vain gesture in light of employer discrimination, the Courts of Appeals have enforced
Board orders reinstating striking workers despite the failure
of individual strikers to apply for reinstatement when the
strike ended. E. g., NLRB v. Park Edge Sheridan Meats,
Inc., 323 F. 2d 956 (CA2); NLRB v. Valley Die Cast Corp.,
303 F. 2d 64 (CA6); Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., v.
NLRB, 119 F. 2d 903 (CA8). See also Piasecki Aircraft Corp.
v. NLRB, 280 F. 2d 575 (CA3); NLRB v. Anchor Rome Mills,
228 F. 2d 775 (CA5); NLRB v. liummus Co., 210 F. 2d 377
(CA5). Consistent with the NLRA model, several Courts of
Appeals have held in Title VII cases that a nonapplicant can
be a victim of unlawful discrimination entitled to make-whole
relief when an application would have been a useless act serving only to confirm a discriminatee's knowledge that the job
in til(' pa:,<t. desired jobs but were intimidated and discouraged by
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he wanted was unavailable to him. Acha v. Beame, 531 F.-2d
648, 656 (CA2); Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F. 2d
226, 231-233 (CA4); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F. 2d
441, 451 (CA5); United States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 479
F. 2d 354, 369 (CA8).
The denial of Title VII relief on the ground that the claimant had not formally applied for the· job could exclude from
the Act's coverage the victims of the most entrenched forms
of discrimination. Victims of gross and pervasive discrimination could be denied relief precisely because the unlawful practices had been so successful as totally to deter job applica. tions from members of minority groups. A per se prohibition
of relief to nonapplicants could thus put beyond the reach
of equity the most invidious effects of employment discrimination-those that extend to the very hope of self-realization.
Such a pe'r se limitation on the equitable powers granted to
courts by Title VII would be manifestly inconsistent with the
"historic purpose of equity to 'secur[e] complete justice''' and
with the duty of courts in -Title VII cases "'to render a decree
which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory
effects of the past.'" Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody; supra,
a.t 418.
(2)
To conclude that a person's failure to submit an application
for a job does not inevitably and forever foreclose his entitlement to seniority relief under Title VII is a far cry, however,
from holding that nonapplicants are always entitled to such
relief. A nonapplicant must show that he was a potential
victim of unlawful discrimina.tion. Because he is necessarily
claiming that he was deterred from applying for the job by the
employer's discriminatory practices, his is the not always easy
burden of proving that he would have applied for the job had
it not been for those practices. Cf. Mt. Healthy City School
District Board of Education v. Doyle, U. S. - , - .
When this burden is met, the nonapplicant is in a position
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to that of an applicant and is entitled to the
presumption discussed in Part III-A, supra.
The Government contends that the evidence it presented
in this case at the liability stage of the trial identified all nonapplicants as victims of unlawful discrimination "with a fair
degree of specificity," and that the Court of Appeals' determination that qualified nonapplicants are presumptively en't itled to an award of seniority should accordingly be affirmed.
In support of this contention the Government cites its proot
of an extended pattern and practice of discrimination as evidence that an application from a minority employee for ·a
line-driver job would have been a vain and useless act. It
"further argues that since the class of nonapplicant discriminatees is limited to incumbent employees, it is likely that
every class member was aware of the futility of seeking a liMdriver job and was therefore deterred from filing both an ini•
tial and a followup application. 51
•51 The limitation to incumbent employees is also said to serve the sali'l'h
function that actua.I job applications served in Franks: providing a mean
of distinguishing members of the excluded minority group from minority
members of the public at large. While it is true that. incumbency in
this ca,o;e and actual applications in Franks both serve to narrow wha.t
might otherwise be an impossible task, the status of nonincumbent
applicant and nona.pplicant incumbent differ substantially. The refused
applicants in Franks had been denied an opportunity they clearly sought,
and the only issue to be resolved was whether the denial was pursuant ·to
a proven discriminatory practice. Resolution of the nonapplicant's claim,
however, requires two distinct determinations: that he would have a.pplied
but for discrimination and that he would have been discriminaturily
rejected had he applied. The mere fact of incumbency does not resolve
the first issue, although it may tend to support a nonapplicant's clajm to
t.he extent. that it. ~ hows he was willing and competent to work as a driver,
t hat he was familiar with the tnsks of line drivers, etc. An incumbent's
claim that he would ha.ve applied for a line-driver job would certainly be
more superficially plausible than a similar claim by a member of the general
public who may nrver have worked in the trucking industry or hea.'td of
'1'. I. .M. E.-D . C. prior to suit.
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We cannot agree. While the scope and duration of the
company's qiscriminatory policy can leave little doubt that
the futility of seeking line-driver jobs was communicated to
the company's minority employees, that in itself is insufficient.
The known prospect of discriminatory rejection shows only
that employees who wanted line-driving jobs may ha.ve been
deterred from applying for them. It does not show which of
the nonapplicants actually wanted such jobs, or which possessed the requisite qualifications.~
There are differences
between city and line-driving jobs, 5 3 for example, but · the
rlesirfability of the latter is not so self-evident as to warrant
a co~lusion that all employees would prefer to be line drivers
if given a free choice."' Indeed, a substantial number of white
2

r." Inasmuch as the purpose of the nonapplicant!s burden of proof will h<'
to establish that his status is similar to that of the applicant, he mu:;t brar
thr burden of coming forward with the basic information about his qualificat.ion:; that he would ha.v e presented in an application. As in Franks,
and in accord with Part III-A, supra, the burden then will be on the
employer to show that. the nonapplicant was neverthele:;s not a victim of
discrimin,ntion. For example, the employer might show that there were
ot.her, more qualified persons who would have been chosen for a particular
vacancy, or that the nonapplicant's stated qunlifica.tions were insufficirnt.
See Franks, supra, at 773 n. 32.
5 a Of the employees for whom the Government sought transfer to linedriving jobs, nearly one-third held city-driver positions.
~' The company's line drivers generally earned more annually than its
city drivrrs, but the difference varied from under $1,000 to more than $5,000
depending on the terminal and the year. In 1971 city drivers at two
Ca lifornia terminals, " LOS" and San Francisco, earned substantially more
f han the line drivers at those terminals. In addition to earnings, line
drivers have the advantage of not being required to load and unload their
truc·ks. City drivers, however, have regular working hours, are not
rrquirrd to spend extended periods away from home and family, and do
not face the haza rds of long-distn nce driving at high speeds. As the Govf'rnmrnt acknowledged at argumrnt, the jobs are in some sense " pa.rallel"~ome may prefer one job and some may prefer Mother.
The District Court found generally that line-driver jobs "are considered
~ he mo;st desirable of the driving jobs." That finding is not challenged
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city drivers who were not subjected to the company's dis-criminatory practices were apparently content to retain their
city jobs. 55
In order to fill this evidentiary gap, the Government argues
that a nonapplicant's current willingness to transfer into a
line-driver position confirms his past desire for the job. An
employee's response to the court-ordered notice of his entitlement to relief 50 demonstrates, according to this argument, that
the employee would have sought a line-driver job when he
first became qualified to fill one, but for his knowledge of the
company's discriminatory policy.
here, and we see no reason to disturb it. We observe only that the
differences between city and line driving were not suc·h that it can be said
With confidence that all minority employees free from the threat of discriminatory treatment. would have chosen to give up city for line driving.
MIn addition to the futility of applicat,ion, the Court. of Appeals seem;; to'
ha.ve relied on the minority employees' accumulated seniority in nonlinedriver positions in concluding that nonapplicants had been unlawfully deterred from applying. See 517 F. 2d, at 318,320. The Government adopts
that theory here, arguing that a nonapplicant who has a.ccrued time a.t fhe
company would be unlikely to ha.ve applied for transfer because he would
have had to forfeit all of his competitive seniority and the job securitythat went with it. In view of our conclusion in 'Part II_;B, supra, this·
argument detracts from rather than supports a nonapplicant's entitlement·
to relief. To fhe extent that a.n incumbent was deterred from applying ·by
his desire to retain his competitive seniority, he simply did not want a
line-driver job requiring him to start at t.he bottom of the "board." Those·
nonapplicants who did not apply for tnmsfer because t.hey were unwilling
to give up their previously acquired seniority suffered only from a lawful
deterrent imposed on all employees regardless of raoe or ethnicity. The
nonapplicant's remedy in such cases is limited solely to the relief, if any,
to which he may be entitled because of the discrimina.tion he encountered
at a time when he wanted to take a starting line-driver job.
50 The District Court's final order required that the company notify each
minority employee of the relief he was entitled to claim. The employee was
then required to indicate, within 60 days, his willingness to accept the relief.
Under the decision of the Court of Appeals, the tcl.ief would. be ctuali.t\c.;a..~
~io:t~ d~w .~eniorit.y.
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This assumption falls short of satisfying the appropriate
burden of proof. An employee who transfers into a linedriver unit is normally placed a.t the bottom of the seniority
"board." He is thus in jeopardy of being laid off and must,
at best, suffer through an initial period of bidding on only the
least desirable runs. See supra, at 15-16, and n. 25. Nonapplicants who chose to accept the appellate court's post hoc
invitation, however, would enter the line-driving unit with
retroactive seniority dating from the time they were first
qualified. A willingness to accept the job security and bidding power afforded by retroactive seniority says little about
what choice an employee would have made had he previously
been given the opportunity freely to choose a starting linedriver job. While it may be true that many of the nonapplicant employees desired and would have applied for line-driver
jobs but for their knowledge of the company's policy of discrimination, the Government must carry its burden of proof,
with respect to each specific individual, at the remedial hearings to be conducted by the District Court on remand.r. 7

c
The task remaining for the District Court on remand
will not be a simple one. Initially, the court will have to
make a substantial number of individual determinations in
deciding which of the minority employees were actual victims
of the company's discriminatory practices. After the victims
have been identified, the cour.t must, as nearly as possible,
" 'recreate the conditions and relationships that would have
been had there been no' " unlawful discrimination. Franks,
supra, 424 U. S., at 769. This process of recrea.t ing the
~ 7 WhilP the mo::;t convincing proof would be some overt act such as a
pre-Act application for a line-driver job, the District Court may find
evidence of an E'mployee's informal inquiry, expression of interest, or even
unexpressed desire credible and convincing. The question is a factual one
for determination by the trial judge.
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past will necessarily involve a degree of approxima.tion and
impreciSIOn. Because the class of victims may include some
who did not apply for line-driver jobs as well as those who
did, and because more than one minority employee ma,y have
been denied each line-driver vacancy, the court will be required
to balance the equities of each minority employee's situation
in allocating the limited number of vacancies that were
discriminatorily refused to class members.
Moreover, after the victims have been identified and their
rightful place determined, the District Court will again be
face d with the delicate task of adjusting the remedial interests
of discriminatees and the legitimate expectations of other
employees innocent of any wrongdoing. In the prejudgment
consen.t decree, see supra, at 3-4, n. 4, the company and the
Government agreed that minority employees would assume
line-driver positions that had been discriminatorily denied to
them by exercising a first-priority right to job vacancies at the
company's terminals. The decree did not determine what
constituted a vacancy, but in its final order the trial court
defined "vacancy" to exclude a.ny position that became available while there were laid-off employees awaiting an opportunity to return to work. Employees on layoff were given a
preference to fill whatever openings might occur at their terminals during a three-year period after they were laid. off.~
8

6 8 Paragraph 9 (a) of the trial court's final order provided:
"A 'vacancy' as used in this Order, shall include any opening which is
caused by the transfer or promotion to a position outside the bargaining
unit, death, resignation or final discharge of an incumbent, or by an
increase in operations or business where, ordinarily, additional employees
would be put to work. A vacancy shall not exist where there are laid
off employres on the seniority roster where the opening occurs. Such laid
off employ€es shall have a preference to fill such laid off positions when
tl1ese again become open without competition from the individuals granted
relief in t.his ca.~e .
''However, if such layoff continues for three consecutive years the position
,... ill bP dermed as 'vacant' with the right of all concerned to compete for
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The Court of Appeals rejected the preference and held that all
but "purely temporary" vacancies were to be filled according
to an employee's seniority, whether as a member of the class
..

the position, using their respective seniority dates, including those provided
for in tills Order."
·
' The trial court's use of a. three-year recall right is apparently derived
from provisions in t.he collective-bargaining agreements. Article 5 of the,
~ationa.l Master Freight Agreement ("Nl\t1FA' 1) establishes the seniority
fights of employees covefed by the Agreement. Under Art. 5, "[s]eniority
rights for employees shall prevail . . . . Seniority shall be broken bY.
dischargr, voluntary quit, [or] more than a. three (3) yea.r layoff." §f.
A;; is evident, the three-year layoff provision in the Master Agreeme;t
determines only when an .employee shall
, lose dll of ,. his accumulated
·en iority; , , it does not determine either lthe
order of layoff or t.he order of
i
recall. Subject to other terms of t.he Master Agreement, NMFA Art. 2,
§ 2, " the extent to which seniority shall be applied as well as t.he method~
and procedures of such application" are left to the Supplemental AgreeM
ments. /d., § 1. The Southern Conference Area .pver-the-Road Supplemental Agreement, covering line drivel-s in the Southern Conference, also
provides for a complete loss of seniority rights after a three~year layoff,
Art. 42, § 1, and further provides that in the event of a reduction in force
"tlw last employee hired shall be llljd off first imd when the force is agajn
Increased, the employees are to be returned to work in the reverse order
in which they were laid off," id., § 3.
This order of layoff and recall, however, is limited by the Master Agreement in at least. two ;;ituat.ion;; involving an influx of employees from outside [~ terJll.inal. NMFA Art. 5, §3 (a)(1) (merger with a solvent
company), § 5 (b) (2) (branch closing with transfer of operation;; to
another branch). In these <:.'lses the Master Agreement provides for
''doveta iling" the seniority rights of active and laid-off employees at the
two f:tcilitie::; involved. Ibid .; see also NMFA Art. 15 (honoring Military
Selrrtive SPrvice Act of 1967). The Master Agreement also recognize:; that
''que:;tion::; of •tcerual, interpretation or application of seniority rights ma.y
ari::;e which arc not covered by the general rules set forth," and provides a
procrdure for rr:;olution of unforeseen seniority problems. NMFA Art. 5,
§ 7. Presumably § 7 applies to persons claiming discriminatory denial of
job::; and seniori ty in violation of Art. 38, which prohibits discrimination in
hiring a.s well as classification of employees so as to deprive them of
emp loyment opportunities on account of race or national origin. See
.wpra, at 21 n. 29. The Dist rict Court apparently c;lid not consider these
l>rovi~ion · when it determined the recall rights of employees on la.yoff,

.
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discriminated against or as an incumbent line driver on layoff.
517 F. 2d, at 322-323.
As their final contention concerning the remedy, the company and the union argue that the trial court correctly made
the adjustment between the competing interests of discriminatees and other employees by granting a preference to laidoff employees, and that the Court of Appeals erred in disturbing it. The petitioners therefore urge the reinstatement of
that part of the trial court's final order pertaining to the rate
at which victims will assume their rightful places in the linedriver hierarchy." 0
Although not directly controlled by the Act,00 the extent to
which the legitimate expectations of nonvictim employees
should determine when victims a.r e restored to their rightful
place is limited by basic principles of equity. In devising and
implementing remedies under Title VII, no less than in for:;u In their briefs the petitioners also challenge the trial court's modification of the interterminal transfer rights of line drivers in the Southern
Conference. See supra, at 6-7, n. 10. This question was not presented in
either petition for certiorari and therefore is not properly before us.
Rules of the Supreme Court 23.1 (c). Our disposition of the claim that
is presented, however, will permit the trial court to reconsider any part
of the bala.nce it struck in dealing with this issue.
60 The petitioners argue that to permit a victim of discrimination to use
his rightful place seniority to bid on a line-driver job before the recall of
all employees on layoff would amount to a racial or ethnic preference in
violation of § 703 (j) of the Act. Section 703 (j) provides no support for
t his a.rgument.. It. provides only that Title VII does not require an
employer to gra nt preferential treatment to any group in order to rectify
an imbalance between the composition of the employer's workforce and the
rru1ke-up of the population at, large. See supra, at 13 n. 20. To allow
identifiable victims of unlawful discrimination to participate in a layoff
recall is not· t.he kind of " preference" prohibited by § 703 (j) . If a
discriminatee i;; ultimately allowed to secure a position before a laid-off line
driver, a, question we do noi, now decide, he will do so because of the
bidding power inherent in his rightful place seniority, and not because of a
preference based on race. See Franks, supra, at 792 (PowELL, J., concurrin"" in vart and dissenting in part).

75-636 & 75-672-0PINION

48

TEAMSTERS v. UNITED STATES

mulating any equitable decree, a court must draw on the
''qualities of mercy and practicality [that] have made equity
the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between
the public interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321,
329-330. Cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177,
195-196, modifying and remanding In re Phelps Dodge Corp.,
19 N. L. R. B. 547, 600; Franks, supra, at 798-799. Especially when immediate implementation of an equitable remedy
threatens to impinge upon the expectations of innocent
parties, the courts must "look to the practical realities and
necessities inescapably involved in reconciling competing
interests.'a in order to determine the "special blend of what is
necessary~ what is fair, and what is workable.'' Lemon v.
Kurtzmarj,, 411 U.S. 192, 201, 200 (opinion of BuRGER. C. J.).
Because of the limited facts now in the record, we decline
to strike the baJance in this Court. 'The District Court did
not explain why it subordinated the interests of class members
to the contractual recall expectations of other employees on
layoff. When it made that determination, however, it was
considering a class of more than 400 minority employees, all
of whom had been granted some preference in filling linedriver vaca.ncies. The overwhelming majority of these were
in the District Court's subclass three. composed of those
employees with respect to whom neither the Government nor
the company had presented any specific evidence on the question of unlawful discrimination. Thus, when the court considered the problem of what constituted a line-driver "vacancy"
to be offered to class members, it ma.y have been influenced
by the relatively small number of proven victims and the
large number of minority employees about whom it had no
information. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals redefined "vacancy" in the context of what it believed to be a class
of more than 400 employees who had actually suffered from
cliscfimination at the behest of both the company and the
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union, and its determination may well ha.ve been influenced
by that understanding. For the reasons discussed in this
opinion , neither court's concept was completely valid.
After the evidentiary hearings to be conducted on remand,
both the size and the composition of the class of minority
employees entitled to relief will be altered substantially.
Until those hearings have been conducted and both the number of identifiable victims and the consequent extent of necessary relief have been determined, it is not possible to evaluate
abstract claims concerning the equitable balance that should
be struck between the statutory rights of victims and the
contractual rights of nonvictim employees. That determination is best left, in the first instance, to the sound equitable
discretion of the trial court. 0 1 See Franks v. Bowman, supra,
at 779; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, at 416. We
observe only that when the court exercises its discretion in
dealing with the problem of laid-off employees in light of the
facts developed at the hearings on remand, it should clearly
state its reasons so that meaningful review may be had on
appeal. See Fra.nks, supra, at 774; Albemarle Paper Co . v..
Moody , supra, at 421 n. 14.
For all the reasons we have discussed, the judgment of the
Court of Appea.ls is vacated, and the case is remanded to the
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.

Other factors, such as the number of victims, the number of nonvirtim employees affected and the alternatives available to them, and the
economic circumstance:; of the industry may also be relevant in the exercise of the District Court 's discretion. See Franks, supra, 424 U. S., at
796 n, 17 (PowELL, J ., concurring and dissenting) .
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